Words, Ideas, and Things

Monthly Picks

2012-03-01T17:11:00.000-06:00

On the first day of each month, I will be posting about new papers I've found interesting in Philosophy or Library & Information Science. I'll try to make sure at least one is accessible to everyone.

Brigandt, I. (forthcoming). Intelligent design and the nature of science: Philosophical and pedagogical points. In Kampourakis, K. (ed.), Philosophical Issues in Biology Education. Springer.
[link] freely accessible

Giubilini, A, & Minerva, F. (forthcoming). After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live? Journal of Medical Ethics.
[link]

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 8)

2012-02-29T04:28:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter Five - Continued

Historical Biblical Criticism

In case anyone still thinks this book is about theism and science, the remainder of Chapter Five is about the clash between (1) assuming the Christian Bible was authored by God, and (2) examining the Bible to see how it fares apart from that assumption. Plantinga gives no notice of the Qur'an, the Book of Mormon, or the Jewish scriptures considered apart from Christian creeds.

And remember: this chapter is supposed to be about real-but-superficial conflicts between religion (or at least Plantinga's religion) and science. Just as he couldn't make up his mind whether evolutionary psychology is at odds with Christian belief, we'll see that his analysis of historical Biblical criticism is also needlessly inconsistent.

Traditional Biblical Commentary

The traditional (i.e. religious) approach to reading the Bible is to start from the assumption that God is the principal author of the whole thing. No book can ever contradict another. Each book is an authoritative lens through which to interpret the other books. "Commentary" to the exclusion of "criticism" is key, as Plantinga illustrates by comparing Biblical and Kantian studies:

"In Kant scholarship, for example, one tries to figure out what Kant means in a given passage [....] Having accomplished this task (at least to one’s own satisfaction), one quite properly goes on to ask whether Kant’s views are true or plausible, or whether he has made a good case for them. This last step is not appropriate in traditional Biblical commentary. Once you have established, as you think, what God is teaching in a given passage, what he is proposing for our belief, that settles the matter. You do not go on to ask whether it is true, or plausible, or whether a good case for it has been made."¹

Plantinga then describes two "critical" approaches to the Bible.

Troeltschian Historical Biblical Criticism — On the assumption that there aren't really any miracles and God didn't really inspire the Bible, what can be salvaged, historically, from the Bible?

Duhemian Historical Biblical Criticism — Without assuming Christian beliefs are true (or false!), what can historians from a variety of religious backgrounds agree is historical in the Bible?

I expected Plantinga to endorse Duhemian HBC as a worthwhile project in the scientific spirit of doing what can be done with public evidence interpreted across differing worldviews. He could have used the same pattern from earlier in this book:

Genuine Science (Duhemian HBC) + Philosophical Naturalism -> Alleged Science (Troeltschian HBC)

Instead, he expresses disappointment at how "monumentally minimal" the results of Duhemian HBC are, compared to Christian belief. Historical Biblical Criticism as a whole gives "negative results" from a Christian perspective. "[T]here are no miracles; there is no resurrection, and certainly nothing to suggest that Jesus was the incarnate second person of the Trinity or even that he was son of God in any unique sense."²

Why count a failure to affirm Christianity as a negative rather than a neutral result? If his goal in the first half of this book is to emphasize compatibility, he's making the job needlessly hard on himself. Nor is it great advertising to play up unquestioning "commentary" as the only appropriate way to approach his holy book.

1. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 154
2. ibid. p. 160

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 7)

2012-02-25T05:53:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter Five

"My overall claim in this book: there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science and theistic religion, but superficial concord and deep conflict between science and naturalism."

That was the first sentence of this book's Preface. Why bring it up now? Because the first four chapters covered the unmentioned "alleged conflict" part of the book. Evolution and the idea of scientific laws don't even qualify as "superficial conflict" by Plantinga's count.

"Of course there is conflict between the widely accepted idea that natural selection, or evolution more generally, is unguided; but that claim, though widely accepted, is no part of current science. It is instead a metaphysical or theological add-on; an assumption that in no way enjoys the authority of science."¹

Chapter Five covers ideas which Plantinga believes are genuinely part of current science and genuinely (though superficially) in conflict with theism.

Evolutionary Psychology

While it might be okay to explain the tiger's stripes in terms of natural selection, it's problematic to extend "Darwinian" explanations to human psychology. In particular, to explain religion and morality as the products of natural selection.

One paper by Herbert Simon really pushes Plantinga's buttons by hypothesizing that a predisposition toward altruism (doing good without expectation of personal benefit) may result from natural selection favoring individuals with a moderate amount of "docility," i.e. the tendency to just accept what society teaches. On average, Simon claims, uncritically accepting the teachings of society helps individuals pass on their genes.

"In this scheme of things, altruism is a relative matter, for only a subset of the altruist's behaviors reduce fitness. Moreover, the altruist is rewarded, in advance, by the 'gift' of docility; altruism is simply a by-product of docility. Docile persons are more than compensated for their altruism by the knowledge and skills they acquire, and moreover not all proper behaviors are sacrificial."²

Why couldn't a self-interested individual just accept the parts of societal wisdom which are personally beneficial and reject the parts which aren't? Simon's answer is that it's often difficult (or impossible) for an individual to figure out which is which:

"Belief in large numbers of facts and propositions that we have not had the opportunity or ability to evaluate independently is basic to the human condition, a simple corollary of the boundedness of human rationality in the face of a complex world."³

Plantinga finds it thoroughly insulting to suggest that the altruistic behavior of "a Mother Teresa or a Thomas Aquinas" comes from their inability to sort out the costs and benefits of social suggestibility and notice they're on the losing side of the gene passing game. Frankly, I think Plantinga is confused about the nature of Simon's paper...and possibly about the language of genetic "fitness" in general. Yes, scientists use value terms to describe genes as tending to encourage or discourage reproduction in a given context. This is meant as a convenient way of talking, not as a social-Darwinist style commentary on human ethics. Of course there's a special danger of making this mistake when a paper discusses human ethics (whatever their contents might be) as arising from what we might call "gene values."

A few pages later, Plantinga writes on a somewhat different topic:

"[God] could have brought it about that our cognitive faculties evolve by natural selection, and evolve in such a way that it is natural for us to form beliefs about the supernatural in general and God himself in particular. Finding a 'natural' origin for religion in no way discredits it."⁴

Why not apply this thinking to ethics? Plantinga could allow for the possibility that altruistic tendencies have evolutionary roots, and still give God the credit. He could draw the same distinction he did in earlier chapters between natural selection and naturalistic selection, where the latter carries the additional burden of philosophical naturalism. Even if Simon himself were antagonistic to theism, I see no reason why Plantinga couldn't separate the man from the field as he does with Richard Dawkins and evolutionary theory in general.

Evolutionary Origins of Religious Belief

Pretty much the same issue as above, except religion is viewed as the byproduct of naturally selected traits. This time, he does draw a distinction between natural origins and naturalistic philosophy. More surprisingly, he goes back to the idea of evolved ethics and now claims it isn't a problem! Then, he writes of both evolved ethics and evolved religious beliefs:

"These theories, therefore, do conflict with religion, but in a merely superficial way. They conflict with religion in the way in which a theory that results from conjoining Newtonian physics with atheism does: that theory conflicts with religion, all right, but it certainly doesn’t constitute a serious religion-science conflict."⁵

Argh! His cases of no-real-conflict and real-but-superficial-conflict turn out to be equivalent.

Genuine Science + Philosophical Naturalism -> Alleged Science

In the first four chapters, he concluded "no real conflict" because he pointed to Genuine Science before the philosophical add-on. In this chapter, he's using the same structure but pointing at Alleged Science to conclude "superficial conflict." I can't interpret this charitably because he explicitly mentioned Newtonian physics on the first page of the chapter, then wrote: "There are other areas of science, however, where the appearance of conflict is matched by reality."⁶ Evolutionary psychology was first on the list that followed.

I hope a second-edition editor encourages him to make up his mind and consolidate these sections under one characterization.

1. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 129

2. Simon, H.A. (1990, December 21). A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism. Science 250, p. 1667. [pdf]

3. ibid. p. 1666
4. Plantinga (2011). p. 140
5. ibid. p. 143
6. ibid. p. 130

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 6)

2012-02-21T23:18:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter Three

"No Miracles" Zone

Shifting away from the discussion of evolution, Plantinga next addresses claims that modern people can't go around thinking it's possible for a supernatural God to act in the natural world (how quaint!). I wasn't satisfied with Plantinga's example, so I went and found this gem from Michael Martin:

"Consider science. It presupposes the uniformity of nature: that natural laws govern the world and that there are no violations of such laws. However, Christianity presupposes that there are miracles in which natural laws are violated. Since to make sense of science one must assume that there are no miracles, one must further assume that Christianity is false. To put this in a different way: Miracles by definition are violations of laws of nature that can only be explained by God's intervention. Yet science assumes that insofar as an event as an explanation at all, it has a scientific explanation--one that does not presuppose God. Thus, doing, science assumes that the Christian world view is false."¹

Put another way, there's something wrong with a person who helps herself to scientific explanations and still wants to appeal to miracles at times. Notice how this goes beyond the more typical claim that scientific explanations must be natural explanations; you can't commit adultery by entertaining supernatural explanations on the side and expect science to let you back in the house.

Plantinga responds by characterizing scientific laws as descriptions of "how things go when the universe is causally closed, subject to no outside causal influence. They don’t purport to tell us how things always go; they tell us, instead, how things go when no agency outside the universe acts in it."² We can imagine a little footnote anytime a scientifically discovered regularity is mentioned:

* Valid when God isn't messing with nature.

I'm not quite happy with this philosophy of science, but I have to admit it's a pretty standard way of handling the problem.

Everything... All the Time

On Plantinga's view of classical theism, God does a lot more than occasionally intervene. God continually and actively sustains the natural world.

"[A]part from that sustaining, supporting activity, the world would simply fail to exist. Some, including Thomas Aquinas, go even further: every causal transaction that takes place is such that God performs a special act of concurring with it; without that divine concurrence, no causal transaction could take place." ³

This changes the footnote for scientific discoveries from "valid when God isn't messing with nature" to "valid when God is messing with nature in his more usual ways." Continual divine activity is what makes the natural world function at all.

Whatever the metaphysical situation may be, I view scientific laws as descriptions of how things go, as revealed by scientific method. Laws don't mention God's sustaining power or God's special interventions because these are "pluralities" scientists have not needed in order to describe the phenomena open to public view. If you want to believe God is behind Newton's law of gravitation, that's fine with me. But let's not put a metaphysical footnote on it.

Chapter Four

Masters of the Universe

Before the twentieth century, it was common to picture the universe as a whole behaving like it does at roughly human scales and human speeds. If, like Laplace's demon, you could know the current state of the clockwork universe, then — in theory — you could calculate future events perfectly. Or you could calculate backwards to reveal all the details of the past. Relativity and quantum physics made things more complicated, or at any rate more interesting.

For people of certain philosophical temperaments, the problem of divine action in the world remains a concern. Plantinga points out the Divine Action Project as a recent example.

"It would be fair to say, I think, that the main problem for the project is to find an account of divine action in the world—action beyond creation and conservation—that doesn’t involve God’s intervening in the world."⁴

Plantinga himself has no issue with the idea of God sometimes taking special action that disrupts the usual operation of the world, but he offers "a way around this problem" for those who do consider it a problem. On the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber view of quantum physics, wave function collapses can happen spontaneously. As far as nature is concerned, something is going to happen...but what exactly will happen is left open. Plantinga offers a divine collapse-causation (DCC) model where God is deciding how things turn out when wave functions collapse.

"Furthermore, if, as one assumes, the macroscopic physical world supervenes on the microscopic, God could thus control what happens at the macroscopic level by causing the right microscopic collapse-outcomes. In this way God can exercise providential guidance over cosmic history; he might in this way guide the course of evolutionary history by causing the right mutations to arise at the right time and preserving the forms of life that lead to the results he intends. In this way he might also guide human history. He could do this without in any way 'violating' the created natures of the things he has created."⁵

He goes on to suggest at least some of the Bible's miracles could be chalked up to extremely unlikely outcomes of quantum physics. Even more exciting: maybe human beings possess this same special ability as part of our "image of God"! Our non-physical minds might be communicating our free choices to our brains. "Here we see a pleasing unity of divine and human free action, as well as a more specific suggestion as to what mechanism these actions actually involve."⁶

Before Christians get too carried away by this theological breakthrough, Plantinga has some words of caution:

"The sensible religious believer is not obliged to trim her sails to the current scientific breeze on this topic, revising her belief on the topic every time science changes its mind; if the most satisfactory Christian (or theistic) theology endorses the idea that the universe did indeed have a beginning, the believer has a perfect right to accept that thought. Something similar goes for the Christian believer and special divine action.

But where Christian or theistic belief and current science can fit nicely together, as with DCC, so much the better; and if one of the current versions of QM fits better with such belief than the others, that’s a perfectly proper reason to accept that version."⁷

Isn't accepting DCC a case of being significantly more flighty than keeping up with mainstream science? This seems like picking through oddball versions of periphery scientific suggestions for a way to make peace with a fairly obscure theology of not-intervening-when-intervening.

1. From Michael Martin's paper "The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God" which sparked a lively debate with John M. Frame. This paper is a kind of parody, so I'm not sure Martin would assert the same ideas in another context.
2. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 79
3. ibid. p. 67
4. ibid. p. 97
5. ibid. p. 116
6. ibid. p. 120
7. ibid. p. 121

On "The Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Ethics"

2012-02-20T00:28:00.000-06:00

"Believers can argue that morality requires God all they want, but until they can provide some legitimate reasoning or evidence for it, they do not deserve the benefit of a doubt. Who's to say that a universe without God could have no morality? We aren't 100% sure that this one has a god, and yet many of us seem to have no difficulty in making moral decisions. Being good without God is not a problem."¹

While I agree with Taylor Carr that better reasoning or evidence is needed to make divine command ethics a convincing position for those of us who don't subscribe to it already, I think he goes one step too far when he raises what is known as the epistemological objection (i.e. the knowledge-based objection). Essentially:

How could morality require God, if knowing right from wrong doesn't require knowing God?

The not-entirely-absent moral sense of atheists is supposed to demonstrate God's irrelevance to morality. But does this objection work? My short answer is: no, because it's possible for our moral sense to rely on God somehow, without us realizing it.

Knowing vs. Knowing How One Knows

In case my short answer didn't totally satisfy you, let's take a look at Glenn People's recent paper "The Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Ethics." Or, if you're more of an auditory learner, I can recommend his podcast episode on the topic.

First, let's see how he characterizes the basic epistemological objection.

"The underlying argument is as follows, where Q is the act of knowing moral facts and C is anything.
If C is the cause of our ability to Q, then person p cannot Q unless he believes in C.
p does Q, and does not believe in C.
Therefore C is not the cause of our ability to Q."²

As an example, take Aristotle's views on the heart and the brain:

"Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure, and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart, and find in it their ultimate termination. This, indeed, reason would lead us to expect. For the source must, whenever possible, be one; and, of all places, the best suited for a source is the centre."

"The brain, then, tempers the heat and seething of the heart."³

So...if [electrical activity in the brain] is the cause of our ability to [think and feel], then [Aristotle] cannot [think and feel] unless he believes in [electrical activity in the brain]. Yet Aristotle could think and feel even though he didn't believe his brain contained any such activity. (1) is false. It stays false when filled in this way:

If [God] is the cause of our ability to [know right from wrong], then [Richard Dawkins] cannot [know right from wrong] unless he believes in [God].
[Richard Dawkins] does [know right from wrong], and does not believe in [God].
Therefore [God] is not the cause of our ability to [know right from wrong].

Since (1) is false, (3) is an invalid conclusion to draw from (2).

31 Flavors

What counts as a "command" in divine command ethics? There isn't a consensus here. At one extreme, divine commands might be aspects of God's unexpressed private will. At the other extreme, a divine command might be a literally voiced, undoubtedly divine imperative given directly to the individuals expected to follow it. Let's label these extremes secret and explicit respectively.

If divine commands were secret, the epistemological objection would be quite strong since there would be absolutely no reason for our moral sense to bear a relationship with God's will. If divine commands were explicit, we'd all know it! Philosophers who actually subscribe to divine command ethics are at various points in between. They hold that God expresses his will somehow, but not as spoken commands to each person.

Here's a moderate form of divine command ethics:

"Consider for example the possibility that God conveys the “sign” to people regarding some act (let’s pick murder) via a proper function of the human conscience. Nobody needs to know what conscience is, how we got one, or that God uses it to ensure that we have some true beliefs in order for them to know, via conscience, that murder is wrong (assuming, of course, that there were a conscience with proper functions)."⁴

So God does express his will, not as a verbal command, but in the design of our consciences. Whether we believe in God or not, we have an innate sense of moral outrage when we witness certain kinds of killing.

I don't think this is how the world actually works, but it's not easily disproven.

Oh, Academics!

Up to this point, I haven't actually addressed the core of Peoples' paper. He's writing in response to a paper by Wes Morriston called "The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers" who is himself writing in response to a book and some papers of Robert Merrihew Adams.

Adams is well known for developing a form (or two or three) of divine command ethics intended to steer a respectable path between the extremes of secret and explicit.

Morriston seizes on the most explicit-leaning aspect of Adams' work, and applies an epistemological objection to it.

Peoples responds to Morriston's paper by (1) pointing out that Morriston's objection is so narrowly aimed that it doesn't threaten divine command ethics in general, and (2) accusing Morriston of misconstruing Adams' position anyway.

I have no interest in taking sides on the interpretation of Adams' divine command ethics. It's a minor battle which isn't going to sway the campaign. But then...that does appear to be Peoples' main point.

1. Carr, T. (2009, July 24). Being good without God. GodlessHaven. Retrieved February 19, 2011, from http://www.godlesshaven.com/articles/good-without-god.html
2. Peoples, G. (2011). The epistemological objection to divine command ethics. Philosophia Christi 13(2). La Mirada, CA:Biola University. p. 389
3. Aristotle, On the parts of animals. Heart quote from Book III. Brain quote from Book II. Peoples used a different example, so blame any defects on me.
4. Peoples, G. (2011).

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 5)

2012-02-17T01:59:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter Two - Continued

Draper's Evidential Argument

Dawkins and Dennett are meant to represent the position that evolutionary theory has ruled out theism, or at least traditional Abrahamic theism, or at least Plantinga's interpretation of God creating humankind in his image. Paul Draper will now represent the position that evolution at least constitutes significant evidence against theism.

Without getting into Draper's supporting arguments,¹ the basic idea is that we would be relatively less likely to discover that our origins are evolutionary in a world created by God than we would in a fully natural world. The discovery that our origins actually are evolutionary, therefore, constitutes some evidence that we live in a fully natural world. You may recognize this as a form of inference to the best explanation.

Suppose Draper is correct and the fact of evolution counts in favor of naturalism. Plantinga counters by saying that other facts weigh in favor of theism, e.g. that there are intelligent beings on Earth with a moral sense who worship God. Such beings would be relatively more likely to exist if there is a God who wanted them to exist, than in any scenario without a similar guarantee. At this point, I would argue that the facts of moral and religious diversity would be odd in a world with one God who wants a unity of morals and religion...to which Plantinga might play the Calvinism card. And so it goes.

Remember Plantinga's theology about theism being necessarily true? He also complains about Draper assuming theism is a contingent matter. (I really need to write a post on this topic sometime.)

Science Education

"A solid majority of Americans are Christians, and many more (some 88 or 90 percent, depending on the poll you favor) believe in God. But when that choir of experts repeatedly tell us that evolution is incompatible with belief in God, it’s not surprising that many people come to believe that evolution is incompatible with belief in God, and is therefore an enemy of religion. After all, those experts are, well, experts. But then it is also not surprising that many Americans are reluctant to have evolution taught to their children in the public schools, the schools they themselves pay taxes to support. [...] The association of evolution with naturalism is the obvious root of the widespread antipathy to evolution in the United States, and to the teaching of evolution in the public schools."²

I pretty much agree with Plantinga's point that equating evolution and naturalism is a foolish move if you want evolution taught in public schools. To use the weather analogy, meteorology might be controversial in middle school classrooms if Richard Dawkins were out there claiming the hydrological cycle reveals the truth of atheism.

At the same time, Plantinga is badly mistaken about the primary source of "the association of evolution with naturalism." He acts like American Christians are being duped into thinking there's a conflict between evolution and their religious beliefs. Nope. They came up with that idea on their own. Naturalists like Dawkins are reacting, not instigating. For many American Christians, taking Genesis as history is an essential doctrine, despite Plantinga's quick dismissal earlier in the book.

Come to think of it, this book bothers me the same way Intelligent Design books and articles usually do. There's no outright affirmation of the basic scientific discoveries that divide Old Earth Creationists from Young Earth Creationists. It's all about leaving things open for Christians, even when it's the equivalent of leaving open geocentrism. Plantinga is like a politician trying to please a broad base while hoping his scientifically literate constituency and his anti-science constituency don't notice he's refusing to stand with either of them.

Natural Evil

Setting the Genesis issue aside, what about the argument that evolution doesn't fit the picture of a good God who cares for the well-being of his creatures? As Darwin wrote:

"I had no intention to write atheistically, but I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars or that a cat should play with mice."³

Plantinga gives a possible reason why God may allow so much suffering that can't be blamed on humankind.

"God wanted to create a really good world; among all the possible worlds, he wanted to choose one of very great goodness. [...] Among good-making properties for worlds, however, there is one of special, transcendent importance, and it is a property that according to Christians characterizes our world. For according to the Christian story, God, the almighty first being of the universe and the creator of everything else, was willing to undergo enormous suffering in order to redeem creatures who had turned their backs on him. [...] The Word became flesh and dwelt among us. He was subjected to ridicule, rejection, and finally the cruel and humiliating death of the cross. [...] All this to enable human beings to be reconciled to God, and to achieve eternal life. This overwhelming display of love and mercy is not merely the greatest story ever told; it is the greatest story that could be told. No other great-making property of a world can match this one.

If so, however, perhaps all the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement, or at any rate atonement. But any world that contains atonement will contain sin and evil and consequent suffering and pain. Furthermore, if the remedy is to be proportionate to the sickness, such a world will contain a great deal of sin and a great deal of suffering and pain. Still further, it may very well contain sin and suffering, not just on the part of human beings but perhaps also on the part of other creatures as well. Indeed, some of these other creatures might be vastly more powerful than human beings, and some of them—Satan and his minions, for example—may have been permitted to play a role in the evolution of life on earth, steering it in the direction of predation, waste and pain."⁴

What I'm hearing is that huge numbers of sentient beings suffered over millions of years to provide a fitting background for God to suffer briefly. Answers like this are why I recommend people read apologetics books rather than Dawkins, Dennett, et al. if they want to risk their faith.

1. See http://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2006/01/biological-evolution-as-evidence.html for a more detailed analysis.
2. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 53
3. Darwin, C. (1860/1911). Charles Darwin to Asa Gray. In F. Darwin (Ed.), The life and letters of Charles Darwin (vol 2). New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company. p. 105
4. Plantinga (2011). p. 58

Lingo: WEMI

2012-02-14T01:08:00.000-06:00

Work, Expression, Manifestation, Item (WEMI) is a conceptual model used in library science. To make it easier to understand, let's start by talking about applying the WEMI model to books.

Suppose you have a paperback copy of The Hobbit. I have an identical-looking copy. Are we holding the same book? There are a couple of ways to answer this:

No. I could shred my book and your book would be unaffected.
Yes. We could swap copies and both of us would still have the same book.

Obviously, I'm using different definitions of "book" in (1) and (2). Both usages are common in English. Under the WEMI model, we would say that you and I hold distinct items. I could shred my item without affecting your item, but when we swap, we're swapping items. So the word "book" in (1) means book-as-an-item, but "book" in (2) means something else.

Now suppose you have the same paperback copy of The Hobbit, but I have an older hardcover copy (with more tasteful cover art). Besides the fact that we're swapping items, is (2) still valid? Do we still end up with the same book-not-as-item that we started with?

You're probably thinking "yes." We don't tend to think of different editions as different "books." Still, it's worth making the distinction. You can't order just The Hobbit from Amazon.com; you must choose a paperback edition, a mass market paperback edition, a hardcover edition, an audio CD edition, or a Kindle edition. These are different ways of wrapping up and presenting — of manifesting — the same essential content, i.e. the text of The Hobbit.

Let's take this one final step. This time you and your book club friends have spent the last month reading The Hobbit in a variety of editions: paperback, e-book, audio CD, etc. No problem! You all read or heard the same text, so you can have a great discussion about the text. Then I show up and say I watched a film version, or played a video game, or attended the ballet. What did I do that's so different from the variety of ways the rest of you experienced The Hobbit? I watched (or played) a different expression of The Hobbit. It's not just that the wrapping was different; someone created new content.

Still, Tolkien's text and the upcoming film adaptation of The Hobbit are highly related. They will share characters, theme, plot, and many of the same lines. They can be considered different expressions of the same work, broadly speaking.

What's the point of the WEMI model? Searching and browsing tools which make these kind of distinctions can help users find what they need more efficiently. Interests may vary anywhere from a cultural studies student writing a paper on the different expressions of The Hobbit...to a collector interested in a specific, physical volume.

For some people, these four levels are not fine-grained enough, or just don't fit with the shape of their interests. For example, does a Japanese translation of The Hobbit count as a different manifestation, or a whole new expression? How much can two expressions differ and still be covered by one broad work? These concerns don't mean WEMI is wrong; it just means WEMI isn't right for every purpose. But what conceptual model is? Even models of unquestionably objective features of the world, like subway maps, can legitimately bow to both facts and interests...so long as we understand what's going on and why.

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 4)

2012-02-11T22:03:00.001-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter Two

Which came first, the mind or the material?

Richard Dawkins may not be a card carrying member of the philosophers guild, but Daniel Dennett sure is.¹ In his book, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett argues that our natural — rather than intelligently designed — origin has profound implications for our lives outside of biology class. He compares the Darwinian Revolution to the Copernican Revolution, since both drastically changed our views about our place in the world.

One of the largest shifts, as Dennett tells it, was believing that a mind (God) brought the physical world into existence...to believing that the physical world brought minds into existence.

I admit this is a harder sell than the natural design of the human eye. At least with an eye, we all agree that having the parts in the right places will result in a functioning organ. There is much less confidence — even among atheists — that having the parts in the right places for a functioning brain will result in a functioning mind. (In fact, this is the reason I call myself a naturalist, but hesitate to identify as a physicalist; I'm not convinced that consciousness has been explained by the physical sciences.)

Clash of the Extremists

It's easy to paint Dawkins or Dennett as zealots for naturalism who go beyond what science strictly requires of modern educated people. Here are some options I see for theists:

God brought the kind of physical world into existence which was capable of producing human-like beings by natural processes. Since it did, it's still correct to give God the ultimate credit.
Our world could have produced human-like beings by natural processes, but didn't happen to do so. God tweaked the natural world to set things going in our direction.
Our world could not have produced human-like beings by natural processes.
No possible world — in the broadly logical sense — could have produced human-like beings by natural processes.

The first two options are, I would argue, easily compatible with modern science. The third is typical of Intelligent Design arguments. Plantinga himself holds the fourth and most extreme position, as he lets on here:

"So neither Dennett nor contemporary evolutionary theory shows that possibly, all of the features of our world, including mind, have been produced by unguided natural selection. But assume (contrary to fact, as I see it) that this is in fact possible in the broadly logical sense. If so, is it also biologically possible?"²

In a previous post, I explained that Augustine was reluctant to accept the standard interpretation of the days of creation because he held to a theology which made it hard for him to imagine God working on something over time. Plantinga's position also comes from a theological stance that God is the same in all possible worlds. This makes it hard to imagine that features of our world with close ties to God's intentions could differ in other logically possible worlds.

You keep using that word...

Plantinga does try to address the question as if naturalistic evolution were logically possible, but still questions whether it is possible given the way our physical world works:

"For, of course, it is perfectly possible both that life has come to be by way of guided natural selection, and that it could not have come to be by way of unguided natural selection. It is perfectly possible that the process of natural selection has been guided and superintended by God, and that it could not have produced our living world without that guidance."³

Q: Do you know what we call "guided natural selection"?
A: Artificial selection.

Rationalism and Empiricism

Let's talk about Plantinga's other signature area: the rationality of theistic belief. Through much of the twentieth century, certain philosophers brushed off theism as an idea unfit for even bothering to consider whether it is true or false; theism is irrational either way. Plantinga wrote a series of books which essentially argued — and argued successfully, I think — that if (a certain kind of) theism is true, then theism is not irrational.

What puts people off is that Plantinga can maintain his brand of Christian belief in a way that is almost in principle immune to contrary evidence and needs no positive evidence or arguments!

"But suppose Swinburne’s arguments are indeed unsuccessful, and add that the same goes for all the other theistic arguments—for example, the moral argument as developed by George Mavrodes and Robert Adams, and the cosmological argument as developed by William Lane Craig, and all the rest. Does it follow that one who believes in God is irrational, unjustified, going contrary to reason, or in some other way deserving of reprimand or abuse or disapprobation? No. After all, one of the main lessons to be learned from the history of modern philosophy from Descartes through Hume is that there don’t seem to be good arguments for the existence of other minds or selves, or the past, or an external world and much else besides; nevertheless belief in other minds, the past, and an external world is presumably not irrational or in any other way below epistemic par.

Are things different with belief in God? If so, why?"⁴

Until philosophers can defeat his theism on these terms, Plantinga is content to reject natural human origins because it doesn't fit the internally consistent story he believes about the world. Whatever the substantive fruits of science may be, the spirit of scientific inquiry is to look and see what is true about the world. This attitude of empiricism is very different from free-floating rationalism. Granted, we do need some minimal philosophy before empiricism can get to work, but theism — let alone a niche kind of theism — is not required.

Note: The Kindle Edition does not use traditional page numbers. I'm using "k. 93" to indicate Kindle location 93. This book is 6,220 locations long.

1. Plantinga and Dennett have beards. Dawkins does not.
2. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. k. 701.
3. ibid. k. 712.
4. ibid. k. 754.

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 3)

2012-02-10T01:26:00.001-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter One - Continued

Dawkins' Subtitle

Famous science writer (and infamous atheist) Richard Dawkins gave his book The Blind Watchmaker a provocative subtitle: "Why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design." Plantinga points out — rightly — that the naturalistic evolution of living beings would not imply a naturalistic universe overall. It's a bad subtitle, except for marketing purposes.

(As an aside, I was frustrated with The God Delusion for much the same reason. Dawkins treats biological evolution as a fatal blow to theism, or at least he comes off that way.)

Plantinga is much more concerned with the implication that "the evidence of evolution" reveals a lack of design in human beings. If biological evolution only happened to produce God-like creatures (us), then the all-important theological claim that God intentionally created us in his image is false. But does evolutionary science really show that humanity arose by happenstance?

Notice how low the bar is set. Dawkins must prove there is no room for a divine hand in human development, or Plantinga succeeds.

...and I think he does succeed. After all, the bar for Dawkins is set very high:

"Nor does [Dawkins] try to show either that there is no such person as God, or that, if there is, it is not possible that he should have somehow set up and directed the whole process. And why should he? After all, he’s a biologist and not a philosopher."¹

Plantinga further points out that Dawkins hasn't shown how the mental can arise from unthinking material. (How lazy!)

After all, he's a philosopher and not a biologist

Not content with an easy defensive victory, Plantinga decides to attack Dawkins on his home turf.

Stop me if you've heard this one before: Atheists can't appeal to God to explain the diversity of life, but they can appeal to natural evolution! This — and not the strength of the evidence — is why atheists are so passionate about claiming life evolved naturally. Michael Behe, author of Darwin's Black Box, has challenged Darwinist orthodoxy and has yet to be adequately answered. Atheistic scientists like Dawkins are only going by their feelings and guesswork that natural evolution can explain it all. Plantinga writes:

"There is no attempt at the sort of serious calculation that would surely be required for a genuine answer. No doubt such a calculation and hence an answer to those questions is at present far beyond our knowledge and powers; no doubt it would be unreasonable to require such a calculation; still, the fact remains we don’t have a serious answer."²

Silly scientists, only addressing Behe's specific challenges and not proving him wrong in principle!

I used to believe evolution was motivated by atheism, but only because I was kept in ignorance by my family, my church, and my private school. This isn't good advertising for the harmony of science and (certain kinds of) religion! Now I read Plantinga's claim that biologists aren't doing the serious work to give serious answers to objections and it just blows my mind.

Biologists are the ones doing real work. No wonder they sometimes get testy; they have to put up with lazy, ill-informed, or irrelevant criticisms from a society that demands biologists admit God might guide genomes, but doesn't demand that meteorologists admit God might guide cold fronts. Can the weather man prove cloud formation is entirely made plausible by natural processes alone? Maybe if we had school boards demanding recognition of "Divine Wrath Stormology" we would have the equivalent of Dawkins making naturalistic claims and the equivalent of Plantinga writing:

"For the nontheist, undirected [weather] is the only game in town, and [the exchange of heat energy] seems to be the most plausible mechanism to drive that process. Here is this stunningly intricate [atmosphere] with its enormous diversity and apparent design; from the perspective of naturalism or nontheism, the only way it could have happened is by way of [an] unguided [hydrological cycle]; hence it must have happened that way; hence there must be such a[n Aristotelian] series for each current [rain storm]. The theist, on the other hand, has a little more freedom here: maybe there is such a series and maybe there isn’t; God has created the [meteorological] world and could have done it in any number of different ways; there doesn’t have to be any such series. In this way the theist is freer to follow the evidence where it leads."³ (substitutions for the sake of parody)

Assembling a Modern Eye, One Cell at a Time

Maybe you think I'm being too harsh on Plantinga's science. Please watch this short clip of Dawkins explaining how eyes could plausibly have evolved in a gradual manner:

Dawkins - Eye Evolution

Make sense? Starting from light sensitive cells on the skin, small changes would have been progressively more helpful. We see other animals with eyes all along this range, so it's not even much of a hypothetical. Yet somehow Plantinga picked eye evolution as a good place to question the plausibility of natural selection:

"We can see this as follows: consider a particular human eye—one of Dawkins’s, for example; assign a number to each cell contained in that eye (as with certain kinds of build-it-yourself toy kits); let the first member of the series be a creature that has cell number 1, the second be one that contains cells number 2 and number 1; the third contain cell number 3 plus cells number 1 and 2, and so on. This won’t quite work; for this eye to function, there will also have to be an appropriate brain or part of a brain to which it is connected by an optic nerve. But you get the idea: clearly there is such a series. Of course that by itself doesn’t show much; if it’s to be relevant, the length of the series will have to be constrained by the time available, and each step in the series will have to be such that it can arise by way of genetic mutation from a previous step. Furthermore (and crucially), each mutation will have to be fitness-conferring (or at least not unduly costly in terms of fitness), so that it’s not too improbable that they be preserved by natural selection."⁴

Did you catch what he did there? Plantinga thinks eye evolution is about starting with one cell present in a modern eye and progressively adding single cells in their modern places. This is like enumerating each building in, say Chicago, then thinking Chicago started with one of those modern buildings and progressively added every other modern building on the list until filling out the whole thing. That's not how Chicago came to be the way it is and it's not how biologists think living systems came to be the way they are. The "toy kit" view leaves out all the intermediate history of what worked at the time and what shaped what came after, but isn't a subset of what we have now.

I wouldn't fault a person for initially misunderstanding evolution as a straightforward cell-by-cell buildup toward current lifeforms. But I do expect more from a published book that's largely about evolution.

Note: The Kindle Edition does not use traditional page numbers. I'm using "k. 93" to indicate Kindle location 93. This book is 6,220 locations long.

1. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. k. 393.
2. ibid. k. 465.
3. ibid. k. 485.
4. ibid. k. 441.

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 2)

2012-02-06T02:22:00.001-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Chapter One

Narrowing

Is there a conflict between science and theism? It's useful to draw a distinction between (1) science as a method and (2) science as the body of knowledge we've gained through this method. Plantinga begins with the alleged conflict between biological evolution (a major result of scientific method) and certain kinds of theistic belief.

"I’ll be concerned in particular with Christian belief and science; most of the alleged conflicts, however, have to do with theism, belief that there is such a person as God, rather than with doctrines that separate specifically Christian belief from other theistic religions such as Islam and Judaism. Most of what I say, therefore, will apply to other theistic religions as well as to Christianity."¹

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are popular forms of theism, but what applies to them does not necessarily apply to other theistic religions.

Reasoning from the doctrine that humans — and not other species — were created in the image of God, Plantinga declares it essential to Christian faith that God specially "guided, directed, orchestrated, or shaped"² the biological origin of humankind. This further narrows the scope of the theism under examination, since not all Christians draw the line at this point. A few do not require the special creation of humans.³ Many others draw the line at a more-or-less historical understanding of Genesis.⁴

So Long, Young Earth Creationists!

"Many Christian evangelicals or fundamentalists accept a literal interpretation of the creation account in the first two chapters of Genesis (as well as the genealogies in the next few chapters); they are inclined therefore to think the earth and indeed the universe vastly younger than the billions of years of age attributed to them by current science. [...] Of course Christian belief just as such doesn’t include the thought that the universe is young; and in fact as far back as Augustine (354–430) serious Christians have doubted that the scriptural days of creation correspond to 24-hour periods of time."⁵

Sorry, all the Christians I knew growing up, Plantinga doesn't intend to defend your faith as compatible with science. Plantinga defines Christian belief as what's included in a list of nine creeds.⁶ Genesis isn't affirmed as history in those creeds, so you're on your own. (I didn't check the creeds to see if they include his interpretation of "God created man in his own image" from the same creation stories.)

What about Augustine? Plantinga gives the impression that "serious Christians" from Augustine onward have left room for an old earth, but Augustine's main deviation from Young Earth Creationism was in thinking creation was instantaneous! If anything, he was a Young-er Earth Creationist (by a few days). He came to this idea because of a popular theology in his day that made it hard to picture God working on something over time, and because he struggled to make sense of how the days could be separated by an evening and morning on a global scale (since it's always evening and morning somewhere on Earth).⁷

The seven days themselves are a red herring if humankind started about six thousand years ago, were almost wiped out in a flood, then started to grow again before having their languages divided. Personally, I don't see any point between Adam and Jesus where the Bible signals a change from myth to history. Jesus' genealogy in Luke 3 implies a historical interpretation throughout; other New Testament references support or are consistent with Genesis-as-history. If Plantinga wants the Abrahamic religions to represent theism as a whole, then he needs to do a much better job of removing recent creation from the discussion.

Oh well, there's still a lot of material here about science being compatible with God intervening in the development of humankind. Let's see how Plantinga plans to ease that particular tension for the subset of theists troubled by the notion of unguided evolution for humans, but not otherwise troubled by modern evolutionary theory.

Defining Evolution

Plantinga lists four theses of "evolution strictly so called" plus a fifth thesis he calls "Darwinism" and a sixth thesis he calls the "naturalistic origins thesis." He argues that the doctrine of God creating humankind in his image is clearly consistent with the first four theses, less obviously consistent with Darwinism, but absolutely not consistent with the naturalistic origins thesis.

Evolution Proper

1. Ancient Earth thesis. The Earth is billions of years old.
2. Progress thesis. Life started out simple and has progressed to complex forms. Humans are the culmination of this process.
3. Descent with modification thesis. Biodiversity comes about from changes in offspring.
4. Common ancestry thesis. Life on Earth originated once, so we're all related.

Darwinism

5. A natural mechanism is responsible for descent with modification. Natural selection and other natural processes are included here.

Naturalistic Origins

6. Life evolved without divine intervention.

This would be better if Plantinga left out everything but (3) and (5).⁸ Evolution concerns inheritable changes across generations. Darwin proposed natural selection as a major mechanism of these changes. His contemporary, Mendel, discovered genetic inheritance. In the late 1920's, Wright pointed out genetic drift as another mechanism of evolution. It wasn't until the early 1940's that several researchers were able to identify DNA as the physical carrier of genetic information. These are the elements of evolutionary theory. So you see, it's primarily about a process that's going on right now. Like gravitational theory, we can apply this knowledge to understand what happened in the distant past, but those findings are secondary.

Is the Earth billions of years old? Yes, but we know that without any reliance on biological science. Did complex forms of life arise from simpler forms of life? It sure looks like it from the fossil record. Do we share ancestry with other life on Earth? Both the fossil record and genetic analysis suggest so. Is evolution a natural process? It appears to be.

Plantinga is happy to accept (1) through (5), saying that "God could have caused the right mutations to arise at the right time; he could have preserved populations from perils of various sorts, and so on; and in this way he could have seen to it that there come to be creatures of the kind he intends."⁹ In essence, it could look to the world that natural gene variation and natural selection explain evolution...but God was behind the scenes manipulating these processes to produce the human species.

I like to compare this to the view that rain is a natural process, but God can tweak the natural world just enough to send rain for the crops of praying farmers. Since scientists can't rule out this possibility, it would be a philosophical addition to meteorology to say that rain falls without divine intervention.

I don't have a problem with this, so long as people understand how modest such claims really are. It usually turns into a foot-in-the-door tactic, however, where God becomes possibly involved and suddenly it can't rain without a miracle. That will be the pattern of this book.

Note: The Kindle Edition does not use traditional page numbers. I'm using "k. 93" to indicate Kindle location 93. This book is 6,220 locations long.

1. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. k. 202.
2. ibid. k. 264.
3. Howard J. Van Till, for example.
4. See http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/2009/10/19/where-do-we-draw-the-line
5. Plantinga (2011). k. 294.
6. ibid. k. 266.
7. Discussed at length in Augustine's book The Literal Meaning of Genesis.
8. See http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evolution-definition.html
9. Plantinga (2011). k. 319.

On "Where the Conflict Really Lies" (Pt. 1)

2012-02-04T20:34:00.000-06:00

Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism is Alvin Plantinga's popular-level challenge to the idea that science and religion are in conflict. At least, that's the defensive portion of the book. He goes on to argue that the real conflict is between science and an irreligious worldview.

I'm concerned that people eager for this conclusion will cite Plantinga as an intellectual authority without understanding which parts of his overall argument are strong vs. which parts are weak, overly specialized, or overly generalized. My plan is to cover select portions of his book, supporting or criticizing Plantinga as appropriate.

For new readers of this blog, let me say up front that I'm a naturalist, i.e. I believe the natural world is all there is. On the other hand, I don't think everyone who disagrees is making an intellectual blunder. I'm especially sympathetic with Deists, but also with other Theists who are drawing the best conclusion they can from their own experiences. Mistaken conclusions don't necessarily imply bad methods.

Series Index

1. Series Index; Preface
2. Chapter One — Evolution and the Image of God
3. Chapter One — Dawkins
4. Chapter Two — Dennett; Necessity; Rationalism
5. Chapter Two — Draper; Science Education; Natural Evil
6. Chapter Three & Chapter Four — Divine Action
7. Chapter Five — Evolved Ethics and Religion
8. Chapter Five — Historical Biblical Criticism
9. [forthcoming]

Other Plantinga Posts

On "Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience"

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Pt. 1)
The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Pt. 2)

Preface

Worldview Terminology

Plantinga's use of terminology is a bit quirky. From the first page:

"I take naturalism to be the thought that there is no such person as God, or anything like God. Naturalism is stronger than atheism: you can be an atheist without rising to the full heights (sinking to the lowest depths?) of naturalism; but you can’t be a naturalist without being an atheist."¹

Atheism is the most straightforward term for the thought that there is no such person as God. Why didn't he say that instead? I suspect he is using naturalism as a practical synonym for what is sometimes called explicit (or strong) atheism, as opposed to implicit (or weak) atheism.² In other words, a committed naturalist holds a positive belief which rules out a God who exists beyond nature, but not everyone lacking a belief in God has given the issue much thought.

Readers can usually substitute 'atheism' for 'naturalism' in Plantinga's books and papers. This has the bonus of keeping things simpler for readers aware of the controversies surrounding the word 'naturalism.'

A Drop of Poison

Suppose I start this series by putting Plantinga in a list of famous contemporary apologists, then characterizing these apologists as immature, out of their element, and not nearly as respectable as old-school apologists like Augustine or Chesterton. I could color your entire perception of Plantinga's ideas and motivations in a way that puts him at a disadvantage.

This is a rhetorical technique called poisoning the well. I'm bringing this up only because Plantinga puts a drop or two into atheism's well. Nothing outrageous; maybe just enough to give the water a bitter tang.

"Why [Dawkins, Harris, Dennett, and Hitchens] choose this route is not wholly clear. One possibility, of course, is that their atheism is adolescent rebellion carried on by other means. Another (consistent with the first) is that they know of no good reasons or arguments for their views, and hence resort to schoolyard tactics. In terms of intellectual competence, the new atheists are certainly inferior to the “old atheists”—Bertrand Russell and John Mackie come to mind. They are also inferior to many other contemporary but less strident atheists—Thomas Nagel, Michael Tooley, and William Rowe, for example. We may perhaps hope that the new atheists are but a temporary blemish on the face of serious conversation in this crucial area."³

I have no objection to Plantinga addressing less developed but popular atheistic arguments. I just wish he would hold off on negative characterizations until after discussing the arguments.

Yes, I realize it might be hypocritical of me to bring this up. I thought about waiting for the last post in the series, but decided it's something readers should notice then look past to give both Plantinga and his opponents a fair hearing.

The Greatness and Limitations of Science

Why is it so important for worldviews to be compatible with science? Plantinga calls science "the most striking and impressive intellectual phenomenon of the last half millennium," since it is a "cooperative venture" among many brilliant people which progressively builds on previous questions.

"If there were serious conflicts between religion and current science, that would be very significant; initially, at least, it would cast doubt on those religious beliefs inconsistent with current science."⁴

I couldn't help but notice that these virtues of science are on par with theology in its heyday. Theology also had a lot of smart people coming up with ideas, then more ideas building on earlier ideas. Outside claims were resisted if they seemed out of line with established theology. So I don't think Plantinga has captured the reasons why science is such a big deal across worldviews, while orthodox theologies are not.

Is science like a religion, but less so? I get this impression from passages like:

"Some treat science as if it were a sort of infallible oracle, like a divine revelation—or if not infallible (since it seems so regularly to change its mind), at any rate such that when it comes to fixing belief, science is the court of last appeal. But this can’t be right. First, science doesn’t address some of the topics where we most need enlightenment: religion, politics, and morals, for example. […] Second, science contradicts itself, both over time and at the same time. Two of the most important and overarching contemporary scientific theories are general relativity and quantum mechanics. Both are highly confirmed and enormously impressive; unfortunately, they can’t both be correct."⁵

Maybe I'm overreacting, but it seems like Plantinga is highlighting the limitations of science without highlighting its strengths (besides current popularity). Scientific inquiry does not give infallible answers sufficient for all time; it gives answers at varying levels of confidence based on the evidence currently available to many people across different cultures and worldviews.

It's also odd for Plantinga to say that science doesn't address religion in a book devoted to what science tells us about religion. Does science have any bearing on politics or morality? That will depend on some preliminary moral and political philosophy. I think both topics are a combination of ends and means; and science has a lot to say about means.

Note: The Kindle Edition does not use traditional page numbers. I'm using "k. 93" to indicate Kindle location 93. This book is 6,220 locations long.

1. Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, and naturalism [Kindle Edition]. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. k. 93.
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicit_and_explicit_atheism
3. Plantinga (2011). k. 114.
4. ibid. k. 136.
5. ibid. k. 128.

Lingo: Sex, Gender, and Orientation

2012-02-03T01:19:00.005-06:00

What is the difference between 'sex' and 'gender'? And how is 'sexual orientation' distinct from both of these concepts?

Short Version

Sex is a person's biological category, usually — but not always — straightforwardly male or female based on genes, hormones, and anatomic structures.

Gender is the socially constructed side of masculinity or femininity. For example, long hair might be considered a female trait in one culture, but not in another.

Orientation describes a person as being attracted to the same sex, the opposite sex, both sexes equally, or as being at any point along this range.

Another World

In a world we don't live in, every person's genes, hormones, and anatomic structures would line up as clearly male or clearly female. Every biological male would conform to a universal view of masculinity; every biological female would conform to a universal view of femininity. Finally, every biological female would be attracted exclusively to biological males, while every biological male would be attracted exclusively to biological females.

Real life is more complicated.

Sex

The first use of 'sex' recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is from a fourteenth century Wycliffe Bible in which Noah was asked to collect "male sex and female" for the ark. Dividing up members of a species according to reproductive function was its primary usage until the early twentieth century when it became the word of choice for physical intimacy (and 1912 marks the earliest recorded use of 'sexy' to describe a person).

For a variety of reasons, a human may not clearly fall into the typical male or female biological categories. 20/20 produced a helpful introduction to intersexuality, as it's called.

Gender

'Gender' has its deepest roots in the general notion of kind or category. It is related to the words 'genus' and 'genre.' Grammatical gender, e.g. "la mesa" (the table) or "el caldero" (the pot) was the main specific application of the term. Obviously, grammatical gender is not tightly integrated with biological sex, unless you know something about tables and pots that I don't!

With the rise of 'sex' as the term for physical intimacy, 'gender' became a popular replacement when speakers wanted to talk about (biological) sex without calling to mind sex-the-activity. (As the joke goes: "Sex? Yes, please!") It's still common for these words to be used as pure synonyms.

However, there is a growing trend of treating 'sex' and 'gender' as distinct attributes, a trend which started among United States psychology professionals in the 1940s. Here is a contemporary definition from the American Psychological Association:

"Sex is assigned at birth, refers to one’s biological status as either male or female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes such as chromosomes, hormone prevalence, and external and internal anatomy. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for boys and men or girls and women. These influence the ways that people act, interact, and feel about themselves. While aspects of biological sex are similar across different cultures, aspects of gender may differ."¹

Whether we use the word 'gender' or some other term to refer to cultural masculinity/femininity as opposed to biological masculinity/femininity, this is a very important distinction. We need some way to talk about it.

Since gender is a cultural category, a person may not feel they belong to the gender their society assigns to their sex. But this is not much different from a New York resident failing to identify as a Yankees fan.

Orientation

'Sexual orientation' is another twentieth-century term. To quote the American Psychological Association again:

"Sexual orientation refers to an enduring pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or both sexes. […] Research over several decades has demonstrated that sexual orientation ranges along a continuum, from exclusive attraction to the other sex to exclusive attraction to the same sex[....]

Sexual orientation is distinct from other components of sex and gender, including biological sex (the anatomical, physiological, and genetic characteristics associated with being male or female), gender identity (the psychological sense of being male or female), and social gender role (the cultural norms that define feminine and masculine behavior)."²

Most people are right-handed; most people are predominantly attracted to the opposite sex.

Some aren't.

The Recognition of Culture

What happened in the twentieth century to prompt these changes in the way we talk about sex, gender, and orientation? That's a topic for whole books, but I'll hazard a guess: it was the growing recognition of human culture as distinct from the findings of natural science.

In other words, pink is not really a girl color. That's just an advertising campaign.

1. From http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.pdf
2. From http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx

Monthly Picks

2012-02-01T01:39:00.000-06:00

~~On the first day of each month, I will be posting about new papers I've found interesting in Philosophy or Library & Information Science. I'll try to make sure at least one is accessible to everyone.~~

But not this month!

Nothing in the PhilPapers feed grabbed my attention. Library Science abstracts were scant this month; don't know if I should blame the publishing schedule or the announce-it-online schedule.

I'm thinking of blogging through Plantinga's new book. Any interest? In other news, I now have access to the Oxford English Dictionary. Brace yourselves.

Reading the ACLU Policy Guide (Pt. 9)

2012-01-30T00:09:00.000-06:00

Series explanation and overview here.

Note: These are my summaries of the 1995 version of the guide, not the policies themselves.

Military Power

Policy 120 — Conscription

Forced military service — or even nonmilitary service — violates constitutional rights to freedom of association, freedom from involuntary servitude, and privacy. "The notion that the American people are too stupid or too cowardly to defend their nation unless coerced into doing so has no place in a free and democratic society." Drafting is a poor substitute for providing "the compensation and respect that will attract enough volunteers to fill the ranks."

If there is a draft, the ACLU at least asks that conscription be handled in an equitable manner. "[T]he pattern of exemptions has favored the wealthier, more educated groups and has discriminated against poorer segments of our society, including minority ethnic groups." Drafts have also discriminated according to sex. The subtext here is that draft legislation would be less likely to succeed if wealthy, educated, or female youths were just as threatened by it.

Policy 121 — Conscientious Objection

"No one should be subject to participation in the Armed Forces of the United States contrary to conscience, whether that conscience has been formed by religious, ethical, moral or philosophical conviction or belief."

The ACLU recognizes and will defend different levels of conscientious objection. A person may accept alternative service, but not a specific type of alternative service under the direction of the military. A person may serve in the military, but object to combat training or service. Or a person may serve in a combat capacity, but object to a particular armed conflict as a whole.

Objection cannot be limited to religious beliefs, as this would violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Non-religious beliefs "which result in a claim of conscientious objection must be sincere and meaningful beliefs, which occupy in the life of the objector a place parallel to that filled by the religious beliefs of religious consciousness objectors."

Policy 122 — Separation of Powers

Constitutionally, Congress — not the Executive Branch — has the power to declare war. This is important because Congress is "the branch of the federal government most capable of providing the American people with a full, open and diverse debate before committing them to undertake the burdens of war."

The ACLU will defend this principle against Executive attempts to circumvent it, besides the valid exception of taking emergency defensive action (which is truly an emergency and truly defensive).

Reading St. Paul as a Respectful Liberal

2012-01-29T16:49:00.001-06:00

[This is a version of the PDF I handed in for my Intellectual Freedom class this week. We were to summarize an assigned chapter by creating a 1-2 page handout.]

In his Introduction to Courting the Abyss, John Durham Peters characterizes modern liberalism as hypocritically respecting everything, except the rejection of liberalism itself. What is his proposed alternative? The spirit of St. Paul:

"He respects those who do not know or choose not to know, something the liberal tradition has rarely excelled at. Paul makes space for those who opt out of his theory and thus offers one antidote to illiberal tendencies in liberalism." (k. 644-645)

To eat or not to eat

Christians celebrate their faith with bread and wine which represents (or becomes) Jesus' sacrificial body. In Paul's time, pagans celebrated their faith by sacrificing food to idols, then eating it as a form of communion with their gods. Question: is it wrong for Christians to eat food sacrificed to pagan gods? Paul gave two answers.

No — Pagan gods aren't real. There is only one true God and "food will not commend us to God; we are neither the worse if we do not eat, nor the better if we do eat." (1 Cor 8:8)

Yes — If a fellow Christian grew up in pagan culture sees you do this, he may be encouraged to eat such food with his old mindset of worshipping false gods. "But take care that this liberty of yours does not somehow become a stumbling block to the weak. For if someone sees you, who have knowledge, dining in an idolʼs temple, will not his conscience, if he is weak, be strengthened to eat things sacrificed to idols?" (1 Cor 8:9-10)

Today we might ask whether it's ok to drink alcohol and be told, "Yes, unless your drinking encourages an alcoholic to stumble."

Private freedom & public restraint

"The eyes of others alter private liberty: this is a strange and delicate moral standard." (k. 534)

A key failure in modern liberalism — by Peters' account — was the ACLU's defense of the Nazi march through Skokie, Illinois. He draws an analogy between these liberal defenders and the Christians in Corinth who wanted to "eat whatever they please without concern for what others think." (k. 642) Freedom is commendable, but not when it causes others distress.

"Paul's key difference from other revolutionaries is that the radical bows to the conservative." (k. 871)

More food for thought

Is this division of private freedom and public inoffensiveness desirable or even possible? Peters offers this criticism of his own position: "Paul's solution might seem to favor the wealthy, who can afford to eat their meat behind closed doors and out of the eyeshot of the offendable." (k. 552)

What about people who were offended by interracial couples? Would Peters have advised these couples to refrain from public displays of affection? Would he advise same sex couples to do the same today?

"As with food and conscience, Paul lets the lowest common denominator set the communicative level." (k. 666-667) Is this really what we want?

And how do we deal with those who are offended in mutually exclusive ways? There are Americans who are offended by government schools preaching a particular religion...and those who are offended when this doesn't happen. Paul may have wanted to "become all things to all men" (1 Cor 9:22), but this just isn't possible.

...

Is there perhaps a more refined position between letting Nazis parade through a Jewish neighborhood and creating an artificially offense-free public space?

Biblical quotes from the New American Standard Bible. All other citations are Kindle locations in Courting the Abyss.

Peters, J.D. (2005). Courting the abyss: Free speech and the liberal tradition (Kindle edition). Chicago, Illinois: University Of Chicago Press.

On "John Durham Peters on Censorship"

2012-01-25T01:31:00.000-06:00

In my class on intellectual freedom this semester, we're reading a book with the central claim that advocating free speech is tantamount to approving of what everyone does with free speech. In a short video clip by the author, he puts his thesis this way:

'I'm bothered by the kind of smugness — the kind of arrogance — that is often found in people who say, "Censorship is terrible." When, in fact, there are very good reasons to be outraged about some of the things which we find in the world of communication. Why can't people be outraged at insulting pictures, or obscene pictures, or violent pictures? I think that sometimes outrage is the only decent or ethical response to certain kinds of things that happen in the world.

So if you always take this sort of liberal view that "I'm above censorship and those people who get really upset about seeing some pictures, those people are not well educated. They're not reasonable. They're not rational." That's a kind of class warfare: the elite educated being able to put down people who are more sensitive.'

I'm profoundly unimpressed by the way he continually conflates free-speech advocacy with having no other strong feelings, or at least not speaking out against speech one finds offensive. He's on a crusade against a "liberalism" that isn't representative of how free speech advocacy actually works.

For example, the membership of the ACLU tends to be very strongly opposed to hate speech and opposed to laws prohibiting hate speech:

'Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech -- not less -- is the best revenge. […] College administrators may find speech codes attractive as a quick fix, but as one critic put it: "Verbal purity is not social change." Codes that punish bigoted speech treat only the symptom: The problem itself is bigotry.'¹

If Peters wants to challenge this well-known policy, fine. But he doesn't even do that. He's clearly smart enough to grasp the distinction, so I find it very hard to understand why he spends so much time attacking a strawman liberalism instead.

1. http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/hate-speech-campus

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 13)

2012-01-24T02:24:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Resurrection of Christ

a talk by R.C. Sproul, Senior

"If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is an exercise in futility. I'm wasting my breath. I'm wasting my time. We're all here wasting our time at a conference like this, if Christ has not been raised."

Sproul says Christians should be pitied if Christianity is false, because they would be refraining from much of the fun in life for the sake of false hopes. It's not so simple as that. Consider a typical Mormon who gives up the carnal pleasure of drinking coffee. She probably also gains a lot in terms of emotional support from her religious community. We tend to take the things we have for granted, so she may think, "If only I were free from my religion so I could drink coffee. How great that would be!" But even if her religion is false, she may actually be benefitting more from it than she would from drinking coffee instead.

This is why I don't have a life-goal of convincing all Christians that their religion is false; I believe many of them are better off believing something false than losing their support system.

However, there are three types of Christians to whom I do want to show the faults of Christian belief.

First, a Christian whose life is worse off for believing Christianity is true. This would include homosexual Christians who are put through shame and self-hatred for no good reason. It would also include Christians, like my former self, who were deeply troubled by the doctrine of eternal Hell for others. I didn't have any loved ones die outside the faith, but that would be an especially painful situation for true believers in damnation.

Second, a Christian who is more interested in truth than the benefits of religion. I don't mean: interested in showing that their own religion is true. That's common. I mean the kind of Christian who is interested in knowing what is true, even if that doesn't turn out to be Christianity.

Third, a Christian who is making the lives of others significantly worse because of that Christian's religious beliefs. This would include parents like the Catholic man I overheard saying, "If one of my sons ever says he's gay, I will beat that f----- half to death." I sincerely hope none of his sons do turn out to be gay, but only because it would be hard on them with a parent like that. I also want Christianity to be challenged in the public square, to keep it — and all other religious positions — a matter of individual conscience rather than government policy.

"[O]ur beloved ones, our husbands, our wives, our children, our parents who have died, our friends who have died in the faith have perished. That's the grim reality if there is no resurrection from the dead."

Death is grim. No doubt about that. But Sproul teaches something much worse: unending torment for billions of other people. There's no "good news" in a narrow path to life and a wide path to destruction, unless the destruction spoken of is the bodily death we already expect.

...

It would be easy at this point to paint Sproul as someone primarily interested in benefits rather than truth, but he does change tack a bit toward the end. He cites messianic prophecy from the Old Testament and claims of witnessing a resurrected Jesus in the New Testament as reasons to believe Christianity is true in the first place.

I used to agree about messianic prophecy. Now I see it as a deep dishonesty from the beginning of Christianity. I believe early Christians searched the scriptures for any justification for maintaining that Jesus did not fail when he died, and tweaked both the details of his life and the original meaning of Jewish scriptures to construct new theologies of success. They transformed an apocalyptic preacher into God himself, and invited other nationalities to sign on for this new monotheistic craze which promised so much.

But is it true? Those who ask this question today and are prepared to follow the evidence will find more reason to reject than accept Christian claims. Still, not every form of Christianity can be proven wrong on its own terms. Calvinists, for example, claim no one is mentally capable of seeing the truth except a chosen few. Convenient. Most Christians probably believe the evidence is out there for everyone, just as God's invitation is out there for everyone. Why don't they doubt if the evidence is shoddy? Unfortunately, a lot of them seem to believe the case for Christianity is solid just because someone wrote a book with that title. And many of them simply aren't interested in the question; Christianity is their unquestioned way of life.

I hope this series has been helpful. It was actually quite easy to write, since these are things I've spent many hours agonizing about in the past. Feel free to challenge me on whatever you like. Or, if you must, feel free to express agreement. I can deal with that too!

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 12)

2012-01-23T02:03:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Holy Spirit and Apologetics

a talk by Albert Mohler

"Why are there some who believe and others who do not?"

Because Calvinism...again. Let's just move on.

Questions and Answers #2

One of the answers to a question about God willing evil to exist was:

"The entire problem of theodicy arises from a wrong question or wrong presumption. In other words, rather than seeing God as essentially good, and deriving whatever good is from observing the one true and living God, we abstract an idea of good and then try to measure God against that human abstraction. That is always a losing proposition because we don't know what good is.

That's the problem when persons come up to us and say, 'If God does this, he can't be good.' They don't realize that's an internal contradiction. The only God that exists is the God who is good. He defines what is good by consistency with his own character, not by the fact that he corresponds to some arbitrary understanding of good."

Except that people typically have some meaning in mind when they say 'good' which is not precisely the same as "whatever God is like." Now, it could turn out that goodness and (part of) God's nature are the same. To use the philosophers' favorite analogy, it would be like discovering that the morning star is the evening star. Such a discovery is informative; to say "Goodness is (part of) God's nature" would really be saying something beyond "God is like himself."

Unfortunately, the God described during these talks is an especially awkward match-up with common uses of 'good.' Hence the retreat to God being good by definition, no matter what he's like.

...

Ravi Zacharias implies the Dec 26, 2004 Indonesian tsunami was God's response to the ACLU forcing God out of the government in the USA.

He gets huge applause.

...

Someone asks whether evolution if compatible with the Bible. Sproul Sr. affirms 'micro-evolution' then calls 'macro-evolution' the philosophical belief that everything came from a single cell or the big bang. "No, that's not compatible with the Bible. Second of all, it's not compatible with science."

He gets huge applause.

Backfire

Remember, this lecture series was a Christmas gift intended to help bring me back into the fold. Guess I didn't mention that it was reading the Bible and apologetics — not skeptical literature — that destroyed my belief in the first place. These lectures have only served as a reminder that I know too much to be a fundamentalist Christian, and am too much like a fundamentalist Christian to be a liberal Christian.

But why stop now? Just one talk to go.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 11)

2012-01-22T00:52:00.001-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Authority of Scripture

a talk by Albert Mohler

"[I]n postmodern times there is the operational denial that there can be any kind of propositional revelation. There is the operational, explicit denial that there could be any kind of shared information at a cognitive level from the divine to the human in what we would call 'the Bible.'"

Mohler evidently believes that the rejection of the Bible as genuine divine revelation is largely due to a pervasive postmodernist rejection of the possibility of knowing truth. He says, "If we are left in the trap of this epistemological crisis, then we will never really know the truth." I think this is a misdiagnosis. The real problem is that the Bible is indistinguishable from a man-made collection of writings which has become revered through human tradition.

Revelation on Revelation

"Christianity is the only belief system that offers a complete account of revelation. Other belief systems and worldviews may claim a revelation, but none of them offers a comprehensive understanding of revelation beginning with the origin of this revelation, the necessity of this revelation, the authority of this revelation, and the reception and effect of this revelation. The Christian doctrine of holy Scripture sets the Christian claim of revelation apart from all others."

The idea here is that the Christian revelation explains itself better than other revelations explain themselves (with the implication that this is something to be expected of a true revelation). Mohler then curiously undermines his own point by quoting relevant passages from the Bible, the Quran, and the Book of Mormon:

1 Timothy 2:3 "[F]rom childhood you have known the sacred writings which are able to give you the wisdom that leads to salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for training in righteousness; so that the man of God may be adequate, equipped for every good work."

Surah 10:37-38 "And it was not possible for this Qur'an to be produced by other than Allah, but it is a confirmation of what was before it and a detailed explanation of the former Scripture, about which there is no doubt, from the Lord of the worlds. Or do they say about the Prophet, 'He invented it?' Say, 'Then bring forth a surah like it and call upon for assistance whomever you can besides Allah, if you should be truthful.'"

2 Nephi 33:10 "And now, my beloved brethren, and also Jew, and all ye ends of the earth, hearken unto these words and believe in Christ; and if ye believe not in these words believe in Christ. And if ye shall believe in Christ ye will believe in these words, for they are the words of Christ, and he hath given them unto me; and they teach all men that they should do good."

Mohler goes on to say the Bible it is set apart from the Qur'an and the Book of Mormon because it came through multiple authors, over several centuries, in different contexts and styles, during the living memory of events described, and yet with a coherency and consistency throughout. I would characterize this as an argument from both diversity and unity. Further, I will grant that unity is harder to achieve in a collection of books across centuries than in one book set down by one man. On the other hand, why must revelation come as a collection? There is a danger of taking one's own scriptures as the model of what divine revelation ought to look like, then observing the ways other scriptures fail to fit the model.

Since I don't believe any scriptures are really divinely inspired, the whole exercise of comparing the Bible to other scriptures is beside the point. It could simply be the most impressive among human religious writings.

A Book of History

"The Bible deals with historic claims that were known to those who were alive at the times the claims were made."

Since we lack contemporary rebuttals of Biblical history, can't we safely conclude Biblical history is correct? No, because the vast majority of ancient writings have been lost. For all we know there may have been such rebuttals, but no one interested enough to preserve them through the centuries. Or there may not have been any written rebuttals, because refuting the claims of Biblical writers may not have seemed important; our perspective is skewed by our knowledge of how important these texts have become to global culture.

One reason Genesis is such a point of contention is that the creation story, the flood, and the Tower of Babel are events we can investigate today without relying on ancient interests or the preservation of particular texts. All three events fail such testing in spectacular fashion.

The Witness of Archaeology

"Archeological discoveries continue to affirm the truthfulness of the Bible."

What archaeological discoveries have shown is that the Bible really is composed of ancient texts; it's not a tenth century fabrication or something. Suppose we have a nuclear war that wipes out modern civilization. In the year 3012, archaeologists discover a readable collection of James Bond novels. Further archaeological investigation confirms many incidental details of geography and culture. Clearly this would speak to the value of James Bond novels as far as their historical setting is concerned, but not to the truth of their foreground stories.

Divine Foreknowledge

"Does the text disclose facts and information that at the time of the writing could only have been known to God, but at a later date were demonstrated to be true?"

Scientific foreknowledge was covered in a previous talk, so Mohler focuses on predictive prophecy. Even better: he focuses on the claims of fulfilled predictive prophecy in Matthew's nativity account.

Matthew's opening chapters were the very point where I began to question what I was taught about the Bible. You see, Matthew does quote the Old Testament as if it had predicted early events in the life of Jesus...but how many Christians are familiar with the context of these quotes? You can do this study on your own, or — for a quick start — I recommend these videos:

Messianic Prophecies and Matthew's Dishonesty Part 1
Messianic Prophecies and Matthew's Dishonesty Part 2

In short, the first few pages of the New Testament are some of the best reasons to positively reject Christianity. It is a religion which relies on earlier Jewish Scriptures and misuses those same scriptures. The only reason the Old Testament may seem to confirm Christianity, is that Christians have been trained to read it that way.

Incompleteness

"In the Reformation, the principle of sola scriptura was so important because the Reformation was made necessary by the fact that scriptura was not sola. The church claimed the authority to define the authority of scripture. [...] The church claimed the authority to interpret scripture by tradition rather than to judge the tradition by scripture."

I don't want to become too involved with this in-house debate, but I must point out two things:

First, the policy of "scripture alone" has led to an ever greater fracturing of Christian doctrines into just about every conceivable combination with each sect, and sub-sect, and sub-sub-sect claiming the others are not following the Bible. I grew up in a tiny sect that claims, in effect, that all other so-called Christians are going to Hell because of incorrect baptism doctrine...and maybe for using pianos in worship service.

Second, the Bible does not include its own table of contents. The Biblical canon — as it's called — was defined by fourth century Catholics. The same men who finally settled on the 27 book New Testament canon affirmed a larger Old Testament canon than modern Protestants accept. So it's not a matter of following tradition vs. following the Bible; one must follow some tradition about the Bible, before approaching the Bible.

If "God is not the author of confusion" (1 Cor 14:33), then I hardly see how Christianity with its schisms or the Bible with its internal misreadings could be products of the divine.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 10)

2012-01-21T01:47:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Existence of God

a talk by Ravi Zacharias

Zacharias reads Nietzsche's famous Parable of the Madman which beautifully expresses the feeling of losing what was once the central point that made sense of life. More specifically, Nietzsche seems to have been alleging that his contemporary society had done something which would — in time — lead to a fundamental shift away from the living theism of the past. Perhaps the rise of modern science or even German biblical criticism is what he had in mind; both have certainly inflicted grave wounds on the public assumption of theism in Europe.

Another way to read this parable is to conclude, as Zacharias does, that "the implications of a godless universe" are grim. I would suggest this imagery is more about the shock of changing worldviews than about life without theistic belief in general.

Atheism & Morality

The first of three philosophical problems of atheism, according to Zacharias, is the impossibility of morality without a moral law giver.

Now, I do grant the fact that atheists disagree quite a bit about the nature of morality. But then so do theists! Some theists say moral rightness is whatever God commands. Others say moral rightness is consistency with whatever God's nature is. An especially popular theistic theory of morality these days is that moral rightness is what is commanded by a loving God.

See the shift from arbitrary power to the concept of love? From here, it would be a small step to say moral rightness is what a loving person — with a grasp of relevant facts — would do without being commanded.

This is one plausible way of understanding morality without invoking God.

I suppose an apologist could say, "You atheists aren't doing what is morally right, you're just being loving to others!" But that wouldn't play quite as well to certain audiences as the way Zacharias associates atheistic morality with baby raping in this talk. Yes, he does that. It reminds me of how William Lane Craig in Reasonable Faith associates atheism with Nazi vivisections of pregnant women, before he gets around to arguing for the existence of God. This is called poisoning the well, a rhetorical tactic intended to make fair discussion impossible from the outset.

Atheism & Meaning

It is apparently of great importance to some people that the human species was created on purpose, and that each individual person has a life-task assigned by God. I've played enough task-oriented vs. open-ended videogames to understand the comfort of strict direction and the unease — at first — of finding one's own tasks.

Atheism, according to Zacharias, "takes you out of the realm of meaning." It really only takes a person out of the realm of certain kinds of meaning. It does not remove, e.g. the life-meaning found in developing friendships, in learning about the world, and in raising children.

If we look back to Nietzsche's parable, it's important to notice that life still goes on. Carl Sagan left us with prose poetry along similar lines, which I heartily recommend: A Universe Not Made For Us.

Atheism & Hope

Atheism supposedly offers "no hope" because it doesn't feature an afterlife. That's an amazing statement to make right after a talk about how God will put most people in Hell forever with no hope of relief.

Would it be nice to live a good life forever? Certainly! But it doesn't follow that we can reject a worldview just because it lacks this amenity.

Positive Argument #1: Contingency

Quoting Dallas Willard, Zacharias claims:

"However concrete physical reality is sectioned up, the result will be a state of affairs which owes its being to something other than itself."¹

This flagrantly begs the question against physicalism. Sure, if we assume physical reality is explained by something else, then we can safely conclude that something besides physical reality exists.

We could even agree that something besides physical reality exists and not grant that a supernatural person exists, because it is possible that the natural world itself extends beyond the sort of things studied by physics.

So we have a non-argument against physicalism, when an irrefutable knock-down argument against physicalism would still fail to show there is a God.

Positive Argument #2: Finite Series of Causes

From Willard again:

"[E]very physical state, no matter how inclusive, has a necessary condition in some specific type of state which immediately precedes it in time and is fully existent prior to the emergence of the state which it conditions."

Zacharias lays out the implication, "You cannot have an infinite series of causes in time, because if you had to have the infinite series of causes it would never have arrived at this moment."

There are at least two difficulties with this argument. First, it confuses the nature of finite and infinite quantities. For any particular event in an infinite past, there would be a way to "get here from there." I believe the intuition here is that you can't construct an infinite series from a non-infinite series by adding one item, then another, and so on. So it sounds to me like a hidden assumption of a finite past is being brought in conflict with the question of an infinite past.

Second, the philosophy and science of causation in time is not — to my knowledge — a remotely settled matter, especially when it comes to the cosmological issues under question here.

Positive Argument #3: Design.

Zacharias briefly touches on the argument from design by citing cosmological fine-tuning: the apparent fact that certain values in physics have to be precisely right for a world like ours to be possible.

The chief problem I have with fine-tuning arguments is that they rely on the assumption that not having a good natural explanation of these values today means there isn't a good natural explanation to be found tomorrow. Scientific discovery often turns up new questions without immediate answers. It may even be a religious disservice to insert God wherever humans are currently ignorant, then shoo God back into the darkness whenever we figure something out.

Positive Argument #4: Gospel.

Basically, the words and deeds of Jesus resonate with people in a way that demonstrates (to Christians) that he could have only been divine.

I've noticed that Muslims tend to feel the same way about the Qur'an. Mormons have spoken to me about the witness of the Holy Spirit in their heart when they read their relatively new scriptures. Having positive feelings about one's own religion is not a reliable indicator of truth.

...

So is there a God? I don't know. The evidence appears consistent with both atheism and deism. Choosing between these positions seems to be a matter of personal philosophy in the face of insufficient evidence either way.

On the other hand, I'm quite sure there isn't a God who is interested in everyone responding to him in some appropriate way. Such a God would have the motive, intelligence, and power to unmistakably communicate his desire to all human beings. Since this has not happened, such a God does not exist.

1. I found the quote here: http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=42

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 9)

2012-01-20T01:07:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Problem of Evil

a talk by John MacArthur

"How can the God portrayed in the Bible as good and holy and loving allow evil? And not just evil, but massive evil in the world? And not just massive evil in the world, but dominant evil in the world?"

McArthur characterizes the problem of evil as the one dilemma that both theological liberals and skeptics believe "backs Christians into an impossible position." He says that Christians too often feel their only defense is to say that God's ways are mysterious, hoping to steer the discussion to a less threatening topic.

Instead of punting, however, MacArthur believes Christians can take what seems like a desperate situation and turn it into a full-on victory: a 90 yard touchdown that wins the game.

Short Sighted Answers

Before he reveals this game winning play, MacArthur argues that another kind of popular answer is inadequate:

"'God's not responsible for evil, Adam and Eve are.' That is is a very short sighted answer because it only poses the question as to why God allowed them to be able to make that choice. Knowing they would, why did he create them with the ability to do that?"

or

"'God's not responsible, and Adam and Eve aren't responsible; Lucifer is responsible.' Which only poses the question as to why God created the angels with the capacity to rebel and fall, and did so when he knew they would and that Lucifer would become Satan."

Eventually, he says, the problem of evil goes back to God.

No Problem

MacArthur's answer to the problem of evil is that evil is not a problem.

"God created everything that he created of his own free choice and he designed them the way he designed them because that's the way he wanted them, knowing full well that angels would rebel and so would men."

"This is the God of the Bible. This is the only God who exists: the God who is in control of absolutely everything, and evil is no disruption in his plan."

"God wills evil to exist."

According to Calvinists, this is precisely the world God wants precisely the way he wants it. To suggest otherwise would be a heretical denial of God's sovereignty.

Salvation and Damnation

You may be wondering how all this squares with the common Christian belief that the crucifixion was about defeating evil. Well, it doesn't. MacArthur compares such thinking to the dualistic Good God vs. Evil God thinking that goes back to Zoroastrianism. There is no struggle against evil or defeat of evil in the gospel according to MacArthur. Rather, the entire drama of God creating some to be damned and creating some to be saved is to show off "the riches of his glory." Yes, God created the bulk of humanity for the express purpose of sending them to Hell.

You may now be wondering how such a God could be just. MacArthur answers, "He defines justice by what he does."

This isn't winning with a 90 yard touchdown. This is forfeiting the game.

The Problem of [an] Evil [God]

As a Christian and then as a former Christian, I have never been too worked up about the usual form of the problem of evil. Sure, there are some very horrible things going on in this world. But on the scale of eternity, even an Auschwitz is a brief moment compared to everlasting paradise or everlasting torment.

The greater problem of evil for Christians has to do with a God who would keep anyone — let alone most of us — in fiery torment forever and ever. One of the first cracks in my Christian faith was the realization that I would prefer no afterlife over Heaven for myself and Hell for even one human being.

I will never understand how preachers like MacArthur can embrace damnation for others and say "glory!"

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 8)

2012-01-19T18:01:00.001-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Challenge of Relativism

a talk by John Piper

"[H]ow is the bad thing called 'relativism' different from good ways of thinking relatively?"

Piper opens with the example of saying that someone is tall. He points out that such a statement is true or false relative to some standard of measurement. So perhaps a man is tall compared to the average man, but not compared to the average giraffe. Tallness is therefore a relative truth.

Piper emphasizes that this is "a good and indispensable way of thinking. If you're not able to process statements that way, you will probably wind up accusing many people of mistakes they are not making because you haven't tuned in to their standard of measurement, their context." He says that it's important to ask "Relative to what?" to find out what a person means in unclear cases. Two people can even superficially disagree about whether — for example — someone is tall and both be correct, if each one's judgment is true relative to the standard they have in mind.

"Relativism" is a term Piper reserves to indicate a bad way of thinking that is marked by one of these characteristics:

There is no standard for measuring the truth of a statement.
There may be such a standard, but it's unknowable.
There is such a standard, but it's unintelligible.
There is such a standard, but I don't care.

Tallness isn't very controversial, so Piper moves on to the claim: "Sexual relations between two males is wrong." Two people can disagree about this claim without being relativists, he says, because they might agree on the standard "God's will expressed in an inerrant Bible" yet disagree on whether the Bible condemns sexual relations between two males.

At this point, I expected Piper to explain the second way one person can say gay sex is wrong and another person can say gay sex is not wrong without involving relativism: they could have different standards in mind. One might be thinking of the standard "God's will" while the other might be thinking of the standard "not causing harm." If gay sex is against God's will, but does not cause harm, then both claims can be true (just as one person can be tall by one standard and be short by another).

But Piper fails to apply his own earlier example of good relative thinking. He is accusing "many people of mistakes they are not making because [he hasn't] tuned in to their standard of measurement, their context."

That's all that really needs to be said about this talk.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 7)

2012-01-17T21:47:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

A continuation (from here) of my notes on John MacArthur's talk: The Challenge of Science.

Does the Bible Contain Scientific Foreknowledge?

For the sake of argument, let's say there is no significant conflict between what the Bible claims and what we have discovered about the world through scientific inquiry. Many Christians seem content to nullify science as an encroachment on religion, but some — like MacArthur — believe scientific discovery is a positive ally to apologetics. They believe the Bible makes accurate claims about the world predating scientific discovery of these facts. This means the Bible could not have been written by mere human beings of the time.

Let's look at MacArthur's examples of what is commonly called “scientific foreknowledge”:

Creation Account Order

Without going into detail, MacArthur briefly mentions that the order of creation in Genesis “matches so wonderfully with the way things really are.” I can't let this slide. By the second verse of Genesis, the Earth already exists. It's not until the fourth day that God creates stars (so we can keep track of seasons). Here's something I didn't learn in private school: stars came first. The Earth was produced from the remnants of an earlier generation of stars.

Unless there is a major revolution in scientific cosmology which puts the Earth before the stars, this is not a chapter apologists should put forward as an example of scientific foreknowledge. Better to read this chapter in a non-literal way and look for facts of nature elsewhere.

Hydrological Cycle

Did you know that — until the seventeenth century — scientists were ignorant of the fact that rain falls, collects, evaporates, and falls again in a cycle which maintains the same overall amount of water? But the writers of Job and Psalms knew about this millennia earlier!

Oh wait, Aristotle did too:

"[W]e always plainly see the water that has been carried up coming down again. Even if the same amount does not come back in a year or in a given country, yet in a certain period all that has been carried up is returned. [...] all the moisture alike is dissolved and all of it condensed back into water."¹

So did other ancients. By the way, I had no idea if I would be able to find pre-seventeenth century references to evaporation being the source of precipitation. It took me ten minutes to find several relevant textbook passages and confirm the Aristotle quote. MacArthur probably just repeated what he heard somewhere else without looking for contrary evidence.

Astronomy

According to MacArthur:

"[M]odern astronomy — the study of the solar system — didn't begin to replace the old idea of a disc shaped Earth; Sun, moon and stars being gods whose movements revealed their intentions for men. In the Ptolemaic view, the Greek philosophers' sky was a hollow globe surrounding the earth, having the stars set like jewels in its inner surface. The sky was supported by an axis thrust through the earth and on this axis the sky rotated around the earth. This view was popular until, well, around 1500 when Copernican theory came[....]"

Let's look at the verses which McArthur claims revealed astronomy facts many centuries early.

Psalm 103:11 "For as high as the heavens are above the earth, so great is His lovingkindness toward those who fear Him."

McArthur says this refers to the "vastness of the universe" and that "it is not a small little bowl with stars stuck on the inside." But if the writer believed in a smaller world, it would make sense to write what he did to express greatness. If anything, there is evidence here from Hebrew parallelism that the writer did believe "the heavens" are (by our standards) close to the earth. The very next verse reads: "As far as the east is from the west, so far has He removed our transgressions from us."

Job 22:12 "Is not God in the height of heaven? Look also at the distant stars, how high they are!"

Again, simply stating that the stars are "high" does not differentiate between, say, the top of the atmosphere and distances many light-years away. Doesn't the story of the Tower of Babel imply the former? The context of this verse also implies a distance on the order of clouds. Verse 14 reads: "‘Clouds are a hiding place for Him, so that He cannot see; and He walks on the vault of heaven.’" The speaker here is supposed to be wrong about God's perception, but the setup goes unchallenged; it's actually playing off of the stars comment.

Jer 31:37 “'If the heavens above can be measured and the foundations of the earth searched out below, then I will also cast off all the offspring of Israel for all that they have done,' declares the LORD."

MacArthur just paraphrases this as saying "heaven cannot be measured." I think that's a justifiable assumption to draw from this verse, but what about the bit about the earth that he didn't read or paraphrase?

Jer 33:22 "As the host of heaven cannot be counted and the sand of the sea cannot be measured, so I will multiply the descendants of David My servant and the Levites who minister to Me.’"

Oh hey, this time the parallel actually works in MacArthur's favor. There may be room to interpret this as stars visible to the naked eye — which are more numerous than modern light pollution makes it seem — but I want to be fair and say this does sound like the modern view of far more stars.

1 Cor 15:21 "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory."

Modern astronomers have discovered "different varieties of stars." But there's nothing in this verse which goes beyond ancient common knowledge. A reasonable interpretation might involve differing brightness as seen from Earth. A less likely but still plausible distinction is star color. They come in red, yellow, white, and blue varieties. This was and is noticeable without telescopes.

Jer 31:35-36 "Thus says the LORD, who gives the sun for light by day and the fixed order of the moon and the stars for light by night, [...]: 'If this fixed order departs from before Me,' declares the LORD, “Then the offspring of Israel also will cease from being a nation before Me forever.'"

MacArthur relates this verse to the way orbits are extremely predictable. But this was also common knowledge.

Ps 19:6 "Its rising is from one end of the heavens, and its circuit to the other end of them; and there is nothing hidden from its heat."

Supposedly this has to do with the sun's orbit within our galaxy, not the really obvious interpretation of the sun moving across the sky each day. Does our sun heat the entire galaxy? Does our galaxy constitute the entire heavens?

Job 25:5-6 "If even the moon has no brightness and the stars are not pure in His sight, how much less man, that maggot, and the son of man, that worm!"

Scientists learned in the seventeenth century that the moon reflects the sun's light as opposed to generating its own; another fact revealed ahead of time by the Bible!

(Unless, of course, this passage is saying that compared to God, the moon has no brightness and the stars are impure...and that mankind is even worse off.)

At any rate, the idea that the moon is illuminated by the sun and that this is the cause of the moon's phases has been around since Anaxagoras, a pre-Socratic philosopher.

Of Discs and Spheres

By now, the general quality of scientific foreknowledge claims in this talk is apparent. Even Christians who do believe the Bible contains scientific foreknowledge should be pulling McArthur aside and telling him that he's doing more harm than good.

I just want to highlight one final example:

Is 40:22 "It is He who sits above the circle of the earth, and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers, Who stretches out the heavens like a curtain and spreads them out like a tent to dwell in."

This is supposed to show that the writer of Isaiah knew the earth is spherical rather than disc-shaped. I hope you can see that "the circle of the earth" is not a phrase which distinguishes between these two models. Plus, the picture of the heavens being stretched out like a tent is consistent with the idea of a nearby celestial dome. We can imagine God sitting on the dome and looking down at people who — from that height — look like insects.

I'm happy to let poetry be poetry. This isn't a verse I would point out as a reason to be skeptical of Christianity.

Oh, by the way, any miraculous foreknowledge claims about the Earth's shape are a sign that the apologist has never heard of Eratosthenes.

1. Aristotle (trans. Webster, E.W.). Meteorology, Book 2, Part 2.

Taking A Break

2012-01-06T16:23:00.002-06:00

Fun fact: I've been composing these posts with a voice recognition program for the last few months (Dragon Dictate for OS X). Since August, I've been having problems with my right hand. Now my left is even worse, and it's unclear whether I'll be able to work next week. Some kind of nerve problem.

Even though these posts require minimal keyboard and mouse interaction (mostly just formatting), I want to wait on a couple of tests before continuing here. Was planning on slowing down for the start of Spring semester anyway.

Will keep you posted!

PS – I've gotten back into reading fiction lately. The Diamond Age by Neal Stephenson and The Book of the New Sun by Gene Wolfe were both fantastic by my count.

UPDATE Jan 17 - Still working. Drugs helping. Still don't know what the cause is. I'm bouncing between hope and despair depending on pain each day.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 6)

2012-01-05T18:10:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

The Challenge of Science

a talk by John MacArthur

MacArthur begins by pointing out that "whoever created the universe — and everything that exists in the universe — understands it perfectly." Furthermore: "Whoever is capable of creating and sustaining that, is certainly intelligent enough to write a relatively clear and accurate assessment of that, and insight into that, and a true representation of that, that is understandable to the frail human mind."

He goes on to say that we can know a book was written by God if it accurately describes nature in a way that doesn't depend on human discovery. We can also know that any book which inaccurately describes nature was not written by God.

I'm very much on board with this!

Instead of giving a play-by-play on this talk, I will give my own description of the issue, respond to some of MacArthur's arguments, and go beyond what he mentions.

Does the Bible accurately represent nature?

One major difficulty with answering this question is that Christians are divided on what the Bible claims about nature. I don't think anyone takes Psalm 98:8 literally as a claim that rivers have hands which they clap when they're happy. Other cases are less clear. Does Luke 4:5 imply that there was a mountaintop from which every first century kingdom was visible at once? And of course the big question is whether Genesis is straightforward history.

I agree with the speakers in this series that the best interpretation of the Bible as revelation involves taking Genesis as history. However, many (if not most) contemporary Christians take scientific understanding into account and conclude that Genesis was not all meant as history any more than Psalm 98 was meant as a literal description of rivers. Nor is this a new hermeneutic technique. St. Augustine struggled with the way the creation account mentions "evening" and "morning" because he knew there is always evening and morning somewhere on the globe. As I recall, he used this fact of nature to conclude that God wrote Genesis as a sort of stylistic dissection of what God actually created an instant.¹

In the same book, Augustine wrote something worth quoting at length:

"Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and the seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he hold to as being certain from reason and experience.
Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household of faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men. If they find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know well and hear him maintaining his foolish opinions about our books, how are they going to believe those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life, and the kingdom of heaven, when they think their pages are full of falsehoods and on facts which they themselves have learnt from experience and the light of reason? Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when they are caught in one of their mischievous false opinions and are taken to task by those who are not bound by the authority of our sacred books."²

How Not To Correct Science (Or History)

At the risk of being mauled by atheists, I want to draw an analogy between Young Earth Creationism and the belief that Jesus never existed, even as a regular man. Both of these positions are far outside the mainstream of their respective fields. Both have passionate advocates who claim the evidence for their fringe position is being suppressed by mainstream ideological bias.

Now, disagreement is okay. Mainstream positions ought to be criticized if there is good supporting evidence. And it's true that mainstream ideas have the advantage of momentum. But this momentum can both in principle and in practice be defeated by a sufficiently strong alternative which provides a better overall solution. Scientists (and historians) dream of being such revolutionaries. But it isn't easy. You have to present something that can survive expert scrutiny.

Or...you can claim to have an answer that the experts are unjustly ignoring and make your case, instead, to friendly audiences who don't understand the evidence for the mainstream position.

Before I make any specific responses to MacArthur's criticisms of mainstream science, I felt the need to put what he's doing in perspective. It doesn't mean he's wrong, but it does mean these kinds of criticisms have been considered and shrugged off by experts in various fields of science.

How Absurd!

Back to MacArthur's talk:

"Modern scientists [...] since Darwin have, in a very unscientific move, developed a totally irrational approach to reality: nobody times nothing equals everything. That is the ultimate stupidity. And we all understand that. Chance is the creator. Accident, coincidence, randomness, blind luck, coming out of nothing, producing the intricate systems and complex organisms and microcosms of the universe. That is just an absolute absurdity."

Biological evolution does not start from "nothing." It explains how reproducing organisms change over generations. The question of where reproducing organisms came from in the first place is outside the scope of Darwin's theory.

Now, evolution by means of natural selection does allow for some pretty amazing complexity to arise without personal intervention. If this is so offensive, it might help to know that evolution doesn't rule out some divine (or human!) intervention here and there; you can think of natural selection as the default. This should be no more troubling than believing that rain has a natural cycle, and — at the same time — believing that sometimes God intervenes in that cycle. And with or without intervention, you can believe that God set up the natural world to work this way. No conflict with science there.

Argument From Information

Referring to DNA, MacArthur says:

"Supposedly all that was necessary for evolution to function: matter and energy...we now understand that within the matter and the energy is this massive complex information."

It's the other way around. Darwin knew information was being transmitted from generation to generation, but he didn't know how. The later discovery of DNA provided a physical basis for hereditary information.

"Science cannot demonstrate that information can spontaneously occur."

The information in DNA does not appear spontaneously. Evolution isn't the claim that random genetic mutations just happen to produce useful patterns. Genetic information is built up by a long process of testing mutations for helpfulness or harmfulness.

MacArthur goes on to claim that computers prove his point because you can't just put randomness into a computer and get something useful out of it. Actually, computer simulations have provided some of the best evidence that complexity can arise in the ways skeptics have claimed it cannot.³ Even better: genetic algorithms — modeled on natural selection — are producing practical results across many disciplines.

Single Cells Are Complicated

"Behe calls it 'irreducible complexity'; and he is talking about the fact that all of this complexity has to exist simultaneously as a minimum for any integrated cellular system to exist. There cannot be any process by which it is finally achieved."

Yes, each cell is remarkably complex. But this isn't a problem for evolution for two reasons:

First, it's possible to grant that only an intelligent creator could be responsible for the initial existence of a reproducing cell...without calling into question what happens after that.

Second, what appears to be irreducibly complex today may well have developed by redundant natural means, followed by optimization which tidied up those intermediary forms. Natural arches are a common analogy; or scaffolding when it comes to human buildings. Claims of irreducible complexity tend to jump from “I don't see how” to “it is impossible!”

What I'm trying to convey here is that simplistic 'gotcha!'s may play well to certain audiences, but they aren't an adequate response to the high degree of support for mainstream scientific understanding; and I'm not just talking about Biology. Geology, Astronomy, Climatology, Physics, Linguistics, and probably a few other fields support each other but are in sharp conflict with Young Earth Creationism. Which is more likely: that a small group of discontents are distorting the evidence, or that most scientists in a variety of fields are part of a vast conspiracy to hide the truth?

[Continued here...]

1. See The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Highly recommended for anyone who enjoys theology or history of science.
2. Contrary to my usual practice, I pasted this from Wikiquote. I intend to verify it when convenient, but I certainly remember a passage like this when I read Augustine's book.
3. Lenski, R.E., Ofria, C., Pennock, R.T., Adami, C. (2003). The evolutionary origin of complex features. Nature 423(8 May 2003). p. 139-144. [pdf]

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 5)

2012-01-02T23:30:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Faith and Reason

a talk by John Piper

As with the first two talks on postmodernism, Piper is echoing the topic Sproul Sr. just covered. For this reason, I will only mention a few highlights.

Reason

Speaking of the Pharisees asking Jesus for a sign, Piper explains:

They're asking for more signs to give the impression there's not enough evidence to embrace him as the bridegroom. And therefore he says: the reason you do so well with nature and so poorly with spiritual reality is because you're adulterous. Your hearts have gone after other bridegrooms and you don't want me. So it isn't lack of evidence. It isn't lack of rational powers. It's because they are evil and adulterous. And what happens is — Dr. Sproul made this plain — that an adulterous heart disorders the mind so that it can function just fine in selfish quests, but it cannot function in spiritual quests. It is enslaved to wrong inferences because it wants so badly another spouse.

Suppose this psychological model is true. Wouldn't it mean that humans can never be culpable for responding inappropriately on an emotional level to what they believe is true on an intellectual level? At least with Sproul Sr.'s three-part breakdown of saving faith, there was room for a convinced rebel like Satan.

Faith

Piper goes on to characterize faith as something that God puts into people to save them, without any regard for their mindset. So it's not just that outsiders are unable to grasp the conclusive evidence for Christianity; their attitude toward the possibility of Christian truth is also utterly irrelevant.

This is the Calvinist view that everyone has a crippled mind and a heart set against God, until God arbitrarily zaps some of them into Christians. And this doctrine is a consequence of the more fundamental Calvinist doctrine that everything happens because God wills it to be precisely so. Yes, this includes every evil.

Fear

Hellfire preacher Jonathan Edwards observed, according to Piper, that historical evidence and reason can only get us to "probabilities" (particularly among the illiterate). What's needed to effectively drive a Christian to forsake all and endure long torment in life, is a deep concern for unending torment after life.

That's a whole other discussion, but it does serve to illustrate the marginal place of reason compared to fear in the minds of some Christians.

A Question For "All Truth Is Absolute" Folks

2012-01-02T00:09:00.000-06:00

Is Pluto a planet?

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 4)

2012-01-01T19:55:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Questions and Answers #1

Topics during the Q&A range from raising kids in a media culture, to differences between Christianity and Islam, to how Arminianism doesn't represent true Christian salvation doctrine (Calvinism does!). Here's a decent introductory comparison of these doctrinal camps. And here is a pro-Calvinist lecture series. It will be interesting to see how this strong sectarian bent will affect the apologetics talks to come.

The Task of Apologetics

a talk by R.C. Sproul (the Elder, this time)

Sproul begins with the story of God telling Moses to deliver messages to the Israelites and the Egyptians.¹ Moses asks how he should respond if the Israelites doubt that God really appeared to him. As Sproul points out, "Moses is raising the question of apologetics: how can I convince these people of the truth of this mandate and that it has come from God?"

So God equips Moses with three miraculous signs.

Great! This means we can expect miraculous signs to authenticate any genuine messages from God, right? Not so fast. Sproul makes two points. First, that the miraculous signs were given to Moses to "persuade the church, not the world." Second, that miracles are "evidence of things that only God can do, to authenticate an agent or messenger sent from God. But before a miracle has any evidential value to authenticate an agent of revelation, it must first be established that there is a God."

On the first point, Sproul seems to have forgotten about all the miracles Moses supposedly performed for the Egyptians (and which might have been effective if God had not hardened Pharaoh's heart).² I don't see how he can conclude from Exodus that miracles are for "in-house" use only.

On the second point, it's nonsensical to claim that proof of divine action fails to provide any evidence of divine existence.

The task of apologetics is — so far — limited to the rare case of God sending out a new revelation to current believers through a miracle-wielding messenger. Doesn't sound much like contemporary apologetics, does it? It's unclear why Sproul would start his talk in this way, unless he wants to take miracles off the table for showing that Christianity is true in the first place.

Apologetics After Apostolic Times

"Throughout all Christian history in every generation there is a new philosophical movement that attacks Christian faith and truth claims. And so in every generation, the faith must be defended and we are called to give an intellectual apologia (a reply) to those alternate life-views that assail the Christian faith."

Ah, there's the apologetics I know. What I would like to know is whether Sproul thinks Christianity is (merely) one intellectually respectable position among other reasonable positions, or that Christianity is the only reasonable position. This distinction is widely known as defensive apologetics vs. offensive apologetics. We'll come back to this question in a minute. But first, we need to pick up some terminology from Sproul's doctrine of salvation through faith.

Latiny Stuff

Sproul gives a three part breakdown of "the nature of saving faith," as developed by sixteenth century reformers:

Notitia — What is believed. Saving faith is aimed at the correct propositional content.

Earlier, Sproul gave the example of Justin Martyr explaining to the Roman rulers what Christianity was really about, as opposed to the false rumors of the time.⁴ "[T]he first task of apologetics is linked with the task of preaching to give a clear presentation of the data or the content of the Gospel."

Assensus — Belief that the content of Christian faith is, in fact, true.

Sproul is clear that he means belief, not just hope that the claims of Christianity are true. Speaking of evangelists who ask their congregations to take a leap of faith, Sproul says:

"[Y]ou cannot screw up your jaw and choose to believe something that in fact you don't believe. You're lying to yourself and you're on the way to schizophrenia when you play that game. But that's what we ask people to do. We ask people to park their brains in the parking lot, come in here, and believe the absurd as if there's some kind of virtue in that."

Fiducia — An attitude of personal reliance, beyond intellectual belief.³

Pointing out that Satan never doubts the truth of Christianity, Sproul emphasizes the necessity of having "religious affection" for this truth. Specifically, love for Jesus.

"[A]pologetics can never get you to step three. Apologetics can explain the data. Apologetics can give you the rational defense of the truth claims of Christianity. And we're called to do that, to give 'the reason for the hope that is within us.' And we are to work to persuade men. However, the best arguments that we ever offer — however convincing they may be — can never change the human heart that by nature is hostile toward God, at enmity to God, and dead toward the spiritual things of God."

He characterizes the apologetics task of addressing the first two steps as "pre-evangelism," and then says the third step is up to the Holy Spirit. So to summarize: the task of apologetics is to (1) explain what Christians believe, and (2) give reasons to believe this is true.

Why Does Apologetics Fail?

Why do so many people know what Christians believe, but don't believe these things are true? Sproul tries to back off from the way he separated belief from will, and belief from love for God. He does this by claiming that an unbeliever can be given a compelling, "objective proof" and remain unpersuaded because of his or her negative attitude toward God.

Do you see how this explanation muddles the categories he just set up? If intellectual belief is not a matter of the will, then having a will contrary to God does not affect belief. (Or would Sproul like to revise his view that Satan never doubts the truth of Christianity?) Also note that intellectual belief does not bring about love for God, so apologists wouldn't be stepping on God's toes by inducing even universal belief.

An alternate explanation is that the "proofs" of apologists aren't so compelling after all.

Defensive vs. Offensive

To answer my own question from earlier, Sproul appears to believe that offensive apologetics can be entirely successful...but only for insiders. Remember, miraculous signs are to "persuade the church, not the world"; and fully compelling arguments are only fully compelling to Christians.

This sounds awfully convenient. Aren't most religions obviously true from the inside?

What about the Christian who believes the truth of Christianity is demonstrable, studies apologetics, prays for guidance, rereads the Bible, and discovers deep problems as an insider? That was me. When I had all the advantages Sproul reserves for Christians, the arguments of apologists were such a disappointment that I lost all confidence in the truth of Christianity.

1. See Exodus 4.
2. Sproul Sr. teaches a tortured interpretation of the heart hardening verses.
3. See http://www.ligonier.org/learn/devotionals/faith-defined/
4. See Justin Martyr's First Apology.

Monthly Picks

2012-01-01T02:05:00.000-06:00

On the first day of each month, I will be posting about new papers I've found interesting in Philosophy or Library & Information Science. I'll try to make sure at least one is accessible to everyone.

Sinhababu, N. (2011). The Humean theory of practical irrationality. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 6(1).
[link] freely accessible

Cooper, R. & Mazzocchi, F. (2011). Forum: The philosophy of classification. Knowledge Organization, 38(5), p. 398-404.
[link] retrieved from LISTA with Full Text

Nijhof, E. (2011). Searching? Or actually trying to find something? – The comforts of searching versus the challenges of finding. World Patent Information, 33(4), p. 360-363.
[link]

Papers I especially wanted to read but couldn't access

Magelssen, M. (2012). When should conscientious objection be accepted? Journal of Medical Ethics, 38(1), p. 18-21.
[link]

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 3)

2011-12-29T02:17:00.002-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Postmodernism and Christianity

a talk by R.C. Sproul Jr.

Postmodernism again? Thankfully, no. Despite the name of this talk, it's really about adding modernism to the list of anti-Christian philosophies.

This would make sense because Christians don't typically believe science and technology will automatically bring about a golden age for the human condition. Unfortunately, Sproul goes one step farther by treating science itself as part of modernism, and discarding them both.

I will hold my responses for a bit.

Satan's R&D

In Screwtape Letters style, Sproul pictures Satan as an infernal bureaucrat sitting in his office when two labcoat-wearing demons from research and development arrive and pitch their new idea.

"We've been working in our lab now for centuries and we have come up with an alternate explanation of how people came about."

The Serpent says, "You mean without God?"
The scientist said, "Yes, without God."
He said, "Let's hear it."

He said, "Well, we've come up with this theory where there was time and there was space and there was energy and they crashed together and out popped an amoeba."
The Serpent said, "Go on."

"Well, the amoeba went to school and studied really really hard and it grew and it progressed and it evolved and eventually it became a fish."
The Serpent said, "Uh huh and then what?"

"Well the fish, it took its little fins and crawled and clawed its way out of the water onto the dry ground and it turned into a bird. And then it changed into this and changed into that. And then this happened and then that happened. And then billions of years later...there stood man."

[...] "You interrupted my paper shuffling to give me that?! What kind of an idiot do you think would fall for that ridiculous story, that something came out of nothing and grew itself into people?"

Of course, Satan was only feigning annoyance. He knew plenty of idiots would fall for it.

The Great Distraction

Sproul goes on to claim that Satan's real goal is not to convince unbelievers to accept "Darwinism," but to distract Christians who are reading Genesis into thinking it's only a source of ammunition against Darwinism. That crafty Serpent!

And it's not just evolution. Sproul condemns general scientific method as "flip-flopping" and modernist optimism as foolish because we die.

The Idol of Education

What is the newest, grandest, cleanest building in a small city? According to Sproul, it's usually either the one belonging to the Board of Education or the teachers union.

"For the Modernist, the greatest sacrament, the greatest technology, the greatest tool, the greatest engine of progress...is education."

You see, Modernists believe that the way to earthly paradise is to get everyone else to be Postmodernists, which is why academic postmodernism is really a modernist plot.

The Gay Factor

At this point, Sproul seems to realize that his audience may think education and rational argument have some evangelical value. Time to fix that!

It's a misconception that "the lost" are lost because they don't have some vital information or because they haven't understood a sound theological argument. Actually, Christians know from Romans 1 that people like Michel Foucault first fall into homosexual sin, and then invent a worldview to excuse their behavior.

Nor is intellectual growth important within Christianity. Sproul points out that "smart" is not a fruit of the Spirit.¹

Science, Destroyer of Beauty

"Ask a modernist how they understand a rose. You take a rose and if you slice it and you dice it and you stick it in your electron microscope, are you going to understand the rose? We lose a lot when we reduce reality down to the periodic table."

Where to Begin?

Perhaps with a confession. I had quite similar views from childhood right up through my first four years of college. I know how hard it is to give scientific evidence a fair shake when you are already certain of a very different answer. Reasoning backwards from science arriving at the "wrong" answers, it makes sense to believe science must have started out wrong. I still sympathize with Christians like Sproul because I do think taking the Bible seriously as revelation entails some form of Young Earth Creationism.

On the other hand, I understand that many Christians have come to terms with modern science. Plus, I'm more interested in seeing greater scientific literacy than I am in seeing fewer Christians. Why? Because even though it's false, modern Christianity seems to be beneficial to a lot of people. Scientific illiteracy has less, if any, redeeming value (excuse the pun).

The Nature of Science

Science isn't like divine revelation or a "big story" metanarrative. Science is a method of inquiry, not a conclusion.

Science starts close at hand. Working together, what can we figure out about the part of reality that we can all — regardless of worldview differences — see or touch or measure? In this way, we build up a common store of understanding.

In a sense, the very abundance of hard-won scientific knowledge is a problem. There is simply too much for any single person to absorb. It can also be difficult to trace a product of scientific method all the way back to the original level of human hands and eyes. But we must be able to do this, or science will seem disconnected from everyday experience. For this reason, I believe science popularizers are just as vital in the long term as cutting edge researchers.

Science and the Rose

The Feynman Series — Beauty

Evolution

I was taught that evolution was invented as an atheistic alternative which, in turn, required the invention of a timescale measured in millions and billions of years. So it was a surprise to discover that there are very good reasons to accept the older timescale; reasons which are entirely independent of evolutionary theory.

Tree rings, along with yearly ice and sediment layers convinced me that the Earth has been around at least twice as long as the six thousand years implied by a literal reading of Genesis. But why go from tens of thousands to billions of years? The single best explanation I've found is given by G. Brent Dalrymple in his appropriately named book The Age of The Earth. Can't recommend that highly enough. Also, he's put out a more recent and less technical version which I haven't read yet: Ancient Earth, Ancient Skies.

There are plenty of other books on evolution, geology, astronomy, physics, etc. which would be relevant here, but I'm just focusing on what positively convinced me. The important thing is having the simple desire to find out what's really true, by digging into the reasons in support of whatever you already believe and doing the same for opposing positions.

Creationism and Postmodernism

Though Sproul avoids doing this, it's helpful to know that postmodernism is — oddly enough — widespread in the Intelligent Design movement, at least as a political tactic.² I talked to one non-academic Christian who told me, "Science just is a religion too." He was willing to kamikaze the validity of his own religious beliefs so long as he could take down science in the bargain. I hope we can all agree it's a bad idea to jettison the idea of truth, even if we disagree about what is true.

1. See Galatians 5:22-23.

2. See Pennock's paper "The Postmodern Sin of Intelligent Design Creationism," freely available here.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 2)

2011-12-28T02:33:00.000-06:00

[Series explanation and index here.]

Postmodernism and Society

a talk by Albert Mohler

It's as if Mohler read the way I questioned the strength of postmodernism's influence outside of certain academic circles, and decided to give his own version of Zacharias' talk to emphasize the pervasiveness and danger of postmodernism. That, or the conference committee assigned them both the same topic.

So here we go again!

After an ice breaker story, Mohler starts by trying to explain what postmodernism is. He points to the sense of scientific and human progress felt from the enlightenment to the early twentieth century, until society lost its level of "unrealistic optimism" and became disillusioned. This was the end of modernism and the beginning of postmodernism as the spirit of the age.

A pretty good sketch of a difficult subject. Mohler moves on to listing some features of postmodernism.

First: the deconstruction of truth. He says that postmodernism is not concerned with the nature of truth or what propositions are true, but on "whether truth can be known." By contrast, Christians understand that "[t]ruth is established by God and revealed through the self-revelation of God in scripture. Truth is eternal, fixed, and universal. Our responsibility as Christians, we understand, is to align our minds with the truth revealed by a self-existent God."

Sure, if Christian scripture is true in the first place. If not, then that's not what truth is at all.

Remember when I complained about Zacharias giving two alternatives: an outrageous answer and his answer? Mohler is giving us the alternative of denying truth (or denying we can know any truth) vs. truth as what the Christian God has established. Don't let the implausibility of the former make the latter seem unquestionable. I'm starting to wonder if apologists play up the extreme parts of postmodernism because it makes such a flattering contrast for anything else held next to it.

He then quotes Richard Rorty as saying, "Truth is made rather than found." The social construction of truth, Mohler observes, "is at the very heart of postmodernism." Truth claims are seen as "disguised claims to power" with the purpose of suppressing others. If this is the nature of constructing truth claims, then deconstructing truth claims would be a way to remove the disguise and be freed from oppression.

Where I think postmodernism goes wrong is not in the basic ideas, but in their extent. I would say some truth is socially constructed and some truth claims are disguised claims to power. "This is called a fork" is true, because we made it true. "Pink is a girl color" is true, in a socially constructed way. "Homosexuality is unnatural" is a disguised claim to power, which serves to marginalize minorities. Much of Mohler's critique is aimed at the way prominent postmodernist philosophers took these ideas to ridiculous extremes, like saying all truth is socially constructed. But what's harmful in extremes may be beneficial in moderation.

Second: the death of the metanarrative. A meta-narrative is an "explanatory theory of virtually everything." A big story. A worldview. Mohler quotes Jean-François Lyotard defining postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives."

For some reason, he focuses on how this would exclude a Christian metanarrative, instead of emphasizing that most metanarratives should be disbelieved because they are incompatible! Wouldn't an effective approach to postmodernists be something like this: "I can understand your wariness. You're right to see that many 'big stories' people tell about the world are fabricated. But here's why this 'big story' is worth believing."

Third: the demise of the text. This is what Zacharias spent so much time on, i.e. the notion that texts don't contain any limits to their meaning...all meaning is imposed or at least alterable by readers. Props to Mohler for pointing out how Bible studies often proceed in a "What does it mean to you?" style.

Fourth: the dominion of therapy. Something about how we're all sick according to postmodernists. I didn't find this very interesting, to be frank. Guess it does explain The Sopranos.

Fifth: the decline of authority. Pretty much follows from the above. Without some non-constructed truth, absolutely everything would become a struggle among fraudulent authorities. Mohler accuses postmodernists of hypocrisy for preferring liberation-oriented authorities in practice.

Sixth: the displacement of morality. I feel silly for only now realizing these features all start with a 'd'. Anyway, the idea here is that morality is a matter of authority, so without authority all morality gets tossed except liberation-based morality.

Here, Mohler goes off on a long tangent about postmodern art breakin' the art rules! I have a hard time being concerned about this, since I use a simple 'like' / 'don't like' approach to art criticism. Mixing historical styles is not itself something I find offensive or genius. He ends up saying that someone might be ok with a postmodern architect, but "no one wants a postmodern engineer." Funny, and it makes a good point against postmodern extremes, but it's very much in line with my point about postmodernism erring in its extent. Mohler's own story illustrates that it doesn't much matter if the decorations are postmodern so long as the physical structure is stable.

The Sokal hoax is mentioned next, which was so much better than anything Ashton Kutcher ever pulled off. (Or do you prefer comic format?)

Then off to sex in universities, critical legal theory, political disillusionment, and commercial advertising. Overall, the claim is that schools are injecting culture with postmodernist ideas, and this is leading to just about every bad thing from a Christian, traditional, common sense perspective.

I remain dubious about attributing so much to postmodernism.

Notes on "Contending for the Truth" (Pt. 1)

2011-12-27T00:10:00.000-06:00

What do you get a bookish former Christian for Christmas? Apologetics material, of course! I hear this often happens to apostates, and it's usually well-meant from caring people. I take things in the spirit they are given.

Anyway, this year I received a CD set of Ligonier Ministries’ 2007 conference "Contending for the Truth" [freely watchable here]. It's billed as a way to "equip believers to answer the false claims of postmodernism, naturalism, and our culture’s other atheistic theories." It's heavy on philosophy, so I feel this blog is an appropriate place to analyze the talks. We can pretend I'm one of Hemant Mehta's conference ~~spies~~ reporters.

Index

1. Index; Postmodernism and Philosophy
2. Postmodernism and Society
3. Postmodernism and Christianity
4. Questions and Answers #1; The Task of Apologetics
5. Faith and Reason
6. The Challenge of Science
7. The Challenge of Science (continued)
8. The Challenge of Relativism
9. The Problem of Evil
10. The Existence of God
11. The Authority of Scripture
12. The Holy Spirit and Apologetics; Questions and Answers #2
13. The Resurrection of Christ

Postmodernism and Philosophy

a talk by Ravi Zacharias

Zacharias is a personable speaker, but his introduction to the already-fuzzy concept of postmodernism just makes it fuzzier. He starts by characterizing it as "We don't know where we are. We don't know who we are." Then, he contrasts the belief that words have no meaning with the belief that word meaning is an ontological matter. Since he only finds fault with the first theory, I presume he holds to the second one. I find both absurd. He's leaving out the standard view:

All natural languages are both arbitrary and conventional. [...] To take a simple example, English conventionally categorizes eating utensils as forks, knives, and spoons. A single English speaker cannot whimsically decide to call a fork, a spoon, and a knife, a kiuma, a volochka, or a krof. On the other hand, there is no particular reason why a prolonged eating implement should have been called a fork in the first place; the French do nicely calling it a fourchette, and German speakers find Gabel quite satisfactory.¹

So it's true that 'fork' means a certain kind of utensil, but this is a truth-by-convention rather than an objective fact about the world. I suppose this would qualify as some kind of anti-Christian relativism? (Kidding, sort of.) To be fair, Zacharias is mostly targeting individual word meaning-making as Lewis Carroll did with Humpty Dumpty, but I want to point out that it's easy to make one's own views seem unquestionable by only mentioning implausible alternatives.

He goes on to present the option of absolute morality vs. individual morality. See the pattern?

Zacharias paints the picture of a succession of popular intellectual movements: Rationalism -> Empiricism -> Naturalism -> Existentialism -> Postmodernism. He seems to consider all but the last to be part of Modernism. I just want to note that this progression has some rough historical basis, but it sure wasn't a clear-cut evolution of one thing to another. In fact, I think apologists are prone to exaggerate the intellectual influence of postmodernism today by associating Every Bad Thing with the term. Modern science is still an empiricist affair, though some non-scientist academics (e.g. Kuhn and Feyerabend) have tried to infect the process with postmodernism. Rationalists are still kicking in philosophy departments. Really, outside the circles of literary criticism, postmodernism has weak influence. I don't understand why it's given so much attention here.

Earning himself some irony points, Zacharias reads postmodernism into the story of Eve and the serpent. He claims that the serpent was encouraging her to eat the fruit so she could "redefine good and evil" and redefine reality. But the text clearly implies the serpent was right and that eating the fruit resulted in greater understanding of the truth, not a redefinition. It's a story about setting aside the moral ignorance of animals and becoming a morally responsible human being. This is why eating is followed by the realization of nakedness ("the eyes of both of them were opened") and why the human distinctive of farming was established as part of the follow-up curse. But I suppose Every Bad Thing must go back to original sin, right?

The remainder of the talk is mostly about the laws of logic and how reality catches up to you if you take dangerous drugs and have promiscuous sex. Plus a very funny rendition of The Good Samaritan.

1. Millward, C.M., Hayes, M. (2011). A biography of the English language (Third Edition). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing. p. 6-7.

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Pt. 2)

2011-12-26T03:05:00.000-06:00

[...continued from here.]

Last time, I introduced Alvin Plantinga's argument that believing in both evolution and naturalism results in a general belief-reliability crisis. Since I do hold both of these beliefs, I'm motivated to reflect on his argument and figure out whether I need to make an adjustment.

Bold vs. Cautious

I would characterize Plantinga's argument as bold because he reaches for the conclusion that actual, human believers in both evolution and naturalism have a general defeater for their beliefs. At least, they do after grasping his argument.

He is suggesting that I, Garren, have better reason to believe my beliefs are mostly false than to believe my beliefs are mostly true. I can't take this seriously. It's like telling Philosophy freshmen about Descartes' demon that systematically deceives one's senses, and expecting the students to really doubt everything.

But to have a defeater for [the belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable] it isn't necessary that I believe that in fact I have been created by a Cartesian demon or been captured by those Alpha-Centaurian superscientists. It suffices for me to have such a defeater if I have considered those scenarios, and the probability that one of those scenarios is true, is inscrutable for me. It suffices if I have considered those scenarios, and for all I know or believe one of them is true. In these cases too I have a reason for doubting, a reason for withholding my natural belief that my cognitive faculties are in fact reliable.¹

Plantinga's alternative is to accept another story that an external Agent wanted me to mostly believe true things, so He tinkered with evolution to give me reliable belief-forming mechanisms...except when it comes to the stunningly important belief that He exists.

At this point, I must admit that naturalistic evolution does have a major disadvantage: there is less room to simply make up convenient stories about it.

I propose a toned down, cautious version of the argument which doesn't deal with skeptical scenarios. There's no need to claim actual, human believers in evolution and naturalism are involved in a belief-destroying vortex. Instead, Plantinga could argue that theistic evolution provides a better explanation than naturalistic evolution when it comes to the unquestioned premise that we do have (more or less) reliable belief-forming mechanisms, i.e:

If true, theistic evolution would neatly explain why we have reliable belief-forming mechanisms.

If true, naturalistic evolution would provide a very poor explanation of why we have reliable belief-forming mechanisms.

By inference to the better explanation, theism beats out naturalism.

Can Naturalistic Evolution Offer A Decent Explanation?

Suppose evolution is true and naturalism provably can't ever provide a decent explanation for our (more or less) reliable beliefs. Naturalists might still resist the notion of divine intervention because of other considerations that count against theism or for naturalism, but I grant that the consideration we're considering would be a strong point against naturalism.

Now, the important question is whether Plantinga is offering a reason to think naturalism can't ever provide an explanation, or is he merely pointing out the current lack of such an explanation? It would be easy to dismiss him, if his argument were another "How could evolution design an eye?" or some similar structural mystery. These questions keep turning up reasonable answers.² But it's clear that the kind of "beliefs" he is concerned about are not just a matter of physical structure.

To paraphrase:

Naturalists these days all seem to be materialists. What sorts of things are beliefs under materialism? Neural events or states hooked into the overall operation of the brain. "So considered, beliefs will of course be able to enter the causal process that leads to behavior."³

But, any properly-so-called belief must also have the property of being associated with a proposition, e.g: that Frank Herbert wrote Dune. Otherwise, the neurophysiological event wouldn't really be about anything. "How does a neural event somehow get assigned a certain proposition as its content? It is hard to think of any scenarios that are as much as decently plausible."³ And, once assigned, the propositional content itself would be an irrelevant bystander to the physical operation of the brain.

So you see, the core of Plantinga's argument has to do with the nature of propositions. The naturalistic evolution of neurophysiological states (or events) which are generated in response to sensory input and which inform behavioral output goes completely unchallenged.

This makes the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism a fairly niche philosophical concern, perhaps one that is only conceivable for those who take proposition or property talk too seriously. Consider a maze-learning robot that adds information to its internal state, engages in some reasoning to infer when it has probably been dropped into a different point of a past maze, and makes goal-oriented choices based on its internal map. If the robot has reasoned that the goal is probably three feet forward, ninety degrees to the right and six inches forward again, then I would say the robot believes the goal is located there.

We could say the relevant bits of computer memory are "associated" with the propositional content that the goal is three feet forward and six inches to the right. Then we could worry how this separate content-bearing property can reach back into the robot's cybernetic brain and causally influence the bits and volts. Or, just maybe, we could question the philosopher's analysis that took the propositional content out of the realm of causally informed (and informing) bits and volts in the first place.

I admit unfamiliarity with the philosophy of propositions, but it seems plausible that they are just linguistic descriptions of possible world states. A belief may be associated with a world state without involving a linguistic description of that state (though some Postmodernists may disagree). The robot internally represents a possible state of the maze, then we use language to describe that state, and feel the description is both integral and external to the robot's electronic belief. I suspect something like this underlies Plantinga's dualistic intuition.

At any rate, his argument doesn't cause me a lot of concern about the rationality of believing in both evolution and naturalism. I'm much more inclined to think analytic philosophers sometimes generate their own problems, and this is one of those times.

1. Plantinga, A. (2002). Introduction. In Beilby, J. (Ed.), Naturalism defeated? (1-12). Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. p 11.
2. Dawkins did a fun visual demonstration of eye evolution in Growing Up in the Universe.
3. Plantinga, A. (2002). Reply to Beilby's Cohorts. In Beilby, J. (Ed.), Naturalism defeated? (204-275). Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 212-213.

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Pt. 1)

2011-12-22T23:19:00.001-06:00

Since Alvin Plantinga has been in the news lately promoting his book Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism, I thought it would be a good time to review his famous argument against naturalism from the early 90s.¹

(Note: For his more recent moral argument against naturalism, see this post.)

Taking Evolution Away From Atheists and Beating Them With It

...that's the plan, anyway! Plantinga argues that — contrary to expectations — evolutionary theory is friendly to the belief that humanity was intentionally created by God in His image, and fatally undermines the belief that humanity evolved without divine assistance.

Basically:

Natural selection only cares (so to speak) about survival.
Survival is not significantly affected by the truth of beliefs.
It's unlikely, therefore, that purely natural design would produce minds adept at forming true beliefs.

Our ability to form mostly true beliefs makes sense if God intervened in our development; but if anyone believes evolution occurred without such intervention, she is left with a story of how she probably does not have a mind adept at forming true beliefs. Evolution + Naturalism = Self Defeating Belief.

Natural selection only cares (so to speak) about survival.

Pretty much, yeah.

Survival is not significantly affected by the truth of beliefs.

Here's where things get interesting. You might think it's better — in terms of survival — to have mostly true beliefs than mostly false beliefs. Plantinga questions this assumption by examining five possibilities of how beliefs and behavior relate to each other.

(Note: Early on, he focused on Possibility #5; over time, his focus has shifted to Possibility #1 as the core challenge to naturalistic evolution.)

Possibility #1 — Epiphenomenal Beliefs

He starts by drawing a distinction between beliefs as the neural structures that combine with desires to produce behavior and beliefs as carriers-of-propositional-content. The latter definition of belief is the sort that is true or false and it "can't be a matter of definition that there are neural structures or processes displaying both propositional content and causal efficacy with respect to behavior".²

Neural structures which guide behavior.
vs.
Mental stances which are true or false.

Natural selection could have designed neural structures to work in ways that produce survival-enhancing behavior, but mental stances are just extra. "[Mental stances] are not causally connected with behavior, then they would be, so to speak, invisible to evolution; and then the fact that they arose during the evolutionary history of these beings would confer no probability on the idea that they are mostly true, or mostly nearly true, rather than wildly false."²

To put it simply: true/false mental stances run free from the neural structures which affect behavior.

Possibility #2 — Same Thing

...except here Plantinga highlights the possibility that mental stances are caused by behavior or that both mental-stances and behavior are caused by a third thing. So there is a connection, but it's still invisible to natural selection.

Possibility #3 — The Form (Not Content) Affects Behavior

I read a poem very loudly, so loudly as to break a glass; the sounds I utter have meaning, but their meaning is causally irrelevant to the breaking of the glass. In the same way it might be that these creatures' beliefs have causal efficacy, but not by way of the content of those beliefs.³

Is this a real party trick he does?

Possibility #4 — Belief Content Affects Behavior, Negatively

Behavior-affecting belief content might be like sickle-cell anemia: not helpful, but genetically attached to other traits which are helpful.

Possibility #5 — Belief Content Positively Affects Behavior

The true/false mental stances we take actually do help us survive. But...true beliefs don't necessarily help more than false beliefs!

You see, beliefs have to be combined with desires to produce behavior. As Plantinga points out, "there will be any number of different patterns of belief and desire that would issue in the same action; and among those there will be many in which the beliefs are wildly false."⁴

True Belief + Desire A -> The Helpful Action
False Belief 1 + Desire B -> The Helpful Action
False Belief 2 + Desire C -> The Helpful Action
False Belief 3 + Desire D -> The Helpful Action
[...and so on]

Since natural selection only cares about the helpful action, it's more likely that one of the many possible false beliefs will be paired up with a matching desire, than that the single true belief will be paired up with its matching desire. Plantinga gives the example of a pre-historic man, Paul, who has the adaptive behavior of running away from tigers, but not because of the belief you might expect:

Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief.

[...] Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it."⁴

He goes on to give other possibilities of false beliefs being matched up with desires that result in Paul running away from tigers. The point is: natural selection has no reason (so to speak) to favor one scenario over another, so long as Paul's body survives to reproduce.

It's unlikely, therefore, that purely natural design would produce minds adept at forming true beliefs.

If this conclusion is successful, then a person who believes in naturalism + evolution has a defeater for the belief that her belief-forming faculties are reliable. This, in turn, constitutes a defeater for all of her beliefs...including the belief that naturalism is true.

Meanwhile, a person who believes in a creator God + evolution isn't stuck with an across-the-board defeater for his beliefs. In other words, evolution mixed with this kind of theism is stable, but evolution mixed with naturalism catastrophically destructs.

[continued here...]

1. See Chapter 12 of his book Warrant and Proper Function. For a shorter and more recent restatement, see the Introduction of Naturalism Defeated? which is a collection of essays on this very topic, edited by James Beilby.
2. Plantinga, P. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 223.
3. Ibid. p. 224.
4. Ibid. p. 225.

Lingo: Poisoning the Well

2011-12-15T21:20:00.003-06:00

I am at war with him; but there is such a thing as legitimate warfare: war has its laws; there are things which may fairly be done, and things which may not be done. I say it with shame and with stern sorrow;—he has attempted a great transgression; he has attempted (as I may call it) to poison the wells.¹

To poison the well (or wells) is to use some preliminary tactic which has the effect of greatly impeding any fair and reasonable discussion. As you can see above, the term comes from an analogy to poisoning a city before attempting to take it by force. Poison may succeed where force of argument would otherwise fail.

In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton argued against making trial by jury a Constitutional requirement in civil cases. In addition to his actual arguments, he wrote: "It is conceded by all reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all cases." This is poisoning the well since anyone who tries to argue for trial by jury for all civil cases has already been labeled "unreasonable."

I was inspired to write this post because I ran into a rather extreme case of well poisoning in Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl's book Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air which reminded me of William Lane Craig's approach in Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Early on, both books tell horror stories about what life would be like if the positions they defend were rejected. This strongly influences readers to accept the authors' arguments uncritically and reject opposing arguments offhandedly.

Craig on the Horrors of Non-Christianity

Before examining "the question of God's existence," Craig explores "the disastrous consequences for human existence, society, and culture if Christianity should be false."² He spends page after depressing page claiming that our lives are totally without significance unless we will live forever and there is a God. Then Craig tells a story of Nazi doctors performing vivisection on pregnant women, saying this is consistent with atheism and a story about a man giving his life to save others is inconsistent with atheism.³

The choice is clear: cruel, pointless existence if there is no God vs. fulfilling, meaningful life if "biblical Christianity" is true.

(Yes, I did happen to notice that he left out many alternatives besides atheism and his brand of Christianity.)

Beckwith and Koukl on the Horrors of Moral Relativism

Chapter Two of their book is titled "What Is Moral Relativism?" But before trying to define the position they're attacking, the authors explain in Chapter One that moral relativism is about living for personal pleasure without any concern for how others are affected. To make their point, they tell a story about a group of nurses lounging in their break room, "smoking and drinking coffee," while coldly choosing to let a premature child die on the metal counter rather than try to save it or comfort it. When one nurse arrived and tried to hold it, another snatched it away and put it live into a jar of formaldehyde.⁴

This, they claim, is what moral relativism looks like. In fact, it's hardly necessary to argue against it at all!

...

I try not to use such tactics even if it would help me win rhetorically. But sometimes I wonder if choosing not to poison wells in debates is as quaint and self-restricting as many might view the choice to not poison the wells of a city before sending soldiers out to die on its walls. Am I more willing to loose respectably than win underhandedly? Maybe so.

1. From John Henry Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua.
2. Craig, W.L. (2008). Reasonable faith: Christian truth and apologetics (3rd ed.). Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books. p. 65
3. Ibid. p. 80-82
4. Beckwith, F.J. and Koukl, G. (1998). Relativism: Feet firmly planted in mid-air. Grand rapids, MI: Baker Books. p. 21

Aphorism

2011-12-13T03:48:00.000-06:00

A moral dispute is a disagreement about directions before agreeing on a destination.

Rick Perry's War on the First Amendment

2011-12-08T02:56:00.006-06:00

As of this writing, the YouTube version of Rick Perry's campaign ad titled "Strong" has 124 thousand 'dislikes' and 3 thousand 'likes.' I have to admit, the ad made me a little angry. Not so much because someone would say the things he does, but because it's inexcusable for a current Governor and a Presidential hopeful with a team of expert advisers to spread misinformation like this.

What's wrong with "Strong"? Let's take it line by line...

I'm not ashamed to admit that I'm a Christian, but you don't need to be in the pew every Sunday to know...

Why would he be ashamed? About 3/4 of Americans identify as Christian. Claiming generic Christianity is the easy road for American politicians. Try running as a Mormon, a homosexual, or an atheist if you want to encounter a large percent of prejudice today.

He can't exactly claim to be referring to a smaller core of "real" Christians with that pew warming comment.

...there's something wrong in this country when gays can serve openly in the military...

Thankfully, most of us have figured out that soldiers deserve respect, not forced secrecy or discharges for something irrelevant to their duties.

...but our kids can't openly celebrate Christmas or pray in school.

They can. This is a shameless lie.

Now, children in public schools can't be led in prayer or other religious activities because this is coercion. No parents would want their kids led in a ceremony for another religion. Perry is pretending to be defending religious liberty, when he is actually opposing it.

...and he's opposing these Supreme Court rulings in favor of religious freedom for students:

Engel v. Vitale
Abington School District v. Schempp
Lee v. Weisman

As President, I'll end Obama's war on religion.

What war on religion? Wolf Blitzer asked Perry about this yesterday [video][transcript]. Perry mentioned the government not supporting religious organizations with federal dollars. What?! Remember, this is from the guy complaining about federal spending and "Obama's socialist policies."

And I'll fight against liberal attacks on our religious heritage.

Our American heritage is the freedom to believe and worship according to one's conscience, without government imposition.

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. [...] The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? — from Federalist No. 69, by Alexander Hamilton

Is Perry aware of this part of the job description?

Faith made America strong. It can make her strong again.

I'm nearly finished listening a free recording of The Federalist Papers, which were glorified letters to the editor explaining and justifying the design of the Constitution. (Highly recommended!) And do you know what I've learned? It's not faith but wisdom that has made America strong. Our Constitution was brilliantly framed to deal with the practical realities of this world:

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. — from Federalist No. 51, by James Madison

Amen.

Reading the ACLU Policy Guide (Pt. 8)

2011-12-07T02:12:00.009-06:00

Series explanation and overview here.

Note: These are my summaries of the 1995 version of the guide, not the policies themselves.

Loyalty and Security

Policy 103 — Clear and Present Danger Test

Personal opinions are constitutionally protected unless they qualify as creating a “clear and present danger” by either being “an integral part of conduct violating a valid law” or “a direct incitement to specific and immediate violation of law” or they “threaten a danger of unlawful acts so great and so immediate that time is lacking for answer, or if need be, for other protective measures against the threats and acts.”

Protected speech includes speech against democracy, so long as it does not constitute a clear and present danger. I take this to mean that speech against free speech rights is still protected by free speech rights.

Policy 104 — ACLU and Totalitarianism

The ACLU is opposed to “any governmental or economic system which denies fundamental civil liberties and human rights.” (This is consistent with the ACLU supporting the right of other groups and individuals to express support for totalitarian systems.)

Policy 105 — Smith Act and Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950

This policy actually concerns three federal acts:

The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (aka the Smith Act)
The Internal Security Act of 1950 (aka the Subversive Activities Control Act or the McCarran Act)
The Communist Control Act of 1954

Besides requiring legal, adult aliens to register with the government, the Smith Act made it a crime to advocate for the violent overthrow of the US government. At first glance, this might not sound like such a bad thing to criminalize, but citizens who don't have the slightest chance of putting such ideas into action could have been imprisoned for twenty years for expressing the opinion. Furthermore, entire organizations could have been deemed in violation and all members and tangential supporters would be made criminals, without even expressing the condemned opinion personally.

Further acts specifically hounded anyone with communist associations, or who supported broadly communist ideas whether those ideas were related to violent political change or not.

The ACLU's position is that "there should be no governmental restriction on advocacy of any sort, unless the adovcacy [sic] shall cause, in the existing circumstances of its utterances, a clear and present danger of illegal action." Merely increasing the probability that listeners may choose to commit a crime later is insufficient. Regarding organizational guilt: "Guilt is personal; it may not be attributed by association." The ACLU also opposed the McCarran Act because it required members of communist organizations to report themselves, a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Policy 106 —Wartime Sedition Act

I'm a little confused about this policy. It references the "Wartime Sedition Act of 1917", but I'm finding information on the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 (a set of amendments to the first). I agree that the Sedition Act could have been "used against anyone, at virtually any time, to suppress criticism of the government in the name of national security," but I'm seeing multiple sources claiming those parts were repealed a long time ago. Recent ACLU concerns appear to be about last year's WikiLeaks fiasco, as it relates to the original espionage sections.

Policy 107 — Emergency Measures in Peacetime

The ACLU is opposed to indefinitely continuing civil rights-related measures put into play during "genuine war emergencies." This is applied to the Cold War and — I suspect — would apply to our perpetual War on Terror.

Policy 108 — House Internal Security Committee

This policy explains the ACLU's opposition to the House Un-American Activities Committee (later renamed to Internal Security Committee). Instead of doing much in the way of starting legislation for the House, this Committee made a big public show of investigating citizens for expressing "un-American" ideas by a standard "so vague that a citizen cannot know whether the citizen's political activity runs afoul of the Committee's private definition of Americanism." These non-trial trials took away due process rights and chilled free speech. The Committee was dissolved by the mid 70s.

Policy 109 — State and Local Legislation

The ACLU opposes non-federal laws "dealing with advocacy of political doctrine" because there is (or was) already federal legislation in the area, and adding further restrictions just makes the civil liberties situation worse.

Policy 110 — Federal Employee Security

While the ACLU recognizes that some federal jobs directly related to national security warrant security screening, they oppose extending such screening to the many federal "non-sensitive" jobs which only require candidate fitness for the work.

The ACLU specifically opposes investigation into candidates' sexual orientation as a security matter. Apparently, it was claimed that homosexuals were a security risk because they could be blackmailed into betraying their country out of fear of expose. (Notice anything self-fulfilling here? Such investigations create or greatly increase the very motive they seek to exclude.)

Due process must be given to candidates denied positions for security concerns.

Policy 111 — Private Employment Security

The ACLU opposes the practice of any private employers investigating the national security risk of employees or requiring loyalty oaths. If a private employer is contracting with the government in a sensitive area, then the government itself should be the party to conduct security investigations of employees involved in such work.

Policy 112— Professional Associations' Membership Qualifications

Mere association with other organizations should not be grounds for removing a member from a professional association (particularly bar associations). It must be shown that a lawyer, for example, is actually not doing his or her duty as a legal professional because of "external obedience" to another organization.

However, the ACLU does recognize some latitude for not admitting a new member to a professional organization if there is thought to be a high probability he or she will not be able to conform to professional duties. This risk still needs to be evaluated on a person by person basis, not as a sweeping prejudice against the membership of other organizations.

Policy 113 — Federal Benefits and Loyalty Tests

"Loyalty oaths or disclaimers of membership in certain organizations violate the First Amendment rights of freedom of belief and association, and may never be required for participation in government-funded programs such as public housing or subsidies, welfare benefits, veteran's benefits, Social Security or Medicate."

Yes, that's the whole policy.

Policy 114 — Military Discharges

Members of the military should be treated as other federal employees, i.e. screening for security should only be done if that individual's job directly relates to national security.

Discharges must be based on job performance, not merely for exercising constitutional rights before or during service.

Policy 115 — Loyalty Oaths

Swearing non-membership in certain organizations has been required "for employment of government workers and teachers, for students seeking government aid, and for Social Security and Medicare recipients and the like." The ACLU opposes such oaths because they suppress free speech and association rights. Plus, they penalize any citizens with a conscientious objection to swearing these kind of oaths, whether they have had the associations in question or not.

Policy 116 — Governmental Surveillance

Police infiltration of organizations is contrary to the Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures," i.e. those not carried out through the use of a targeted warrant issued on probable cause. Otherwise, "[e]verything that is said and everything that is done over an unlimited period of time comes into the hands of the government, no matter how private, how unconnected with a legitimate state interest."

Perhaps this would be less of an issue if there weren't a history of the government collecting files on individuals, and this to their detriment either by denying them government employment or by publicly condemning them without due process in Congressional hearings.

The ACLU does recognize the proper use of "informers" placed or recruited from organizations, if there is probable cause shown that the organization is involved — or is planning to be involved — in "serious criminal acts." A judge must issue a warrant specifying which part of the organization is to be surveilled and for how long. Warrants should be renewed by the original judge and a limit should be set on the number of renewals.

This policy also speaks against using the military to spy on citizens, against building files on citizens merely for protesting government actions, and against keeping attendance lists of lawful gatherings.

Policy 117 — Controlling the Intelligence Agencies

Bill of Rights violations on the excuse of "national security" need to end. The ACLU has a list of specific measures to remedy the situation. Some highlights:

Implement only three categories of classified information. (1) Details of defense tech which would help other nations. (2) Tactical military details during declared war. (3) Defensive contingency plans.
Explicitly state that any information about the US government engaging in illegal behavior is ipso facto declassified.
Allow Congress to "unilaterally" release Executive branch information.
Make intelligence agency budgets public.
Create detailed charters for government agencies, and prohibit any agency activity beyond these limits.
Rename the CIA to the FIA: Foreign Intelligence Agency. Keep it out of the domestic intelligence business entirely.
Prohibit all CIA operations intended to secretly manipulate (or just plain overthrow) foreign governments.
Prohibit the NSA from monitoring US-to-foreign communications.
Destroy all current files kept on citizens for exercising their First Amendment rights.

Policy 118 — Secret Government Aid to Private Agencies

I'm curious what circumstances prompted this 1967 policy. Apparently a government agency was secretly funding a citizen advocacy group...or something like that. This endangers free discussion "by the clandestine introduction of ulterior motives of government policy into a supposedly open debate."

Policy 119 — Prior Restraint in National Security Situations

"The true test of our devotion to that principle [i.e. freedom of thought and expression] comes in times of stress or alarm, when those who would suppress the interchange of ideas can appeal for supposed justification to some imminent menace threatening the public welfare."

Citing United States v. The Progressive and the Pentagon Papers as instances when prior restraint "safeguarded nothing more than governmental overreaction, embarrassment, and the desire for secrecy," the ACLU believes prior restraint cannot be tolerated at the very times it is most critical that citizens have access to information.

On 'Embryo: A Defense of Human Life' (Pt. 4)

2011-12-03T23:31:00.007-06:00

[...continued from here]

To review, I readily accepted the biological claim that human embryos are distinct, whole human organisms. Then I challenged George and Tollefsen's (G&T's) metaphysical claims about substance kind and personal identity. In this final post, I will be challenging the basis of this book's ethical claims against killing embryos.

Before I do any more criticizing, however, I want pro-choice readers to feel the force of Embryo's ethical argument. It's not one to be brushed off lightly because it's an appeal to the way many people reason ethically who support legal abortion and destructive research. In other words, there's a good chance you'll have to — at least — change the way you express and argue for your ethical views.

It's a matter of human rights:

When it is a matter of race or ethnicity, color or gender, origin or outlook, our culture resolutely and rightly holds that what matters is the fact of humanity, and not any other property shared by some but not others. But, by the same token, in considering the status of embryonic humans, what should matter is the fact of their humanity. They should not be regarded as inferior to other members of the human family based on age, size, location, stage of development, or condition of dependency.¹

If being a human is really the criterion for having human rights, then the biological claim alone is sufficient for admitting that embryos have human rights. How many pro-choicers are prepared to say that human rights apply to some humans but not others? It would be convenient to classify embryos (and fetuses) as not being "distinct, whole human organisms," but then you run into the troublesome fact that human embryology textbooks routinely state otherwise. (I visited a science library after starting this blog series and skimmed every such volume written since 1990 to confirm.)

And if human rights only apply to some humans, how can we say one way of distinguishing between rights-bearing and non-rights-bearing humans is justified, but another way of drawing that distinction is unjustified? Wouldn't our choice of criteria be arbitrary? How can we tell another society which uses another set of criteria to recognize human rights that they're mistaken?

On the other hand, we might wonder why these rights only apply to humans.

The Clear, Bright Line of Substance Kind

The solution given in Embryo is that human rights apply to all beings with an essence of human organism, as opposed to only some beings with this essence or beings with a different essence. Besides a being's essence (or "substance kind"), all other qualities are accidental properties which don't change what kind of being it is. So being dark skinned, or being a sailor, or being conscious are not the sort of qualities that make an essential difference in kind, but being a dog or being a pine tree would constitute such a difference.

Setting aside the nature of rights, I don't think G&T's answer draws a uniquely justifiable line because — as I argued in part 2 of this series — there is no principled, biologically motivated way to determine that my substance kind is human rather than mammal, or human rather than male. A racist could use these ideas of substance kind and root-form attributes to argue that a zygote is essentially light or dark skinned to justify treating them differently. An animal rights activist could go the other direction and argue that cows and humans are essentially mammals and that it's unjustifiable to treat them as if they possess different rights for merely accidental differences.

Let's look at how G&T address this issue:

A racist picks out shade of skin as a more important characteristic than common humanity in deciding the worth of human beings. Now, between human beings and all other nonhuman animals, there is a radical difference in kind: human beings, unlike every other animal species, have the basic natural capacity for reason and freedom. But between any two human beings, the difference in color will always be only a difference of degree, a difference that makes no difference to the sorts of beings that each is.²

What's interesting here is that being human is not the fundamental criterion for having what we call "human rights." Instead, having the basic natural capacity for reason and freedom are the criteria...which humans happen to uniquely possess among the animals.

Reason and Freedom

To be clear, G&T are not asserting that only beings which can immediately exercise reason and freedom count as rights-bearing humans. It's that humans are the only organisms with these capacities programmed, so to speak, into their genetic plan of development. This is the difference that makes a difference between a dog embryo and human embryo.

By "reason" and "freedom," the authors mean that humans are the only animals with any capacity at all for considering and judging (reason), and then acting as an "uncaused causing" (freedom). These qualities distinguish persons from non-personal beings which think and act on sheer instinct.³

But is it true that (1) humans have these special qualities and (2) no other animals have them to any degree?

We do have the capacity for rational thought, but this is a trivial observation since we use "rational thought" to refer to a type (or maybe several types) of thinking we already know humans exercise. It's harder to determine whether any other animals exercise rational thought to some degree. Heck, I recently heard a claim that humans lacked rational thought before we developed written language; how do you disprove that without a written record? The claim that reason is 100% exclusively a human trait is at least questionable, given common descent and the early state of non-human psychology.

Freedom — by which G&T mean libertarian free will — is questionable in another way: it may be that no humans have it! In fact, I think it is conceptually impossible for humans to have libertarian free will. At any rate, it's not a popular position among philosophers.

So, in my view, we have a situation where more species than humans probably count as having some degree of "reason" and no species at all count as having "freedom."

The Myth of Rights

There are, in fact, an infinite number of degrees of the development of the basic natural capacities for self-consciousness, intelligence, or rationality. So if human beings are worthy of full moral respect (as subjects of rights) only because of such qualities, and not by virtue of the kind of being that they are, then, since such qualities come in varying degrees, no account could be given of why basic rights are not possessed by human beings in varying degrees. The proposition that all human beings are created equal would be relegated to the status of a myth—a noble (or, perhaps, not-so-noble) lie.⁴

To be blunt, yes. Natural rights are a noble lie. We express our deeply held values in the language of rights because it has been effective at swaying the masses and pressuring leaders, not because there's any good reason to believe rights existed before we demanded them.

Who can read the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and see anything but a modern wishlist? And what makes less extravagant lists any different? There are probably worthwhile arguments in favor of natural rights that I'm not addressing here — which readers are welcome to point out — but I'm mainly trying to explain why I personally don't find Embryo's arguments compelling from beginning to end. I was already this skeptical of natural rights before picking up the book.

What Do We Want From Rights?

I'll make a conjecture here. What the authors of Embryo (and their intellectual forerunners) wanted from rights was a way to justify treating humans as special compared to all other animals, and not merely from self-preference or from some difference in degree. The "extraordinarily puzzling biblical teaching that man is made in the very image and likeness of God"⁵ seemed to provide such a justification, if its meaning could be explained. Reason and freedom appeared to be what set humankind apart from other animals, but these attributes came in degrees for individuals. The solution was to focus on membership in the kind which featured these divine attributes. From here, it follows that embryos — who share in the human kind — must also qualify for special treatment; they bear the image of God.

Rhetorically, Embryo still has bite among many who don't believe in this "image of God" distinction, because belief that humanity is objectively special is still widespread. I won't say this attitude is a result of religion, because it may well be that religion was shaped by this attitude.

It seems to me that our evolutionary history undercuts the conceit of human exceptionalism. Sure, we excel in certain areas, but other animals excel in ways we do not. We rule other species by force, not by natural right. Why do we consider it a grave moral evil to kill and eat a human but not a cow? Simply because we decided to draw the distinction, then trained generations to feel a special revulsion toward cannibalism. And why did we want to discourage cannibalism? Probably because it afforded greater security against being killed by other humans when food supplies are low. Cows weren't in a position to negotiate for inclusion in this right not to be killed for food, so beef became a staple of our diet.

While other species don't vote or organize protest marches for their rights, some folks engage in activism on their behalf. This is why animal rights have been growing in the last century. I see pro-lifers as taking a similar stand for mute, young human beings. They can succeed in extending rights to embryos by convincing society to value human embryos specifically, or by making it difficult to conceive of embryos as a distinguishable category from the adults and children we already deeply value and therefore protect. This book, Embryo, is a respectable example of the latter tactic. However, I don't find its conclusion compelling because the criteria G&T use to set humanity apart are suspect, and qualities I'm more concerned about — a conscious lifetime and the ability to suffer — are shared by mature cows but not by human embryos. I would sooner call a cow a "person" than an embryo.

1. George, R.P., Tollefsen, C. (2008). Embryo: A defense of human life. New York: Doubleday. p. 114.
2. Ibid. p. 120-121.
3. Ibid. p. 106-107.
4. Ibid. p. 121.
5. Ibid. p. 106.

Monthly Picks

2011-12-01T01:32:00.000-06:00

On the first day of each month, I will be posting about new papers I've found interesting in Philosophy or Library & Information Science. I'll try to make sure at least one is accessible to everyone.

Evers, D. (forthcoming). Weight for Stephen Finlay. Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
[link] freely accessible

Kaplan, J.M. & Winther, R.G. (forthcoming). Prisoners of abstraction? Genetic diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity, and the very concept of "race". Biological Theory, forthcoming.
[link] freely accessible

Kim, D., McCalman, D., Fisher, D. (forthcoming). The sacred/secular divide and the christian worldview. Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming.
[link] freely accessible

Björklund, F., Björnsson, G., Eriksson, J., Francén, R., & Strandberg, C. (forthcoming). Recent work: Motivational internalism. Analysis, forthcoming.
[link]

Papers I especially wanted to read but couldn't access

Zaïane, J.R. (2011). Global information ethics in LIS. Journal of Information Ethics 20(2), p. 25-41.
[link]

On 'Embryo: A Defense of Human Life' (Pt. 3)

2011-11-29T00:51:00.009-06:00

[...continued from here]

If what I wrote in Part 2 is correct, certain pro-life arguments are flawed to the extent they rely on living beings having one definite "substance kind." I agreed that I am a human organism – just as human embryos are — but it's also true that I am a mammal and that I am a heterogametic being. The first category applies to whales and the second fails to apply to about half of all human embryos.

Still, these are all categories for organisms. The authors of Embryo spend considerable time arguing that 'I' statements refer to the organisms we are (however we might characterize such organisms). "I composed a haiku" must be saying that a particular organism composed a haiku. And since this particular organism began to exist as a single cell zygote, any use of 'I' is mistaken if it does not refer to an entity which began to exist at that time.

Even if adults and embryos don't all share one (and only one) substance kind, perhaps every adult shares one (and only one) identity with a past embryo.

This is the point made in the opening of Embryo, which describes an infant born in 1997 as a survivor of the 1995 hurricane Katrina; he was a frozen embryo at the time, you see. I won't dispute that Noah — as he was named — shares an identity with that embryo rescued from a flooded hospital. It's true that Noah was rescued as an embryo. However, it's also true that he was not.

Oh. I must be one of those crazed relativists, right? In some areas I am a relativist, but I suggest reserving 'crazed' for the ones who endorse contradictory propositions. I'm only claiming that the two boldface statements above which appear contradictory aren't necessarily in conflict because we can and often do mean different things by 'I' language (and 'he' language in this case). Furthermore, such variations may interfere with clear communication, but aren't otherwise a mistake, since personal identity is a conceptual chimera rather than a reality.

Consider this snag:

It is necessary to add the qualification "the vast majority of us," because there are exceptions to this claim about the beginning point of human beings. For identical twins do not come into existence at fertilization. At least one twin comes to be at a later point when the embryo divides—probably because of some extrinsically caused disruption—into two genetically identical human beings. What has happened to the early embryo? Some think that the early embryo is identical to one of the subsequent twins; it is as if a new embryo has "budded" off from the first. Others think that the first embryo ceases to be, and two new embryos take its place.¹

Well, which is it? Are the authors waiting on a biological fact that embryologists just aren't sure about yet? They can't be reserving judgment on account of not knowing whether the first embryo's soul (if it had one) is attached to one, both, or neither twin; they've already sworn off dualism! Might I suggest it's up to us to arbitrarily decide to count the original embryo as identical to one, both, or neither of the twins?

Same goes for science fiction scenarios about teleportation copies and personality reprogramming.

Or, better, perhaps we should realize that such odd cases reveal seams in the patchwork of personal identity. There's no simple, objective fact of the matter whether an original embryo survives twinning. Why, then, would the situation be different if no twinning occurs?

Without a strongly realist view of personal identity, 'I' language is set free to apply to the different ways we think of identity. Would I survive a personality reprogramming? A permanent removal of conscious awareness? A teleportation? A bodily resurrection? A religious conversion? A mental state upload to a computer? A piecemeal physical replacement? A brain (or body) transplant? A millennium in cryostasis?

We can get different answers depending on which aspect of personal identity we're asking about.

Back to Noah. How can I say it's (also) true that he wasn't rescued as an embryo? Because here I'm using a 'he' which indicates Noah's conscious lifetime, so to speak. This isn't some other substance I'm claiming Noah "really is" rather than a human organism (or vertebrate organism, or male organism).² I am merely using an aspect of personal identity focused on first-person experience, not biological life.

This view might be called linguistic dualism in contrast to metaphysical dualism, but 'I' language pluralism would be more accurate. It accommodates 'I' language which focuses on bodily action, language which combines body and mind, and also allows for language limited to a concern for mental attributes. Metaphysical dualism may turn out to be an illusion, but even then we may want to retain a way of speaking about ourselves that doesn't begin and end with our organism.

[concluded here...]

1. George, R.P., Tollefsen, C. (2008). Embryo: A defense of human life. New York: Doubleday. p 55.
2. As metaphysical dualism is described on p. 61.

On 'Embryo: A Defense of Human Life' (Pt. 2)

2011-11-23T01:22:00.007-06:00

[...continued from here]

Last time, I gave an overview of the pro-life argument in Embryo. I'm not going to critically discuss most of what's in the book. Instead, I only want to explain a couple of major places where Embryo zigs and I zag.

To shorten things a bit, I'm just going to agree with the first step of George and Tollefsen's (G&T's) argument. Embryos are distinct human organisms. Done.

I can also almost agree with G&T's second step. I am a human organism, just as embryos are. Where I start to diverge is this notion that I have a definite "substance kind" independent of how the inquiry is framed.

When we speak of substance or nature or essence, we are drawing attention to the kind of thing an entity is and the various properties or characteristics that an entity might possess accidentally, contingently, or temporarily.¹

G&T then ask readers to consider an oak tree to understand that being an oak tree is its "substance or essence or nature." But what if they had asked readers to consider a tree to understand that being a tree is its essence? Now, if I point at something which is both a tree and an oak, is its substance kind tree or is it oak tree?

Tree. Then why not plant or living being?
Oak tree. Then why not quercus dumosa (one of many species of oak)?
Both. Then "the kind of thing an entity is" admits of multiple, compatible answers.

Perhaps the authors use "oak tree" for familiarity, but would have preferred a species name like quercus dumosa; they are trying to make a point about the species homo sapiens after all. Here's the catch: modern evolutionary theory undermines the idea of species as natural kinds. The concept of a species (like the concept of a language) is a convenient label for a cluster of organisms (or idiolects) that are significantly more similar to each other than another cluster of interest. I see no in-principle reason to stop at species when asking what "kind of thing an entity is," even if we're limiting our inquiry to genetics. My substance kind may as well be heterogametic human organism if we're having a discussion at that level.

What I'm saying here is that essence vs. accident is a matter of focus, not ontological fact. How does this affect the pro-life argumentation in Embryo? Let's look at two excerpts. The first is an explanation of why the essence vs. accident distinction must not be overlooked (let alone denied!):

Among the areas in which the gravity of this mistake is most clearly seen is in the area of embryo ethics. For embryos clearly cannot think, choose and speak; nor are they (yet) self-conscious or even sentient. Were this to mean that embryos were not the same kind of beings as the readers and authors of this book, that they were not persons, then it would be difficult to see why they should be accorded the same moral respect that we, authors and readers, believe we are entitled to.²

The argument here needs a little more context before it becomes clear. We get a strong hint later in the chapter:

Body-self dualists look only at the properties essential to human life, such as mental functioning and self-consciousness, as they exist at the height of their development. But where could such properties come from if they were not already rooted in the nature of the being that possessed them?³

So, roughly, the idea is that we adults can only derive our mental properties from our nature/substance kind. We only have one substance kind: human organism. Any moral respect due by virtue of possessing a property is due by virtue of membership in a substance kind with that property. Therefore, any moral respect due by virtue of our mental properties is due by virtue of being a human organism (which embryos also are).

But if substance kind is interest-relative, then the way the inquiry is framed can give the result of me having the same substance kind as an oak tree (both eukaryotic organisms), or a different substance kind from my mother (heterogametic organism vs. homogametic organism). We could even count "organism" as a substance kind if we are contrasting organisms against entities which aren't organisms.

Talking about kinds is useful in everyday speech, but I don't think such categories are as real as George and Tollefsen make them out to be.

[continued here...]

1. George, R.P., Tollefsen, C. (2008). Embryo: A defense of human life. New York: Doubleday. p. 58
2. Ibid. p. 60
3. Ibid. p. 81

On 'Embryo: A Defense of Human Life' (Pt. 1)

2011-11-20T01:09:00.007-06:00

Embryo: A Defense of Human Life is an important pro-life book which attempts to build its case without any reliance on religion. One crucial step even works better under a physicalist view, which I certainly didn't expect.

In this post, I will sketch the overall shape of Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen's argument.

Three Steps

Embryo begins with a biological argument that human embryos are distinct, whole human organisms. This is followed by a metaphysical argument that we adult humans are essentially (only) human organisms. Finally, a moral argument that human rights can only be held by adults by virtue of being human organisms...which applies equally to human embryos.

The Biological Argument

This section of the book hinges on the difference between organisms and mere parts of organisms. How can we count embryos as distinct organisms, while denying this status to eggs, sperm, and skin cells?

George and Tollefsen (G&T) don't provide a detailed general definition of "organism," but they do list features of embryos which set them apart.

An embryo...

...is a single biological system (p. 39)¹
...is typically genetically distinct from its parents (p. 40)
...contains all the genetic information needed to develop into an adult human (p. 41)
...internally directs its own growth and development (p. 41)
...is actively developing toward maturity (p. 39)

Eggs and sperm each only contain part of the genetic information needed to develop into a mature human; nor are they actively developing themselves in that direction. Skin cells may contain full genetic information, but they aren't actively developing themselves in the direction of a mature human either.

Against arguments that embryos don't count as organisms on their own because they need to remain in a womb to survive, G&T write: "All human beings are dependent on their environment for their ability to grow, survive, and flourish, and human beings early in their development are no exception."²

The biological argument is successful when readers agree human embryos are whole human organisms at an early stage of development.

The Metaphysical Argument

This is the step that works better under a physicalist worldview because G&T argue against various forms of self-body dualism. In other words, they argue that you and I are identical to our bodies. We began to exist when our bodies began to exist; we will die when our bodies die. Since our bodies are essentially just human organisms, you and I are essentially just human organisms.

What is our substance kind, our nature, our essence? What sort of beings are we, substantially, rather than accidentally? We will argue in this chapter that we are, in fact, living organisms of the human species, that is, we are human beings.³

What's the alternative? Plato and much of Christian tradition claimed that we are souls inhabiting a body, until our bodies die and our souls continue on. Descartes considered himself essentially a thinking being, and only accidentally an embodied being.⁴ Other forms of self–body dualism are mentioned, but you probably get the point by now.

G&T give three reasons to doubt dualism. First, they appeal to the way we naturally think of ourselves as walking, touching, eating, etc. Second, they bring up the problem of how "minds and bodies can have causal impacts upon one another" and suggest that skepticism about knowledge is only such a perennial nuisance because philosophers have accepted Descartes' dualist assumptions. Third, they accuse dualists of incoherence for attempting to explain one entity by introducing two entities, neither of which can be identified as the dualist.⁵

Still, some may object to G&T's animalist view that we are fundamentally human organisms (human animals), because our creative, intellectual, and moral abilities seem left out; these qualities seem objectionably omitted from what it means to be human persons.

The authors answer by pointing out that almost no one insists these abilities must be immediately exercisable in adult humans to count as a person (otherwise patients under general anesthesia would cease to be people for the duration). On the other hand, if capacity for characteristically human mental abilities is key, then human embryos possess such capacity in root form even as they develop themselves toward the point of exercising these abilities.

This metaphysical argument is successful when readers accept that they are identical to their bodies, when they agree they are persons by virtue of being human animals.

The Moral Argument

Once it has been established that both adult humans and embryos are essentially human organisms, it might seem the pro-life argument is complete. Not so fast. There are still pro-choicers who engage in what the authors call moral dualism, in which some human beings are accorded human rights but other human beings are not.

When it is a matter of race or ethnicity, color or gender, origin or outlook, our culture resolutely and rightly holds that what matters is the fact of humanity, and not any other property shared by some but not others. But, by the same token, in considering the status of embryonic humans, what should matter is the fact of their humanity. They should not be regarded as inferior to other members of the human family based on age, size, location, stage of development, or condition of dependency.⁶

If we take human rights seriously as intrinsic moral dignities held by virtue of being human, then — considering the biological and metaphysical conclusions above — we cannot exclude human embryos. Moral dualists must undermine the concept of human rights, which would be a slippery slope to start down.

As you might have guessed, Utilitarianism and other consequentialist moral theories are rejected by George and Tollefsen. Such views don't take rights seriously as basic moral concepts. Is this an ad hoc move? No; plenty of other philosophers reject consequentialism for similar reasons without having the moral status of embryos in mind.

An Inconvenient Truth?

Embryo wraps up with a discussion of how public policy should change if the biological, metaphysical, and moral arguments are sound. The objection that pro-life policy is necessarily based on religious belief is defeated by this book's non-reliance on religion. And the objection that the treatment of embryos is a private matter can be answered by the appeal to human rights.

G&T call for the United States to continue the federal policy of not funding "embryo-destructive research" and for states to do the same. They also encourage increased funding for "research into adult, amniotic, and placental stem cells." Finally, they call for laws to ensure in vitro fertilization procedures only create embryos in the numbers that will be brought to term; adoption agencies should then push to rescue the current multitude of frozen embryos.⁷

I agree these would be appropriate public policy steps if the overall pro-life argument presented in this book were sound. However, I do have reservations, which I'll explain in a followup post (or posts, if needed).

[continued here...]

1. These are semi-quotes.
2. George, R.P., Tollefsen, C. (2008). Embryo: A defense of human life. New York: Doubleday. p. 51.
3. ibid. p. 59.
4. ibid. p. 62-63.
5. ibid. p. 70-77.
6. ibid. p. 114.
7. ibid. p. 210-217.

Notes On Civics Education

2011-11-13T19:11:00.009-06:00

Yesterday I attended the annual meeting of the Academic Freedom Coalition of Nebraska (AFCON). This year's topic was “Reviving Civics Education in Nebraska,” with a particular emphasis on transforming civics education from passive lessons on how government works to an active habit of becoming personally informed and involved.

A panel of speakers from the Civics Nebraska Partnership Advisory Committee (CNPAC) explained how they had been appointed by the Nebraska State Board of Education to research and make recommendations on improving civics education. This task came with some restrictions. Additional funding was off the table. Nor did the committee think yet another standardized test would be effective, which would mean they had to do without that motivating influence on school administrators.

Civics Portfolios

Instead of standardized testing, the committee promotes the concept of civics portfolios for students. Think of it as an art portfolio except with an ongoing record of various kinds of civic engagement. (Art is another subject focused on doing, not merely knowing.) The key element here is student choice. It's one thing to be assigned a particular task, quite another to be given the freedom to choose and take ownership of a kind of task within wide boundaries. This also allows students to choose partisan projects the school itself could not specifically assign.

I recommend taking a look at these guidelines for a pilot program in civics portfolios going on right now. Some of this is happening in higher education as well.

Legislative Action

Earlier this year, State Sen. Rich Pahls introduced a bill to put this change of perspective on civics education into state law. LB544 passed and was signed by the Governor on April 26. What did this bill accomplish, exactly? There was already a requirement for every Nebraska high school to teach civics in at least two grades, with a variety of specific topics to be covered. One such topic was, “The duties of citizenship.” This bill expanded that language to:

The duties of citizenship, including active participation in the improvement of a citizen's community, state, country, and world and the value and practice of civil discourse between opposing interests.

Civics portfolios are not mentioned, but they are an effective means to the newly prescribed end.

I find it interesting that this newly expanded requirement immediately follows a requirement to teach: "The benefits and advantages of our form of government and the dangers and fallacies of Nazism, Communism, and similar ideologies," which is less about critical thinking and more about assigning the 'proper' conclusions. You can read the entire statute here.

What About Me?

I found this panel discussion highly relevant to my budding career as a librarian. Students working on their civics portfolios will need to research such areas as local demographics, local conflicts of interest, entrenched societal debates, means–ends solutions, laws, and cultural differences. They may need assistance working with creative media and with writing papers. Think what will happen if this whole “civics engagement” thing actually sticks with students and carries through beyond school requirements! Our reference desks could see a dramatic increase in activity, particularly if we take the opportunity to market libraries in this area. Count me in.

Religious Freedom

2011-11-08T17:50:00.000-06:00

[I wrote this as a sample essay for the city newspaper, but it didn't land me a spot on the panel of community columnists this year.]

Conversations about government and religion too often get stuck on conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment. We can do better by uniting around the goal of religious freedom.

What is religious freedom? According to the Nebraska State Constitution, "All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences." Such statements reflect important past progress compared to Europe's history of religious wars and the oppression of Jews and "heretics," which the Plymouth Pilgrims and so many others came to America to escape.

Today, religion in America is much more than a question of which sort of Christian or Jew a person may be. The Pew Forum's 2008 "U.S. Religious Landscape Survey" revealed that about one in five Americans identity as neither Christian nor Jewish, a considerably larger minority than Black Americans. The right to worship "Almighty God" of Jewish scripture is necessary for religious freedom, but insufficient.

Why should the religious majority support freedom of conscience to worship other Gods or not worship any God? First: simple fairness. If you appreciate the government not telling you that Catholic or Baptist is the way to be, you can appreciate the government not telling your neighbors that Christian or Jewish is the way to be. Second: your current freedom deepens when it includes the freedom to believe otherwise. Third: governments have a tendency to bend religious doctrine to the benefit of the state, not the other way around.

Assuming we're all on board with this notion of religious freedom for all, the next step is practical application. I recommend a simple thought experiment:

Imagine if the population of the United States were majority Muslim instead of majority Christian. Assuming you are not a Muslim, how would you want the government to handle matters of religious freedom? If you have children, how would you want schools to handle religion? If you are patriotic, how would you respond to your fellow Americans who think patriotism and Islam are a package deal? Re-run the hypothetical with a majority Hindu or majority Non-religious America.

By roleplaying the perspective of a religious minority, what seemed fair from a privileged position may not look so fair after all. For example, many American Christians see nothing wrong with public school teachers leading students in Christian-style prayer, so long as children can choose to leave the room or quietly refrain. But what if the roles were reversed? If public school teachers in a majority Muslim America led their captive audiences in Muslim-style prayer, would this sit well with Christian parents so long as their children could choose to refrain from joining the class on prayer rugs?

When it comes to religious belief, none of us needs the government on our side. Nor would I want it. I'm much more concerned that you and I both have freedom of conscience as fellow citizens. It won't always be easy to figure out the best way to implement religious freedom, but if we commit to this common goal we can argue the details as friends and neighbors who want to do right by each other.

Unprotected Speech

2011-11-06T01:19:00.001-05:00

Depictions of animal cruelty are not, as a class, categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. [...] Since its enactment, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions on a few historic categories of speech—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct—that “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. Depictions of animal cruelty should not be added to that list. While the prohibition of animal cruelty has a long history in American law, there is no evidence of a similar tradition prohibiting depictions of such cruelty.¹ [boldface added]

The First Amendment itself does not even hint at "permitted restrictions.” However, legal tradition has allowed restrictions in the categories listed above. The unfortunate effect of this situation is that citizens can't take the Constitution at face value.

Categories of unprotected speech aren't automatically made illegal. It's just that states can pass laws restricting speech in these categories without the Supreme Court raising a fuss. Or it would work like that if the categories were more clear. Obscenity, for example, has been defined by different tests which are themselves unclear.

The Hicklin Test

From ~1870 to 1957, the definition of obscenity in the United States was often based on a British formulation:

[A]nd I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Now, with regard to this work, it is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.²

The Roth Test

In 1957, the Supreme Court declared the Hicklin test unconstitutional:

The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.³

...and recognized a new standard which some courts had already been applying:

whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.⁴

One major difference here is that the average person rather than “the most susceptible persons” is considered. It also matters whether the offending material occurs throughout a work or just in some parts. And the standard is allowed to change to fit “contemporary community standards” regarding speech about sex.

All of this makes the Roth Test problematic. Who is this theoretical “average person”? How large is the community under consideration? And do we count the community of the writer/speaker, the reader/listener, or anywhere the work is advertised or sold? At what point do elements in a work count as “the dominant theme"?

The Miller Test

In an attempt to “formulate standards more concrete than those in the past,” the 1973 Supreme Court established the test which is currently in use.

We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. [...] As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.⁵

On the plus side, the requirement of specific definition in state law – depending on how state laws are written – might actually provide citizens with some idea of what is legal, without waiting to find out how some judge feels about it.

The problem of vague standards persist, however, because the question of whether a work appeals to “the prurient interest in sex” is still dependent on what a hypothetical “average person, applying contemporary community standards" would decide (see context of the quote above). What counts as a "patently offensive" portrayal? And what does it mean for a work to have “serious” value in one of the areas mentioned?

...

If you couldn't tell already, I'm not a fan of subjective laws. A citizen should be able to read the laws to find out ahead of time whether a given action or expression can be legally condemned. As Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent:

Obscenity - which even we cannot define with precision - is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process.⁶

1. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___ (2010).
2. Regina v. Hicklin (1868). [full text]
3. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). [full text]
4. ibid.
5. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). [full text]
6. ibid.

Monthly Picks

2011-11-01T01:07:00.001-05:00

On the first day of each month, I will be posting about new papers I've found interesting in Philosophy or Library & Information Science. I'll try to make sure at least one is accessible to everyone.

Dahan, Y. (2011). Privatization, school choice and educational equality. Law and Ethics of Human Rights, 5(2), 307-334.
[link] freely accessible, for those willing and able to fill in personal and institutional information

Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P.E., Mendelovici, A., McGreer, V., Wheatley, T. (2011). Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(10), 3162-3180.
[link] freely accessible

Nolan, D. (2011). Why historians (and everyone else) should care about counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
[link]

Winget, M. A. (2011). Videogame preservation and massively multiplayer online role-playing games: A review of the literature. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 62(10), 1869–1883
[link]

Papers I especially wanted to read but couldn't access

Bourne, K. (2011). Commanding and controlling protest crowds. Critical Horizons, 12(2), 189-210.
[link]

Ginn, S., Price, A., Rayner, L., Owen, G.S., Hayes, R.D., Hotopf, M., Lee, W. (2011) Senior doctors' opinions of rational suicide. Journal of Medical Ethics, forthcoming.
[link]

Two Kinds of Intrinsic Value

2011-10-29T22:25:00.001-05:00

There are at least two major, distinguishable meanings for “intrinsic value.” Unfortunately, these meanings often go unspecified, which results in a lot of unnecessary confusion. Christine Korsgaard covered this in her 1983 paper, “Two Distinctions in Goodness" from which I'll be borrowing.

The first kind of intrinsic value is contrasted with instrumental value. Instrumental value is the value something has because it's helpful or supportive of something else which has value; think “derivative value.” For example, an important point in how we treat (other) animals is whether there is any reason to consider factors beyond the value of animals to human well-being.

The second kind of intrinsic value is value that is located inside as opposed to outside the thing that is valuable. As Korsgaard put it, “It refers, one might say, to the location or source of the goodness rather than the way we value the thing.”¹ This kind of intrinsic value might be, for example, a property of the valuable thing itself which does not depend on anyone in the world valuing it.

So if I claim old trees have intrinsic value, it's not clear whether I'm saying that old trees have non-derivative value or whether I'm saying old trees have value regardless of anyone valuing them. Suppose I personally and directly value old trees. Also suppose that old trees need someone to value them in order to have value. In this situation, old trees have the first kind of intrinsic value but lack the second kind of intrinsic value.

Korsgaard considers the first kind of intrinsic value to be something of a misnomer, since only the second kind of intrinsic value contrasts with extrinsic value. Whether value is derived or not is simply another issue.

1. Korsgaard, C.M. (1983). Two distinctions in goodness. The Philosophical Review. 92(2). [search link]

A Proposal To Remove Date Format Ambiguity

2011-10-16T17:21:00.000-05:00

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Date_format_by_country

Instead of wondering whether 5-6-2012 takes places in May or June, how about this:

5.6.2012 day.month.year
6-5.2012 month-day.year

2012-6-5 year-month-day

The last format takes care of China, Japan, Korea, and some other places which add up to a whole lot of people who don't have to change anything. They can use optionally use different separators without ambiguity because no one uses year-day-month.

Using dotted notation ending in a year can be considered the base format in this system, since it is already the most popular format worldwide and follows a consistent short-to-long progression from day to month to year.

6-5.2012 mixed punctuation format could be used to unambiguously signify the style used by the United States and a few other places, which flips the day and month out of basic order to month-then-day. The dash can be imagined as a double-ended arrow (↔) which flips elements out of the basic order.

This means you can think of the year-first format as being derived from two flip operators like this:

5.6.2012 to...
2012-(5.6) to...
2012-6-5

Challenge: can anyone find a format in common usage in some part of the world which looks like a date in the proposed scheme but has a different meaning?

Expressive-Assertivism

2011-10-11T22:23:00.011-05:00

Expressivism is a type of moral theory which says that moral judgments are expressions of desire-like attitudes, rather than true/false assertions of fact. This straightforwardly explains why it would be odd for a person to judge something to be morally right or wrong and then be indifferent towards it.

For simple moral utterances like "Slapping children is wrong" or "You ought to watch out for pedestrians," it can make sense to understand these as expressions of attitudes. The big problem for expressivism is explaining what's going on in other sorts of moral utterances like:

Is it wrong to slap children?
If it's wrong to slap children, then it's wrong for my neighbor to slap her son.
Either it's wrong to slap children, or I've been misinformed.

These sure seem to involve true/false logic! While some expressivists have tried to show that appearances are deceiving and these sentences don't — after all — involve true/false logic, others have embraced a hybrid view which includes both the expression of attitudes and some true/false logic in the meaning of moral language.

Daniel Boisvert's Expressive-Assertivism is one of these hybrid forms of expressivism.¹ It was inspired, of all things, by the way ethnic slurs work (which I'll explain as I go over the three core features of Expressive-Assertivism).

First Core Feature: Dual-Use Principle

In normal circumstances, a person who speaks a simple moral sentence like "Slapping children is wrong" is performing two distinct speech acts (two "direct illocutionary acts"). One speech act is expressive and the other is assertive.

Likewise, the simple use of an ethnic slur "John is chink" simultaneously asserts something about John (that he's of Chinese descent) and expresses contempt for people of Chinese descent.

Second Core Feature: Extensionality Principle

In normal circumstances, a person who uses moral terms in any so-called extensional context still performs the same kind of expressive speech act as in simple moral sentences. The three "problem" sentences above are examples of extensional contexts, but "wrong" in "Lisa thinks that slapping children is wrong" is in an intensional context which falls outside the scope of this core feature.

The hateful attitude expression is still present when people use slurs in sentences like "Is John a chink?" and "Either John is a chink, or I've been misinformed." And notice how it's the same sort of contempt for people of Chinese descent we saw in the simple case.

Third Core Feature: Generality Principle

In normal circumstances, the expressive speech act is not aimed directly at the object of moral judgment, but at everything in a broader category.

Using the word "chink" normally expresses a contempt for all people of Chinese descent. This is why the negative attitude expression is still at full force when John's membership in the hated category is uncertain.

Solving 'The Moral Problem'

Michael Smith famously characterizes the central problem of metaethics as finding a way to show that the following two propositions "are both consistent and true" with regard to each other and with a Humean theory of motivation:

1. Moral judgments of the form 'It is right that I φ' express a subject's beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do.

2. If someone judges that it is right that she φs, then ceteris paribus, she is motivated to φ.²

Expressive-Assertivism provides an account for both elements. The assertive speech act concerns the "objective matter of fact" of whether the judged action, practice, etc. has a certain property. The expressive speech act directed at all things which have that property explains an individual's motivation.

It also helps that the way Expressive-Assertivism goes about solving the moral problem is so similar to the way another kind of value judgement — the ethnic slur — plausibly works.

Answering the Objection from Missing Expressives

These next three sections break what is commonly known as the Frege-Geach problem (aka the embedding problem) into three more specific objections.

The 'missing expressives' objection concerns sentences like:

If it's wrong to slap children, then it's wrong for my neighbor to slap her son.

where it may seem like the speaker can't be expressing his own attitude at that moment. At least not like someone who says "Slapping children is wrong." But Expressive-Assertivism explains both cases as expressions of attitude toward things that are wrong in general (whatever 'wrong' means). This is the Generality Principle at work. Just because a speaker isn't sure whether an action or a person belongs to a despised category, doesn't mean his use of moral language (or the language of ethnic slurs) is expressive free.

In short, the expressives are there. They're just aimed more broadly.

Answering the Objection from Incomplete Semantics

Simple versions of expressivism run into trouble when they claim sentences like "Slapping children is wrong" only expresses an attitude, because this leaves at least some of the meaning of "slapping children is wrong" unexplained in sentences that start "If slapping children is wrong, then ...."

Compare:

[expression of attitude].

with

If [expression of attitude], then ....

What the heck is the second kind of sentence supposed to mean? Happily, this isn't such a problem for Expressive-Assertivism since the true/false 'assertive' component makes normal sense in an 'if..then' context. A full reading with a reduction of 'wrong' might go something like this:

If slapping children is harmful on balance [expression of negative attitude toward things that are harmful on balance], then ...

I should be clear that Expressive-Assertivism as a theory doesn't have anything to say about whether wrongness is a property that can be reduced like this. A philosopher who agrees with G.E. Moore about moral properties being indefinable can adopt Expressive-Assertivism. She would just have the usual issue of explaining why we have strong attitudes toward such properties.

Answering the Objection from the Ambiguity of Attitude-Attribution Verbs

Consider these two sentences:

Sarah believes that her brother pickpockets.
Sarah believes that pickpocketing is wrong.

The first sentence attributes a true/false belief to Sarah. Under simple expressivism, the second sentence could only attribute an attitude to Sarah. But it would be odd if the phrase "believes that" is associated with true/false belief unless it's followed by ethical vocabulary.

As a hybrid theory, Expressive-Assertivism's account of the two sentences isn't quite so disparate, but the objection could still be pressed by saying it would be odd for "believes that" to only attribute a true/false belief, unless followed by ethical vocabulary in which case an attitude attribution is suddenly tacked on.

Boisvert responds by saying "believes that" attributes a psychological state potentially composed of both true/false belief and attitude to the subject. The same psychological state, in fact, that a person normally possesses when they utter just the clause after "believes that."

For example, when Sarah says "Pickpocketing is wrong" she would normally hold an attitude toward things that are wrong and also hold a true/false belief that pickpocketing fits in that category. If Jack says "Sarah believes that pickpocketing is wrong" then he would be attributing both the belief and the attitude to Sarah as part of her overall psychological state (try removing either element and Jack's claim is weaker than we normally understand it). Here's the key point: if Jack says "Sarah believes that her brother pickpockets" then Jack is still attributing a psychological state to Sarah, even if the state happens to lack an attitude component.

In programming terms, Boisvert would be saying "believes that" is like a single function which takes a structure rather than a simple variable as an argument. It wouldn't be like multiple, overloaded functions as the objection alleges. (I hope at least one person finds this analogy helpful!)

Wrapping Up

Expressive-Assertivism has two more attractive features covered in Boisvert's paper which I won't elaborate on: "it holds that the descriptive content of moral sentences is non speaker-relative" and "it is consistent with, but is not forced to accept, minimalism about truth."

Overall, I think Expressive-Assertivism is on the right track. Not surprising since I intentionally set out looking for something like it because I've held a rough kind of hybrid expressivist view for a while and knew someone had to be advocating a theory in the neighborhood. Boisvert isn't the only one working on hybrid theories, so you can expect to see more comparing and contrasting from me in the near future.

If you want to read ahead, see this paper from Mark Schroeder and the list of similar papers.

1. Boisvert, D.R. (2008). Expressive-assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 89(2). p. 169-203. [direct link]
2. Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell. p. 184.

Literature Reviews Project

2011-10-10T17:35:00.007-05:00

When I became interested in philosophy, I immediately started reading scholarly books and papers. Emphasis on "starting" because I didn't usually finish reading them. You see, the best part came at the beginning when the author would sketch the history of the debate. Then came the author's own contribution. Slowly. With a hundred qualifications. Time for me to move on and read the next beginning!

Since then, I have found books and papers worth reading in full. I've also learned the term for those wonderful summaries: literature reviews.

Even more recently, I've discovered that literature reviews can be standalone works with less personal agenda. Neat!

Let's set literature reviews to the side for a minute. I read a paper¹ for class this Fall which suggested having community college freshmen construct online annotated bibliographies in some field of interest. The idea was to give them a project that immediately involves them in the scholarly community as producers and not just consumers. They would also learn information literacy skills along the way. "So hey," I thought, "why don't I do that?" I've been on the lookout for a suitable topic since then.

Last Friday I listened to a conference talk by Sue Ann Gardner of UNL on her experience writing a literature review.² With the amount of distillation work put into these things, it's a tragedy for anyone interested in a topic to miss out on the final product. My thoughts were "Where can I find a list of literature reviews in Library and Information Science?" followed by "If there isn't a list, why don't I figure out how to make one...and make one?" I had found my bibliography project.

My plan now is to learn how to locate any standalone literature reviews in LIS journals since the beginning of 2010, decide how to organize them, and work out the best way to present them on the web. I also want to develop an effective way of continually monitoring new LIS articles (is there a PhilPapers for LIS?).³ I intend to follow Patterson's suggestion of learning by creating something of value to others. And this particular combination of activity and topic may even form a feedback loop of rapid familiarization with the current idea-scape of the library profession.

If any of you become inspired to collect literature reviews or know of any current repositories, let me know.

UPDATE — I started compiling such a list, but have set it aside for now. Defining what I wanted to count and not count was proving difficult when I didn't even have full text access to most of the candidates. Here's what I found for Jan 2010 - Dec 2011, in case anyone is interested or I take it up again later.

1. Patterson, D. (2009). Information literacy and community college students: using new approaches to literacy theory to produce equality. The library quarterly, 79(3), 343-361.
2. Forthcoming in Library Resources & Technical Services.
3. ADDED: http://www.ebscohost.com/public/library-information-science-technology-abstracts-lista is close!

Lingo: Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts

2011-09-29T21:49:00.005-05:00

John: "Darling, do you want to go out to the show tonight?"

Laura: "I'm feeling ill."

John: "That's ok. You stay there and I'll make soup."

Notice how Laura didn't respond to John's question by saying, "No, I don't want to go out to the show tonight." What she actually said — her locutionary act — was "I'm feeling ill."

An illocutionary act is what a person does in saying something else. Locution is speech. In-locution (in speaking) becomes il-locution through phonetic assimilation. In saying that she feels ill, Laura was telling John that she doesn't want go out.

Beyond communicating the state of her health and the answer to John's question, Laura accomplished one more thing through saying "I'm feeling ill." She got John to make her some soup. A perlocutionary act (per-locutionary, through speaking) is focused on the response others have to a speech act.

These terms from J.L. Austin's 1962 book How to Do Things with Words are used extensively in philosophical literature today. And in fiction, having a character who is deaf to the illocutionary force of language is always good comedy.

Words Defined by Words Alone

2011-09-28T02:51:00.002-05:00

In Chapter Three of The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood, Gleick (2011) wrote:

The dictionary ratifies the persistence of the word. It declares that the meanings of words come from other words. It implies that all words, taken together, form an interlocking structure: interlocking, because all words are defined in terms of other words. This could never have been an issue in an oral culture, where language was barely visible. Only when printing—and the dictionary—put the language into separate relief, as an object to be scrutinized, could anyone develop a sense of word meaning as interdependent and even circular. Words had to be considered as words, representing other words, apart from things. (p. 66)

This passage had the unintended effect of moving me farther away from Gleick's views than I was before reading it. It's an old rule to "define" words by using any other words but the one currently being defined, and a synonym for "definition" is "meaning," so it can be easy to think that some correct string of other words is what constitutes the meaning of a word. Gleick carries this to the conclusion that any given word only has meaning by virtue of other words which themselves only have meaning by still more words, or maybe the original word. He considers this as an insight gained through literacy and dictionary making; preliterate people simply weren't in a good position to notice that word meaning arises from a network map of individually meaningless words.

I consider this sort of view an illustrative overreaction to the crude philosophy of language that all words stand directly for things. Gleick would have us believe, instead, that all words stand for words. Not only would this fail to hook up to the world of things, it fails to hook up with the world of ideas. (At least, any ideas which can't be captured by graph theory.) A moderate take is that perhaps some words stand only for words or only for things, but many words stand for ideas. If I want to convey a certain idea to you, I select words intended to evoke that idea — or a similar enough idea — in your mind when you hear my speech or read my writing.

What are dictionary entries under this moderate view? Acts of communication. Dictionary writers are trying to evoke the ideas which are usually intended to be evoked by the use of a word. A good dictionary definition does two things: it correctly identifies the list of commonly-intended ideas behind the use of a word, and it successfully communicates these ideas to dictionary readers. Dictionaries may be artifacts of literate culture, but I would find it very hard to believe everyone waited for dictionaries to be invented before thinking to ask speakers for clarification of strange words. So under the moderate view, an analogue of dictionary use was probably already happening in oral culture. I suspect the major difference in written dictionaries is that authors were expected to define common words, and may have found unexpected challenges in that task.

Gleick, J. (2011). The information: A history, a theory, a flood. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Blog Stats and Stuff

2011-09-25T22:04:00.007-05:00

Words, Ideas, and Things has been around for just over ten months. Thought I would share some behind-the-scenes tidbits.

* WIT just passed 10,000 pageviews. Yay.

* For the first three months, pageview average was in the 150-200 range. This figure jumped to the 1,000-1,500 pageviews per month range and stayed there after Luke Muehlhauser featured WIT in a weekly links post in February.

* Most new traffic comes from Google. Traffic from other blogs has come in the order: Common Sense Atheism, The Warfare Is Mental, Somewhat Abnormal, Say Hello to My Little Friend, and Utilitymon. If you link here but aren't showing up in my list of top referrers, thanks and try harder!

* Geographically, top traffic has come from: United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Poland, Israel, Australia, Germany, Russia, and Ireland. It's extra fun to see places like Moldova show up in the daily stats.

* Only 15% of traffic uses Internet Explorer (this isn't the late 90s). 44% of traffic comes from Windows, 30% from Macs, 14% from Linux. Android is the most popular mobile platform by this count.

* Google searches on four particular topics are especially popular reasons for people to stumble in.

Moral realism.
Philippa Foot in general and her paper "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in particular.
Assumptions/presuppositions in scientific method.
Writing statements of purpose for graduate school in general, and writing them for Library Science programs in particular. (I hope I don't get turned down for plagiarizing someone who actually plagiarized me!)

* Inquiries about moral relativism and ACLU policies have started to pick up steam. There's been a few searches on what moral relativists think of murder, so maybe responding to that question would make a good post on its own!

* I make it a point to contact most of the authors whose work I analyze. This helps me to write more responsibly in the first place, and also gives authors the opportunity to correct any mischaracterizations. A few of them have responded in personal email and in post comments, which is just cool.

* Stylistically, you may have noticed I'm breaking with the web convention of colored links. Earlier on, I tried to make links apparent with parenthetical remarks, but more recently I have started manually editing in HTML underline tags. The underline button in Blogger's editor doesn't do anything if you have a link highlighted (ugh). I'm also avoiding all images on this blog; sometimes this makes conveying an idea more challenging, but I've had at least one blind reader who would appreciate it.

* Blogging about blogging is something I tend to avoid. (Obviously, this isn't a hard rule considering this very post!) Sometimes I do engage in subtle re-blogging by talking about a principle that's at stake, without drawing an explicit connection to the blogosphere topic of the week. This is also why you don't see links to the blogs I read.

* The name of this blog is meant to be a WITty reference to a three-category view that distinguishes language, from the ideas conveyed by language, from substantial stuff that exists independently of language. Postmodern philosophy which strongly mixes these categories drives me bonkers.

* I don't post on any sort of hard schedule. Bigger posts usually appear on the weekends or immediately after, just because that's when I have the most free time. And if I don't feel a burning need to write about something, I don't. I want to keep this blog a fun project...using my own admittedly odd definition of 'fun.'

Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom

2011-09-23T06:27:00.005-05:00

The fields of Knowledge Management, Information Systems, and Information Science use a theoretical model called the knowledge hierarchy, the information pyramid, the DIKW model, and several other mix-and-match terms along these lines. Not only the name of the model but the details of the model itself change significantly depending on who is teaching it,¹ so it would be more accurate to say it's a family of models.

Three core features of these models:

Data, information, and knowledge are distinct concepts (as opposed to synonyms).
Information is higher-level than data. Knowledge is higher-level than information.
There is at least one more level above knowledge.

From what I can tell, the relationship between data and information is the most common focus of this theorizing, with less agreement on what knowledge is and how it's supposed to relate to information, and even less agreement beyond that.

Data vs. Information

There is a lot of emphasis on the etymology of "data" as something which is "given"; it's there from the start and needs to be processed, refined, selected, vetted, etc. in order to produce information. A common analogy is the refining of pure metals (information) from ore (data). Sure, someone had to mine the ore or collect the data, but it's only useful as raw material for the process of creating information.

Problems with Data vs. Information

"Data" and "information" are both common words in non-technical English which don't convey the kind of sharp contrast used in DIKW models. We can already talk about "raw data" as opposed to "processed data" or "organized data." There's nothing odd about using "personal information" to refer to a Social Security Number, though this would fall under the data category in many DIKW models.

Considering (1) these are fairly close synonyms in non-technical English, and (2) the important distinction captured by DIKW's contrast of data vs. information can be conveyed by a variety of evocative phrases like "raw data" vs. "processed data," I argue that re-using these words in a technical sense muddies up communication without a good reason.

Plus, one person's given data is another's processed data. For example, the global average temperature in 1845 may look like a simple point of data to someone collecting such numbers for use in climate research. But that number has a complex origin story involving instrument calibration, tree ring measurements, statistical analysis, etc. There isn't a natural distinction between input stuff and output stuff when data/information is so often processed in an iterative or recursive way.

Information vs. Knowledge

According to different versions of DIKW, knowledge concerns the application of information, or "know-how" as opposed to "know-what," or expertise that exists within a human being, or an understanding of how different kinds of information relate. I'm seeing all sorts of ideas here, usually (but not always) about the transition from inert facts to taking action.

A Problem with Information vs. Knowledge

In non-technical English and in mainstream philosophy of knowledge, we do understand that what we know — or at least what we believe — has a profound effect on the way we take action, but also that knowledge is more-or-less inert before adding motivation or goals. "The application of knowledge" is synonymous with "the application of information."

The most charitable way I can see knowledge working as a "next step" to information is to focus on the implication that knowledge is internal to a decision-maker. The word "information" seems to more easily allow disembodiment; but then again, we don't think it strange to point at shelves of books and talk about "all that knowledge."

Overlapping Meanings, Not Hierarchy

You may have figured out by now that I'm not a fan of the DIKW hierarchy. I believe its success is due to the way it suggests new value or new information can be added to existing data/information/knowledge by doing some work with it. Information professionals would, of course, want to promote this general idea. It is an important idea!

However, the DIKW hierarchy doesn't seem to reflect either the common usage of its terms or how the world works. Nor are the technical uses of its terms well-defined enough to let professionals in these fields communicate precise concepts without further clarification. Its vices outweigh its virtues as a conceptual model.

If someone could come up with a catchy way (besides a pyramid chart) to convey the key idea about adding value through working with information, I think we could manage to do away with DIKW.

1. Rowley, J. (2007). The wisdom hierarchy: representations of the DIKW hierarchy. Journal of Information Science, 33(2), 163-80.

Metaethics Summary

2011-09-22T01:49:00.000-05:00

I've added a My Metaethics link to the sidebar. Hopefully this will serve as a quick introduction to my views on the nature of moral judgments. Might footnote it up a bunch later.

And if you haven't noticed it yet, farther down the sidebar there is a new external link to the Directory of Open Access Journals' category on philosophy.

Two Reasons to Sign Up For PhilPapers

2011-09-20T23:17:00.001-05:00

I'm taking better advantage of http://philpapers.org in a couple of ways. You should too!

Raise your awareness

Click on My Profile, find Areas of Interest along the left side, and click (edit). Here you can select up to ten areas of interest.

Now, you could just check Send me digests of new papers in my areas, but the much hipper thing to do is click on New Items, fiddle with Custom Filter settings, then scroll down and click RSS Feed. This generates a custom feed to plug into your Google Reader account or whatever you prefer.

It can take some effort to figure out which articles you can read through your school, public library, or state-provided access. Remember, there's always the open access only filter; I would still get 5-15ish daily open access alerts in my areas of interest.

Build your paper library

Click Help and More then click Bargain Finder. PhilPapers automatically checks Amazon Marketplace prices for ridiculous deals in the areas of interest you selected earlier. For many of these, you'll be paying mostly shipping!

While there is an RSS option on this page, it doesn't work in any useful way.

Objective Moral Facts vs. Objectively Moral Facts

2011-09-19T18:35:00.003-05:00

Having a rule capable of kicking out "right" or "wrong" for any particular act (cross-culturally, across time, no matter who is appraising the situation, etc.) is not sufficient to demonstrate the sort of objective morality that skeptics are skeptical about.

It's one thing to say, "Here's an objective fact; this sort of fact is what morality is about; so here's an objective moral fact." It's quite another to uniquely justify the middle step of saying what morality is about. Some examples...

Objective fact: Action X increases overall suffering in the world.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in increasing overall suffering in the world.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X would not be effective if everyone acted similarly.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in doing what would be ineffective if everyone acted similarly.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X is forbidden by God.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in doing what is forbidden by God.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X is out of line with God's nature.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in doing what is out of line with God's nature.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X goes against the overall desires of the person performing it.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in going against one's own overall desires.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X shortens the life expectancy of the person performing it.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in shortening one's own life expectancy.
Conclusion: Action X is objectively morally wrong.

Objective fact: Action X is done out of ill will.
Middle step: Moral wrongness consists in acting out of ill will.
Conclusion: Active X is objectively morally wrong.

Moral skeptics don't typically question the facts in the first lines above (except maybe the God ones). Instead, we question whether there is an additional objective fact that makes one "middle step" true and the others false.

P.S. — I wrote this post after reading the Sep/Oct 2011 Philosophy Now article "Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism." It's a defense of objectivism which doesn't seem to do much more than affirm metaethical relativism. But if you do get a chance to read it and disagree, let me know.

P.P.S. — Some of the above uses of 'objective' are questionable, but they're questionable in the direction of being too inclusive for objectivity so it's not a rounding error in my favor.

A Response to Richard Carrier

2011-09-12T18:14:00.005-05:00

(I had intended to post this as a comment in this thread, but it's either too long or uses characters picky-picky Blogger doesn't like. Please see the original post and comments for context.)

Dr. Carrier,

Thank you for your response!

It seems there are two basic issues under contention here:

1. What counts as morality.
2. The semantics of 'ought.'

We can set 'ought' aside for a moment. Even without ever mentioning that word, you could claim that morality is identified with — not merely associated with or marked by — what a person has most reason to do by virtue of her desires (or a certain class of her desires). I concede that once this identity is in place, your basic argument follows nicely...at least on the individual level.

Why aren't metaethicists flocking to this identity? I suggest it's the same reason metaethicists aren't flocking to Sam Harris' externalist identity between morality and what promotes the flourishing of conscious creatures. Namely: many philosophers and non-philosophers think morality has a different identity, which only partially or contingently overlaps with your answer or Harris' answer. In the May 2011 Craig vs. Harris debate, Craig argued that Harris "isn't really talking about moral values at all. He's just talking about [the identity Harris favors]." Then, in the same debate, Craig implies that morality is identified with a humanity-transcending legal authority; if a proposed description of morality isn't about that, it isn't really morality!¹

So whose identity is correct? Yours, Harris', Craig's, etc?

It begs the question to insist that other answers are incorrect because they don't line up with a person has most reason to do by virtue of her desires. Harris could say your answer is incorrect insofar as it doesn't line up with the well-being of conscious creatures. Craig could say your answer is incorrect insofar as it doesn't line up with God's transcendent laws.

Now we can get back to 'ought.' Your main answer to why your identity should be recognized over the alternatives appears to be that unqualified 'most ought' refers to your answer, and people are likely to admit that morality is identified with what we 'most ought' to do. This way, two paths are meant to lead back to your one answer:

Path A. Agreeing that morality = what a person has most reason to do.
Path B. Agreeing that the moral choice = what a person most ought (or actually ought) to do.

I'm trying to block Path B by denying that there is a single meaning to what a person most ought to do.

"Michael ought[some end] to contribute to UNICEF" can only be true if it converts to the conditional, "If Michael wants [some end], then P" where P is your proposition.

Except we use 'ought' in situations where it doesn't seem plausible we're talking about what the agent wants. Suppose Supervillain McGee empties Fort Knox, launders the gold bars, and successfully hides away in Argentina with his wealth. I expect a lot of people would still say, "Whoever stole those gold bars ought to bring them back" and mean it in a moral sense. But neither McGee's superficial nor his deep desires would be best satisfied by doing that, because he's so good at getting away with crime. Would these people take back their moral 'ought' claims if they knew about McGee's psychology and success? I don't think so!

Nor is it pointless to morally condemn agents who don't give a damn. Others who hear the condemnation might give a damn and conform — at least somewhat — to your negative attitude toward theft.

That's why there can never be a single true proposition of the form "Michael ought[1] to X" for any X, because we can invent countless "some ends" and thus countless "Michael oughts[1]" that are all (by your scheme) equally true, which is impossible (because they all contradict each other).

I agree that there can never be a single true proposition involving 'ought' without an end, just as there can never be a single true velocity without a reference frame. The utterance, "Michael ought to X" could be interpreted as an endless array of true and false propositions, depending on the end. In theory anyway. In practice, we tend to use a fairly small set of ends which can often be successfully inferred from the context of the utterance.

That's why your ought[1] cannot produce true propositions.

Just to be clear:

utterance: "Michael ought to go boating tomorrow."

propositional schematic: In order that [some end], it ought to be the case that Michael goes boating tomorrow.

a complete proposition: In order that Michael keeps his promise to his children, it ought to be the case that Michael goes boating tomorrow.

another complete proposition: In order that Michael appease Dagon, it ought to be the case that Michael goes boating tomorrow.

a third complete proposition: In order that Michael best fulfill his desires, it ought to be the case that Michael goes boating tomorrow.

Now, supposing Michael promised his children a day at the zoo, the first proposition may be false while the third is true. But since they don't logically conflict, this is ok. And of course I put the third one there to show that your supposed base case can easily be seen as a special case.

BTW, in regard to my use of the terms "objective" and "realism" (which are in accord with standard references in the field), see my discussion of the ontology of my moral theory on my blog: Moral Ontology.

Unfortunately, a number of quite distinct uses of those terms are consistent with professional usage. You (and I) could count as moral realists, but on the "low bar" side of the spectrum. Similar deal for 'objective.' These terms tend to get used as badges rather than useful classifications.

1. http://www.mandm.org.nz/2011/05/transcript-sam-harris-v-william-lane-craig-debate-%E2%80%9Cis-good-from-god%E2%80%9D.html

The Establishment Clause

2011-09-10T07:17:00.002-05:00

Time to take a break from summarizing ACLU policies. The policy guide is due today and I don't intend to check it back out for a while. (If you're wondering, I did get through roughly 40% of the guide by number of pages, not counting the internal ACLU policies I don't intend to cover anyway.)

Instead, I would like to explain one major point of disagreement I have with the ACLU.

Establishment Clause → Non-Endorsement

First I want to make it clear that I agree with the ACLU when it comes to interpreting the Establishment Clause as a ban on the government endorsing a particular religion or religion over non-religion. At least I believe it does now that the Bill of Rights has been largely understood as affirming individual rights against the government as a whole (thanks to Incorporation).

Even if there does turn out to be a flaw in such legal reasoning, I still wholeheartedly support the principle of government neutrality toward religious beliefs.

Non-Endorsement → Exclusion on the Basis of Religion

The ACLU overcorrects by insisting non-endorsement requires that no public funds go to religious groups. Take the issue of school vouchers, for example. Here is a recent and typical formulation of the ACLU's stance:

This is not to say that parents don't have the right to provide their children with a religious education. The principles of religious liberty protect the rights of those who wish to observe their faith as they see fit. What these legal precepts should not allow, however, is for a religious education to be provided at taxpayer expense.¹

I believe what's happening here is that the ACLU (rightly) understands that public funds going to religious organizations is often a bad means to the end of religious freedom, but failing to notice that it can be a neutral or good means to the end of religious freedom.

In the case of vouchers, the government would not be favoring one kind of religion over another, or religion over non-religion. The entirety of that kind of choices would lie with parents. So the money and the endorsement come apart in this situation, nullifying the usual grounds for objecting to public funds going to religious organizations.

I'll go one step farther. Imagine if voucher programs were implemented but parents were not allowed to choose otherwise-acceptable religious schools, simply because of the religious element. Wouldn't this discrimination be a clear violation of the Free Exercise clause?

By the way, why does the ACLU keep mentioning a "right" for parents to send their children to religious schools, while admitting poor parents might not have the ability to do so?

Freedom of religion does not extend so far that parents may withdraw children from classes which they feel conflict with their religious principles, even when they cannot practically avail themselves of the right to send their children to private schools.²

Can we infer that poor defendants have a "right" to counsel, but that it's acceptable for them to lack counsel because they can't afford attorney fees?

1. http://www.aclu.org/blog/religion-belief/school-vouchers-inflict-more-harm-good
2. American Civil Liberties Union (1986-1995). Policy guide of the american civil liberties union. New York, New York: ACLU. Policy 86. p. 168.

Reading the ACLU Policy Guide (Pt. 7)

2011-09-10T05:06:00.005-05:00

Series explanation and overview here.

Note: These are my summaries of the 1995 version of the guide, not the policies themselves.

Separation of Church and State

Policy 80 — Bus Transportation, Textbooks, Other Services

The ACLU interprets the establishment clause as forbidding any government funds going to religious schools, and the free exercise clause as guaranteeing the right of religious schools to exist. The former part includes a ban on lending any books or other instructional materials to religious schools; or any help with facilities; or bus services.

However, "hot lunches or public health services" can be directly provided (i.e. not through religious schools) by the government to all children, even those attending religious schools because these involve community concerns for children that exist separately from education.

The ACLU therefore also opposes voucher plans on the grounds that "[a]ny public aid to a religious school inevitably benefits the entire institution, regardless of the particular uses for which it is designated" and this would clearly go against the First Amendment. This includes any kind of tax benefits, even benefits commonly granted to parents who send their children to public schools.

Policy 80a — Church-State Task Force

This policy calls for the formation of an internal ACLU task force to track and respond to Church-State issues.

Policy 81 — Religion in Public Schools

Public schools may not indoctrinate children in religious beliefs, whether in an obvious or subtle manner. They distinguish "the teaching of religion" from "teaching factually about religion," where the latter may be appropriate for history and social science classes.

Regular Bible reading, organized prayers, teaching religious doctrines as if they were scientific, and celebrating Christmas, Channukah, or Easter as religious holidays are all methods of subtle indoctrination.

Public funds should not be used for displays of religious symbols. Nor should public facilities be used for religious purposes either during or after school hours. Public school teachers should not be allowed to wear "distinctively clerical garb," but religious belief or associations should never count against a teacher professionally.

Value education is important, but must be carried out in a secular way rather than as a "subterfuge" for introducing religious indoctrination.

Policy 82 — Shared Time

"Shared time" refers to students attending both public and religious schools, usually to pick up certain classes unavailable in the other context. This isn't necessarily unconstitutional, but does tend to result in public funding going to religious schools. In addition, it can give educators at religious schools some influence over public school operations, such as pressure to agree on common textbooks.

Policy 83 — Released Time

"Released time" is the practice of letting children choose to leave public school at certain times, but only to attend some form of religious instruction. This is quite different from simply releasing all students to do what they like, and so it encourages religious participation...and usually specific kinds of religious participation at that.

Released time also disrupts school for the other students and teachers who remain. For these reasons, the ACLU opposes it.

Policy 84 — Pledge of Allegiance

When the words "under God" were added to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, the ACLU held that the principle of separation of church and state was violated.

Students who have secular or religious reasons for not saluting the flag or swearing an oath of allegiance should be excused from any such requirement.

Policy 85 — Government Jurisdiction Over Parochial School Lay Teachers

Government intervention in the form of the National Labor Relations Board is not necessarily a problem for church/state separation.

Policy 86 — State Educational Standards

The ACLU opposes allowances for parents to opt their children out of public school classes they feel conflict with their religious beliefs, as this gives religious bodies indirect control over curriculum. This includes parents who would prefer to send their children to private schools but cannot afford it.

State educational standards — which cover both public and private schools — should make exceptions for religious schools in "right of conscience" cases, which occur when parents believe they themselves would be guilty of a great wrong for complying with the law. That is, unless the "safety, health, or welfare of the child" is put at risk.

Policy 87 — Higher Education

Colleges and universities which are sponsored by religious institutions but are not run in a way that promotes religions may be eligible for public funds. Nor does the inclusion of a seminary program disqualify rest of the institution from receiving public funds.

Practices which would disqualify the institution as a whole include: religious discrimination affecting faculty or students, any requirements to attend religious events, any courses which foster religion, any religious symbols intended to foster religion in buildings other than chapels, or prayers at any "institution-sponsored events."

Policy 88 — Military Chaplaincy

The ACLU believes the free exercise clause requires that members of the military have access to religious ministers of their own sect, and therefore that such ministers have access to members of the military.

However, the current (as of 1973 and from what I gather still current) form of the chaplaincy often discriminates against minority religious beliefs.

Policy 89 — Prison Chaplaincy

As with the military chaplaincy, there is a tendency to select only from the religious majority, without adjusting for the actual religious beliefs of those served. This combined with "the prominence accorded religious observance in evaluating a prisoner's success in conforming to the rehabilitative model at the core of the parole process" translates into an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Beyond parole, prison chaplains can often coerce religious participation through their influence on the institution.

For these reasons, the ACLU opposes the way prison chaplaincies are implemented. Prisoners should have free access to "a religious or ethical counselor of his or her choice" and such counselors must in turn be allowed to access prisoners.

Policy 89a — Privileged Communications with the Clergy

The ACLU believes the free exercise clause guarantees clergy the right not to be compelled during testimony to disclose information received in confidence in their professional role.

Policy 90 — Blue Laws

While the government may mandate a six day work week for secular reasons, special "Lord's Day" laws restricting behavior on Sundays for religious reasons violate the establishment clause.

Policy 91 — Marriage

Laws against plural marriage — marriage to more than one person — violate "constitutional protections of freedom of expression and association, freedom of religion, and privacy for personal relationships between consenting adults."

In cases of civil divorce, the government may not compel people to have their marriage dissolved by religious authorities.

Policy 92 — Religious Bodies' Tax Exemption

The ACLU considers tax benefits to be the equivalent of giving public funds to religious groups, and so opposes the practice.

However, benefits or funds may properly be given to charitable organizations sponsored by religious groups, so long as "religion plays no part in the delivery of such services" i.e: no religious message with the service, and neither workers nor recipients are subject to a religious test.

The ACLU opposes making exceptions for taxes — such as social security — for religious sects who claim conscientious objection. Slippery slope.

Policy 93 — Collection and Dissemination of Religious Information

During a census or similar state information gathering activities, the ACLU believes there are reasons for the government to ask about race, but not about religion. The main justification being that the state is not allowed to discriminate based on religion, but has an "affirmative obligation to act in order to combat massive discrimination" when it comes to race.

In fact, the government should not even record volunteered information about religious beliefs, except in special cases like military and prison chaplaincies.

Policy 94 — Non-Belief in a Supreme Being

The ACLU supports the Supreme Court's affirmation in Torcaso v. Watkins that state or federal office-holding may not be contingent on a confession of belief in a God.

Non-believers in a God also face unconstitutional discrimination when their conscientious objections to military service are ignored, whereas a privileged kind of religious belief would be respected.

Citizens — religious or not — who have an objection to swearing an oath to God must always be given the opportunity to 'affirm' their words rather than swear.

Policy 95 — Church Political Activities

Religious groups may be as involved in politics as any other groups of citizens.

Policy 96 — Charitable Contributions by Private Utility Companies

If utility rates are increased for citizens because a private utility company is donating to religious causes, the ACLU will object. This is effectively a form of taxation.

Policy 97 — Public Assistance to Members of Religious Orders

Being a member of a religious order should not disqualify a citizen for welfare or other government services that would otherwise be due to them. This is the flip-side to the ACLU opposing special positive state treatment for the clergy.

Policy 98 — Government Funding of Social Service Programs of Religious Bodies

In general, state funds may not go to social programs sponsored by religious groups. It may be appropriate in special cases where these services are rendered without any mention or sign of religion and in a non-discriminatory way.

Policy 99 — Use of Public Property for Religious Purposes

Public property which is known to be open for anyone's use as a public forum may, of course, be used to express religious ideas without any implication of government endorsement. So public parks and streets may be used for religious purposes, but the same sorts of things in most government administrative buildings would be — or would be perceived to be — state endorsement of religion.

The ACLU considers public school buildings to be among the kind of government buildings which cannot allow any religious activities (even "student initiated religious clubs"), at least not during school hours or immediately adjacent to them. "The school is inextricably linked with religious activities if it sanctions religious clubs." For this reason, the ACLU believes the Equal Access Act is "a flagrant violation of the Establishment Clause" and should be repealed.

UPDATE: I did some Googling; it appears the ACLU now frequently invokes the Equal Access Act because it's so helpful in starting Gay/Straight Alliance clubs.

Policy 100 — Governmental Use of Religious Organizations for Overseas Relief Programs

Secular programs should be used instead whenever possible. Religious channels may be used to deliver emergency aid when necessary if the public funds only apply to secular aspects of the relief program, proselytism is contractually forbidden while the religious group is distributing public benefits, and there is no religious test for those receiving or distributing benefits.

Policy 101 — Kidnapping Young People from Religious Groups

In lieu of physical coercion or threats of physical coercion, the government may not remove people from religious groups on grounds of "brainwashing." This is obviously meant to apply to small religious movements considered to be "cults."

Policy 102 — Diplomatic Relations with the Vatican

The ACLU is opposed to the United States establishing a "formal diplomatic relationship with the Holy See," since this is a level of official recognition of a religious authority not afforded to other religious groups.

Reading the ACLU Policy Guide (Pt. 6)

2011-09-06T03:10:00.010-05:00

Series explanation and overview here.

Note: These are my summaries of the 1995 version of the guide, not the policies themselves.

Academic Freedom

Policy 60 — Teachers' Freedom and Responsibility and Due Process in Higher Education

"Academic freedom and responsibility are the liberty and obligation to study, to investigate, to present and interpret, and to discuss facts and ideas concerning all branches and fields of learning."

The ACLU believes the only limits that should be imposed on academic pursuits are "standards of responsible scholarship." So it's not a question of what is discussed, or what is concluded, but how scholarship is carried out. Furthermore, teachers in higher education should be free to express themselves however they like as private citizens when not speaking for their institution. Loyalty oaths are specifically condemned.

"A teacher should be appointed solely on the basis of teaching ability and competence in the professional field, without regard to such factors as race, sex, nationality, creed, religious or political belief or affiliation, or behavior not demonstrably related to the teaching function." Same goes for advancement or dismissal. However, the ACLU does recognize the right of religious schools to discriminate by religious beliefs, so long as these criteria are narrowly defined and made public.

Teachers should be given an impartial hearing before they can be dismissed. There are several pages of details on due process in this area.

Rather than avoiding controversial issues or presenting them as if they are settled, teachers should teach about a variety of viewpoints and may identify their own position on the matter.

The ACLU approves of tenure, but not of tenure quotas.

Policy 61 — Academic Freedom in New Colleges

Standards of academic freedom should play a role in accreditation.

Policy 62 — Teachers' Rights in Primary and Secondary Education

Essentially the same as the rights of teachers in higher education, described above. There is a special mention of giving these teachers some autonomy in selecting supplemental materials, beyond standardized textbooks. (As opposed to being told exactly what to cover and no more.) And if parents complain about the "suitability of any material, out of concern for maturity level, morality, patriotism, literary merit, etc.," a "representative professional committee" should decide the matter.

Primary and secondary education teachers should not be subject to special behavioral rules in their personal lives.

Policy 63 — Academic Due Process for Graduate Students

A thesis rejection must be explained, to guard against rejection for "improper considerations" such as ideology rather than academic merit.

Policy 64 — Release of Information about Students

Teachers should be careful not to pass on the personal views of current or past students to government investigators or prospective employers, otherwise there will be a chilling effect on academic expression. The ACLU recommends teachers attach a standardized explanation that certain kinds of questions will not be answered, until outsiders get the message and stop asking.

The ACLU opposes making academic information available to selective service, since this can make grades "life and death" (literally!) and will encourage students to take easy classes to avoid being drafted.

Schools should keep no more records than necessary, and keep different kinds of information in separate files (academic, medical, disciplinary, etc.). "Disciplinary records should be destroyed upon graduation." Access to records should be regulated, and students must be able to view their own records.

Policy 65 — Administrators' Rights

Essentially the same rights to private expression and association as teachers.

Policy 66 — The University and Contract Research

Research money comes with the danger of outsider control. There are some guidelines here to keep outside parties out of the university's own domain, such as not meddling with promotions, not demanding loyalty tests, and not suppressing unliked research results.

Policy 67 — C.I.A. and the Academic Community

Secret research is acceptable, if the guidelines in Policy 66 are followed...which includes not keeping it a secret that secret C.I.A. research is going on.

University employees who recruit other employees for the C.I.A. must notify the university of this role. Potential recruits among the staff must give consent before being investigated, and gathered information must be destroyed if that person is not hired.

It harms international academic cooperation when the C.I.A. asks traveling academics to gather intelligence.

Policy 68 — Academic Freedom and Scientific Research

Scientific research may be restricted with regard to actions, but not with regard to exploring ideas.

[There is no Policy 69.]

Policy 70 — Federal Scholarships and Exchange Programs

Such scholarships and other financial aid must not be contingent on the private political beliefs and associations of students.

Policy 71 — College Students' Civil Liberties

The ACLU affirms the freedom to learn as a counterpart to the freedom to teach.

Admission standards should be clear, public, and fair. There is a note to see the policy about "Affirmative Action in Employment and Education," which I'll try to remember to number here when I reach that policy.

Care should be taken that audio and video recordings in the classroom don't "inhibit free and open discussion by teacher and student." All involved should be notified when recording is going on.

Representatives of the student body should at least be able to advise, if not actually vote on aspects of school administration.

Students should be able to form officially-recognized clubs without restraint and without being discriminated against for doing so. These clubs should not discriminate "on grounds of race, religion, color or national origin." When applying for official recognition, the names of officers may be presented, but the names of all members may not be required. Student organizations should be able to choose their own faculty advisor, or no advisor, if they wish.

Speakers brought in by student organizations are not implied to be endorsed by the university. The university should make this clear if complaints are made regarding an unpopular speaker. Nor are universities responsible for bringing in opposing viewpoints.

Student newspapers should be free from university control, even if funded by the university. If there is just one newspaper, it should include opposing viewpoints. Similar freedom for student radio, television, and other communication media.

General freedom of speech and association policies apply to university students, both on and off campus. Nor is it appropriate to limit the personal conduct of students.

Unless a university bars all career recruiters from campus, it can't fairly bar military recruiters.

Policy 72 — Sexual Harassment on College-University Campus

Schools should have policies against using academic rewards as sexual blackmail, and against related patterns of behavior that hinder the ability of students to learn.

Policy 72a — Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses

Free speech includes the freedom to make racist, sexist, and homophobic speech. The ACLU is against policies that restrict such speech, whether in private or in public.

Of course, if such speech is part of speech acts like "intimidating telephone calls, threats of attack, extortion and blackmail," then offenders may be held accountable for those acts as usual (but not the offensive content).

Schools do have a duty to ensure equal opportunity and teach against bigotry. The idea is to persuade people not to use such speech, not to restrict speech outright.

Policy 73 — Discrimination in Public Colleges

The ACLU opposes the involvement of state commissions in allegations of institutional discrimination in public colleges. This may be tempting, but once non-educators start making decisions about academic hiring and promotion, they may expand their control in undesirable ways. Best to leave this to the schools themselves and judicial review, when necessary.

"Moreover, it would be tragic indeed if the intervention of a state discrimination commission, real or threatened, led recruitment officers and committees to appoint or promote persons not simply on grounds of competence but on the basis of overt or covert religious 'quotas.'" (How does this square with the ACLU's current defense of affirmative action?)

Institutions of higher learning which receive public funds may not have any different admission or program requirements based on sex. Or offer governmental scholarships which depend on sex.

Policy 74 — Student Evaluation of Teacher Performance

Students may administer surveys on their own and publish results freely. Same goes for teachers conducting surveys in their own classes for feedback.

If surveys are used officially to measure job performance, they should not be relied upon more strongly than their design warrants. Teachers should have access to surveys about themselves, and be allowed to attach explanatory notes. Students should be notified that surveys are being used in this manner, and must be administered in a way that protects student identity.

Policy 75 — Compulsory Education

"The element of compulsion should lie in assuring the attainment of at least minimal levels of literacy in order to further preparation for effective citizenship and the transmission of democratic values, not in prescribing how those levels are to be attained." The ACLU therefore explicitly supports the option to home school (but does not believe parents who choose private or home schooling are entitled to vouchers or similar means of payment).

"Compulsory education of children generally should not be imposed in ways that contravene the religious liberties of parents and children[....]" That is, unless doing so is necessary to either "guarantee the health and safety of children" or "guarantee that the individual will be sufficiently educated to have the minimum competence to participate a a citizen, if he/she chooses, in the democratic governing process of the community."

Policy 76 — Secondary School Students' Civil Liberties

Generally, these are the same as for college students. Students should not be punished for things which aren't against clearly defined rules ("rule by law" vs "rule by personality" is mentioned here). Nor should students be punished for expressing unpopular ideas. Restrictions on speech are only appropriate when safety is a factor or teaching is disrupted. This freedom extends to students putting out newspapers, newsletters, etc. Students may also form official clubs for any lawful purpose, so long as they don't discriminate beyond the narrow "purpose of the organization" (the example given is French competence for a French club.)

Any kind of loyalty oaths "as a condition for enrollment, promotion, graduation, or financial aid" are strongly opposed.

"The school has no jurisdiction over its students' non-school activities." Even illegal activities should be off the table for school treatment of students, so long as they don't specifically concern educational activities.

Demonstrations are allowed, though schools may restrict time, place, and manner so as not to disrupt classes or cause a safety hazard. Students may distribute print material. They may also wear clothing which expresses membership in a group or support of a cause. Lockers may not be searched without probable cause and a prior description of what is being looked for.

"As long as a student's hair style, dress, or personal grooming does not, in fact, disrupt the educational process or constitute a threat to safety, it should be no concern of the school."

Policy 77 — Elementary School Students' Civil Liberties

Every child has the right to free, public, and non-discriminatory education. Non-discrimination includes guarding against passive stereotyping in educational materials and activities (such as sports education).

Students who don't understand English must be taught English and, meanwhile, be taught other subjects in a language they can understand now.

Though there are times when disabled children can't participate fully with other children, this should be kept to a necessary minimum rather than a broad segregation.

States have a duty to provide an equal education to all children, regardless of the wealth of the local tax base. National funding may be necessary to do the same for especially poor states. This doesn't necessarily mean the same dollar figure per child, as this goal can be substantially met by aiding schools most in need.

Student government should be implemented in a meaningful way from early on to prepare children as democratic citizens.

Elementary students — unlike high school and college students — are not likely to know when their rights are being violated and report it. Parents need to be informed to take such action on behalf of their children. "Parents are entitled to an opportunity for full and effective scrutiny of the character and quality of the education their children are receiving. They should have as full access to the school as is possible without substantial disruption of the school's work." And all parents should be able to influence school policy through "school board elections, public hearings, parent councils" etc.

Policy 77a — Classification and Tracking in Schools

Putting elementary students in separate "tracks" is a denial of equal opportunity. It often has the effect of magnifying and preserving racial, gender, and class stereotypes in the next generation. And even if it is supposedly a separation by ability, it becomes hard to fairly re-evaluate students later on.

If any sort of student classification is carried out, the ACLU has a checklist here involving things like making sure this arrangement is better for every student involved.

Policy 78 — Selection of School and Library Materials and Pressure Group Attacks

The ACLU promotes an "atmosphere of free inquiry and discussion" as an effective means of preparing students for citizenship.

Instructional materials covering a range of ideas and political viewpoints should be available in the library and used in classes. Instead of trying to keep all controversy out of schools, a fair and balanced array of views should be available. For example, it is appropriate to have materials about religious views, so long as they're not being used to indoctrinate students in a particular religious view.

Educators have a duty to promote this diversity of ideas, even against objections that some ideas are: "un-American," "communistic," "obscene" or "irreverent." The ACLU pledges to support such educators. "But the ACLU also recognizes the right of parents and students to some measure of protection from compulsory use of instructional materials which they believe assault religious and moral beliefs."

Library materials should be selected by librarians to reflect "pluralistic society" and all its controversies. School boards may not ban or remove such materials.

Parents and other community members have the free speech rights to complain about materials. Schools should have well-defined procedures for accepting any official complaints, then review requests for withdrawal publicly, and settle the matter in a timely fashion. The material may not be taken off the shelf during this procedure. "Objection to the particular language or viewpoint of material cannot be justification for the exclusion of classroom or library material."

Policy 79 — ROTC

ROTC programs must be voluntary and must be taken for credit only when under the control of a non-ROTC educator. Regular principles of academic freedom apply to students involved.

The ACLU opposes Junior ROTC programs in high schools as being "inconsistent with the primary objectives of secondary school education."

On 'Moral Facts Naturally Exist (And Science Could Find Them)' (Pt. 2)

2011-08-30T03:07:00.006-05:00

In my last post, I sketched Richard Carrier's moral philosophy. Today I will explain my primary reservation, but first I want to point out several areas of agreement. Like Carrier, I...

believe morality is concerned with hypothetical imperatives.
accept a Humean theory of reasons, i.e. what a person has reason to do is dependent on that person's psychology.
accept the theory of action that a rational person will always try to fulfill her highest-priority desires, according to the information she has.
agree that science — broadly construed — is vital in finding out the rightness or wrongness of an action.

This definitely puts us in the same neighborhood of metaethics-ville. Carrier characterizes moral facts as objective and his view as realist (by denying the contraries); I quibble with that, but only because I would label the same things differently. Not a big deal.

'Ought' and Internalism

When Carrier defends his view that moral imperatives are a class of hypothetical imperatives, he admits this is an unpopular view among philosophers. "But," he says, "none have ever presented any other identifiable logical relation that can ever be meant by 'ought' (or any other term or phrase semantically equivalent to it) that produces any actual claim to our obedience."¹

This close association of morality, the meaning of 'ought,' and motivational internalism rests at the very beginning of Carrier's chain of deductive logic in the appendix following the chapter. Here are the first three lines, with variables expanded:

1.1 If there is <a moral system>, then <a moral system> is <a system of imperatives that supersede all other imperatives>.
1.2 If <a moral system> is <a system of imperatives that supersede all other imperatives>, then <a moral system> is <what we ought to obey over all other imperative systems (whether they are labeled moral or not)>.
1.3 <what we ought to obey over all other imperative systems (whether they are labeled moral or not)> is <that which we have a sufficiently motivating reason to obey over all other imperative systems>.²

Throughout the chapter, Carrier uses the phrases "what we in actual fact ought to do" and "what we as a matter of actual fact ought most to do" as synonyms, and contrasts this with "other things that carry no sufficient motivating reason for us to do them instead".³ You may recognize this as a strong form of motivational internalism, i.e. recognized moral facts necessarily provide some motivation or — in strong form — overriding motivation.

I think Carrier has a good point that if we start by insisting on internalism, then it's hard to see how moral facts could originate from anywhere but a person's own desires; and if we insist on strong internalism, how they could originate from anywhere but what a person desires most. Or consider a reasons-based version of internalism: a person always has some reason or overriding reason to act morally. If having a reason requires having some appropriate desire — which I affirm — then we're back to the same spot.

'Ought' Externalism

Contrary to Carrier, I hold that sentences like "Michael ought to contribute to UNICEF" or "Josephine ought not fire her pistol into the air when she celebrates" can represent true propositions even if Michael and Josephine happen to lack appropriate desires.

This means I deny (1.3). I'll make this denial punchier: it can be true that we have no reason to do what we ought to do.

How can I get away with saying this? Because I believe the word 'ought' requires an end (or goal) to complete its meaning and make it eligible for being true or false. At the same time, it doesn't require that anyone's desires be a certain way. The logical relation signified by 'ought' works something like this:

Michael ought_{[some end]} to contribute to UNICEF.

or more specifically:

In order that [some end], it ought to be the case that Michael contributes to UNICEF.

The claim being made is that — among the relevant actions open to Michael — the one most likely to precede [some end] is that he contributes to UNICEF. (The 'ought' in the more specific parsing is a non-normative probability 'ought,' like "It ought to rain before midnight." I'm following Stephen Finlay's reductive analysis of normative 'oughts' into non-normative 'oughts' plus ends, which is motivated by making sense of normative language in general.)⁴

Really, though, I just want to drive home the point that 'ought' claims have a gap if you listen for it.

We're normally very adept at filling the gap from context and so we don't notice there ever was a gap. For example, "You ought to eat two cups of green vegetables per week" in typical contexts would suggest a health-related end. In a conversation about minimizing risk for liver cancer, we would fill in the more specific end of minimizing risk of liver cancer. At that point, we have a quite specific claim which is open to empirical investigation.

You ought_{that you minimize your risk of liver cancer} to eat two cups of green vegetables per day.

In order that [you minimize your risk of liver cancer], it ought to be the case that you eat two cups of green vegetables per day.

Notice something else: the truth or falsity of this 'ought' claim does not depend on having actual or ideal desires about minimizing the risk of liver cancer.

Laying Claim to Our Obedience

What I'm saying is that true 'ought' statements don't necessarily lay claim to a person's obedience. Some do, because they connect with a person's desires, and this makes them the only imperatives important to that person, in a relevant sense.

I understand the phrases "there is a reason" and "Josephine has a reason" to reflect this distinction. There may be a reason for Josephine to not fire her pistol in the air when she celebrates (it might cause far more suffering than the joy she gains), but if she lacks certain desires she might not have a reason to refrain from pulling the trigger.

Carrier could grant all of the above, adjust his argument a bit, and still identify moral imperatives as imperatives which are both (1) true and (2) matter to a person by virtue of that person's desires. What I'm challenging in this post is the assertion that what a person "in actual fact ought to do" necessarily corresponds with what that person has motivating reason to do.

In other words, Carrier can't simply rule out other (i.e. externalist) uses of 'ought' as invalid. He needs to show that his moral theory is a better solution to metaethics in some way other than winning by default.

...

I may eventually follow up this post with my take on other parts of his overall moral theory, but this will do for now.

ADDED: A followup on the same topic is here.

1. Carrier, R. (2011). Moral facts naturally exist (and science could find them). In Loftus, J.W. (Ed.), The end of christianity (pp. 333-358). Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. p. 342
2. Ibid. p. 359
3. Ibid. p. 348
4. Finlay, S. (2009). Oughts and ends. In Philosophical studies, 143(3). pp 315-340. See my post on it.

On 'Moral Facts Naturally Exist (And Science Could Find Them)' (Pt. 1)

2011-08-28T02:10:00.006-05:00

This chapter by Richard Carrier comes at the end of The End of Christianity. So far, it's the only chapter I have read because I'm much more interested in popular essays on metaethics than the (anti) religious theme of this anthology.

Can science discover moral facts?

Carrier is following Sam Harris' lead by putting this provocative claim in the title, and — like Harris — doing some philosophy first to analytically reduce moral facts to scientifically-accessible components. So the really controversial steps are philosophical rather than scientific.

I'm familiar with moral philosophy. Give me the short version!

Moral facts are whichever hypothetical imperatives correspond to an individual's deepest desires. Human-universal moral facts exist because all humans share a set of deepest desires. Since science can investigate both hypothetical imperatives and desires, science can discover human-universal moral facts.

What makes 'ought' claims true?

Let's start by looking at conditional 'ought' claims (aka hypothetical imperatives).

If you want to wake up in time for work, you ought to set an alarm clock.
If you want your car to stay put, you ought not park in a tow-away zone.
If you want to become a doctor, you ought to study diligently.

So if I really do want to become a doctor and there really is this connection between studying diligently and becoming a doctor, then I really ought to study diligently. Carrier points out that both of these prerequisites are open to scientific investigation. "And wherever both are an empirically demonstrated fact, the imperative they entail is an empirically demonstrated fact."¹ This means that science can discover 'ought' facts, not just 'is' facts.

What makes an 'ought' claim a moral 'ought' claim?

The majority view has been that moral 'oughts' are different from the above kind of 'oughts' because they're not conditional on what a person wants. Carrier disagrees on the grounds that any system of imperatives which doesn't line up with what a person most wants can't count as morality, because that person will "have a better reason to do something else instead."²

Instead of viewing morality as something that stands in opposition to our desires, morality has to do with what fulfills our deepest desires. It's just that, sometimes, we're mistaken about what promotes our own deepest desires. "What we really want most, and what will really obtain that, are matters of fact that cannot truly be answered from the armchair. Empirical methods must be deployed to ascertain and verify them. Only science has the best tools to do this."³

Doesn't this make morality an individual thing?

Even if morality is grounded on the individual level, there may still be universal moral facts if some moral facts apply to every individual. (Or at least human-universal moral facts if all humans share some moral facts.) Carrier argues that it's likely all humans have the same set of deepest desires.

"Only if what an individual wants most (when rational and sufficiently informed) is not the same as for everyone else will this not be the case. Then, a different set of moral facts will be true for them (yet even then true moral facts still exist, they are just again relative to different groups or individuals.) But that outcome is very improbable for members of the same species."⁴

Carrier's justification for this statement is hard to follow, but it goes something like this:

Humans share many biological facts, and these facts generate a hierarchy of high-order desires that we're stuck with, i.e. we can't just change them without altering our natural humanity. "For example: we all need to eat, breathe, move, think, and cooperate and socialize with a community[....]"⁵ The way these fundamental desires play out for individuals may differ, but we share our most basic biological needs.

Biological differences among humans aren't sufficient to change these high-order desires, at least not without extreme genetic mutation.

Environmental differences only make a difference in how our fundamental human desires play out. Same algorithm; different results. If I had lived life in your shoes, I would want most the things you want most.

So, ultimately, only our shared human biology determines our high-order/foundational/deepest desires, which in turn determine what is morally right for all of us in general terms, and what is right for each of us when applied to our individual situations. To use one of Carrier's examples, we all have fundamental desires to eat and to avoid pointless harm, which might make it morally right for me to eat strawberries but morally right for you to avoid eating strawberries because you're allergic to them; we're both following the same basic imperatives of eating and avoiding pointless harm, which means there is no real difference in moral facts here.

...

To review, Carrier believes moral facts are open to scientific inquiry because his metaethics reduce moral facts to facts about the effectiveness of means to ends (hypothetical imperatives) and psychology (what a person most fundamentally desires). This would be enough to explain how moral facts "naturally exist" and how "science could find them," but he goes one step farther and argues that humanity shares one set of moral facts.

Carrier's chapter is followed by an appendix containing, as he puts it: "formal deductive proofs of every one of these conclusions, fully verifying that they are necessarily true."⁶ I appreciate his boldness! Still, I disagree with his moral philosophy at several points, as I will explain in the next post [which is here, but only covers one point of disagreement].

1. Carrier, R. (2011). Moral facts naturally exist (and science could find them). In Loftus, J.W. (Ed.), The end of christianity (pp. 333-358). Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. p. 335
2. ibid. p. 343
3. ibid. p. 342
4. ibid. p. 351
5. ibid. p. 352
6. ibid. p. 334

Reading the ACLU Policy Guide (Pt. 5)

2011-08-21T20:24:00.003-05:00

Series explanation and overview here.

Note: These are my summaries of the 1995 version of the guide, not the policies themselves.

Labor-Business

Policy 48 — Right to Organize

"The rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively are aspects of freedom of association."

Both public and private employees are covered. There's a note here about the ACLU supporting this right for teachers at religious schools specifically.

This 1980 policy spends some time talking about a contemporary issue involving J.P. Stevens Company (dramatized in the film Norma Rae). Because the J.P. Stevens Company would not recognize the right to organize, and because it discriminated according to sex and race, the ACLU supported the ongoing boycott effort.

Policy 49 — Right to Strike

The ACLU supports the right to strike, as derived from the rights of freedom of association and speech, as well as the abolition of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment. Specifically, the government may not punish people for ceasing to work.

The one justifiable exception is when sudden striking poses "an imminent and substantial threat to the public health and safety of a community." And even then, the ACLU insists there be an effective alternate method for settling the kinds of disputes which lead to strikes.

Policy 50 — Closed Shop, Union Shop and Right to Work Laws

The ACLU does not believe requiring workers to pay labor union fees infringes on their civil liberties, so long as the required amount does not exceed that worker's fair share of collective bargaining costs and "other costs of representation." This policy describes unions as "instruments" of "industrial government." Because citizens receive the benefits of taxes to civil government, they may not refuse to pay taxes; the same principle applies here for industrial government.

However, it does violate freedom of association to require workers to actually join the union, follow union rules, or pay more than the amount described above. Nor can any fee be charged before a person is hired.

Required union fees may be used to lobby for referendums or for "laws beneficial to employees," but not for political candidates. As there may still be conscientious objection to the use of funds, the ACLU supports allowing such workers to make a charitable donation of the required amount.

Policy 51 — Picketing in Labor-Management Disputes

There's nothing here not covered by the policies in part four of this series, except to affirm that picketing in the context of labor-management disputes is included.

Policy 52 — Freedom of Speech and Unionization Campaigns

Freedom of speech is affirmed in the context of workers arguing for — and employers arguing against — unionization. If an employer addresses workers during work hours to speak against unionization, pro-unionization workers must be given an equal opportunity to address workers during work hours.

Both sides must stick to making arguments for their position, not coercing anyone to comply.

Policy 53 — Free Speech Rights of Corporate Employees

Speech which does not "substantially, materially and directly" affect an employee's ability to do his or her job (or others from doing their jobs) is protected by the First Amendment.

Policy 54 — Internal Union Democracy and Equal and Fair Representation

Unions have an especially strong duty to operating under non-discriminatory and democratic standards because they are meant to represent all workers fairly as a form of industrial government.

Every union member should have free speech and association rights within the union, recognized by the union. Every member should be allowed to vote, to hold office, and to only be removed from office in a regular fashion. No discrimination based on "race, religion, color, sex, age, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, opinion or lack of United States citizenship." And finally, fair access to resolving grievances and due process for any kind of discipline.

Policy 55 — Due Process Rights of Private Employees

All private employees have the right "not to be disciplined without just cause," "notice and hearing in cases of termination or discipline," and "notice and hearing in cases of the closing of entire businesses."

Oddly, this policy is more of an internal ACLU note that they need to develop policies in this area.

Policy 55a — Privacy Rights of Private Sector Employees

Employee access to records about themselves is here affirmed to be covered by the same principles as Policy 273 — Data Collection, Storage, and Dissemination. (It will be a few more posts before I get to that!)

Employers may not inquire about aspects of employee personal life and health which do not directly concern job performance. "The employer's legitimate concern for maintaining an acceptable level of job performance can be satisfied by measuring job performance." If job performance does appear to be impaired, establishing "probable cause related to substance abuse," then employers may test for drug abuse.

If government agents attempt to question employees in the workplace, employers have a positive duty to inform employees of their constitutional protections and may not punish employees who take advantage of these protections.

"Individuals are entitled to segregate their personal lives from the requirements of their jobs." For example, employers may not take into account "[m]arital status, parental status or sexual orientation" at the workplace.

Employers must give a justification for any rule about personal appearance, showing that it is "reasonably related to job performance."

Every employee is entitled to some personal storage at work which the employer may not examine.

Policy 56 — ACLU and Intra-Labor Conflicts

The ACLU expresses an interest in getting involved in conflicts between unions and members when the standards expressed in Policy 54 are not being followed.

Policy 57 — Union and Corporation Political Activity

As already mentioned in Policy 50, the fees paid by non-members to a union may not be used "to support the political activities of the union." Collective bargaining and even lobbying for laws relating to working conditions don't count as political activities.

The ACLU supports the right of union members to express opinions at odds with official union policies, with a possible exception of when this threatens "the union's well-being."

Policy 58 — Restrictions on Union Members and Officers

The ACLU doesn't believe union membership (or qualification for union office) should ever be contingent on a member's beliefs. Only action taken against the union should count against members, and mere advocacy is not the kind of action meant. (Which makes me wonder what the exception in the previous policy could be about.)

The government may not punish unions for having members with certain beliefs. Specifically, the ACLU condemns the Communist Control Act of 1954.

Policy 59 — Government Employment

Government employees also have the right to organize into unions and strike. Teachers are specifically mentioned here.

Policy 59a — Government Trusteeships of Labor Unions

If a union is unable to follow the kinds of standards in Policy 54, the ACLU points at "government supervised elections or trusteeships" as a remedy. This may be temporarily necessary to clear out criminal racketeering control of a union and return the union to legitimate democratic status.

An alternative remedy would be court-supervised elections. Either way, there is a danger of the government causing harm to civil liberties, so this policy includes a list of relevant guidelines to guard against that.