1. M is the moral thing for me to do, and M is not in my best interest. (premise)
2. M is the moral thing for me to do. (1)
3. M is not in my best interest. (1)
4. It's the case that agent A ought to do X iff X is in A's best interest. (premise)
5. It's not the case that I ought to do M. (3 and 4)
6. It's the case that X is the moral thing for A to do iff A ought to do X. (premise)
7. It's not the case that M is the moral thing for me to do. (5 and 6)
Yikes! Something has gone wrong here, since (2) and (7) are in direct contradiction.
Denying the (Possibility of the) Premise in (1)
This is the route taken by some theists who believe it is essential to morality that God will step in and make it be the case that acting morally is always (eventually) in our best interest, and vice-versa. Usually by means of a reward and punishment afterlife. Reincarnation schemes can work too.
I positively affirm that sometimes acting morally is not in one's best interest now or later, so I'll need to deny another premise.
Denying the Premise in (4)
This premise equates what one 'ought' to do with what is in one's best interest. But 'ought' in what sense? I maintain that 'ought' always takes an end, which might be in order to fulfill one's own best interest, or in order to comply with the law, or in order to improve the happiness of society, etc.
So I do deny the premise in (4), unless the end involved is something like in order to fulfill one's own best interest.
Denying the Premise in (6)
Finally, this premise equates what one 'ought' to do with what's the moral thing for one to do. I give the same answer as before: it will depend on which end the 'ought' takes.
I deny the premise in (6), unless the end is a moral end. Which ends are moral ends? No need to answer that in general now. There's a more specific issue at hand:
Is in order to fulfill one's own best interest a moral end?Answering 'yes' to this would supply one of the missing premises which would then force me to deny the possibility of (1), even with my end-relational view of 'ought.'1 But I answer 'no' for the same reason I affirm the possibility of (1): I maintain that moral 'oughts' can be true even against an agent's own best interest.
Saving a drowning child is still what I morally ought to do, even if I don't have a guarantee that my own best interest is thereby promoted. I invite opponents to openly disagree with this.
Wait a minute, why not just give the drowning child example up front instead of going through the whole argument analysis rigmarole? I wanted to show that affirming (1) doesn't lead to a contradiction. It would also take affirming (4) and (6), which is consistent with denying the possibility of (1) but isn't forced by affirming (1).
Simply put, I can separate my own best interest from moral rightness...if I consistently distinguish my own best interest from moral rightness. I do so with the crazy notion that the moral thing for me to do has to do with the best interests of everyone affected, without privileging myself.
1. We would have to add that fulfilling one moral end gives the same result as fulfilling moral ends in general. The 'ought' in (4) would also need to be specified as having the best interest end I mentioned.
I’m curious to see how your position handles a similar but different objection (though one, the gist of which, might hold irregardless of whether theism is true.)
ReplyDeleteLet’s say that the following two propositions are true (they are at least plausibly so)
A) In order to preserve life, S ought to not murder
B) In order to eradicate life, S ought to murder
Now, we’d typically cast moral blame on S for committing murder, and moral praise (or at least blamelessness) on S for not committing murder. But if end-relational oughts are all morality boils down to, isn’t this arbitrary? Why is it blameworthy to pursue one end and not another on this view?
Now perhaps S committed murder but S actually had the preservation of life as a goal. Would S be blameworthy now? Yes, in a sense, but what S suffered from was only a rational short-coming. Perhaps then, moral praise or blame is reducible to rational praise or blame? If this is the case it seems plausible that people could have goals that rationally oblige actions that are morally wrong (or certainly are if we take our intuitions seriously).
Let’s say that S has eradication of life a goal. S ought to murder to achieve this goal. But if moral blame reduces to rational blame, S is not at fault if she follows this course of action. After all, given her goals murdering is the rational thing to do. So S would not be culpable. But this seems absurd.
Alternatively if moral blame does not reduce to rational blame but is instead conferred in relation to objective ends-relational ought propositions (such as A and B), designation of blame is arbitrary. For again, what reason is there to blame her for conforming to B and not A?
Put sequentially
1. Moral blame is conferred either through failing to conform to an objective ends-relational ought, or in correspondence with rational blame.
2. It is arbitrary to confer moral blame through failing to conform to an objective ends relational ought.
Supporting argument for premise 2:
2.1. For any end that is optimally reached by X, there is an end that is optimally reached by ~X.
2.2. Therefore, relative to different ends S ought to X or ~X
2.3. Therefore, absent any additional reason why S ought X over ~X, it is arbitrary to blame S for doing X rather than ~X
Back to the main argument:
3. If moral blame is reducible to rational blame then morally reprehensible actions are potentially blameless.
Supporting argument for premise 3:
3.1. Y is a morally wrong action
3.2. It is possible that to reach some end E, S rationally ought to Y
3.3. Moral blame reduces to rational blame
3.4. S is rationally blameless in doing Y
3.5. Therefore S is morally blameless in doing Y (even though it is morally wrong)
Back to the main argument:
4. Therefore moral blame is either arbitrary or absurd.
@Martin
ReplyDelete.."2.3. Therefore, absent any additional reason why S ought X over ~X, it is arbitrary to blame S for doing X rather than ~X"
Within end-relational theory, yes it would be arbitrary. The only way we can truthfully say a person ought to promote end A over end B is that our new 'ought' refers to an end C which is better promoted by the promotion of A than by the promotion of B.
So we get a kind of regress problem that prevents us from using end-relational theory alone to conclude we ought to do X over ~X. The selection of ends has to come from outside this theory of truth conditions for normative language.
I look at it like this:
moral ends + end relational theory -> moral 'oughts'
Attitudes of moral praise and blame are reserved for only certain ends a person might try to promote, not for any old ends a person might promote with rational skillfulness.
There are a variety of possible theories of what makes an end count as a moral end and how we assign blame. I wish moral philosophy were more focused on those questions, separated out from the question of what makes normative statements true (end-relational theory solves this already).
.."But if end-relational oughts are all morality boils down to, isn’t this arbitrary?"
I hope it's clear by now that I don't think end-relational oughts are 'all morality boils down to.' If someone did claim that, your argument would be a good challenge to bring up.
By the way, a person could construct a divine command theory which makes use of end-relational theory while defining moral ends according to God's attitudes, intentions, commands, etc.
ReplyDeleteYou said it here
ReplyDelete"Simply put, I can separate my own best interest from moral rightness...if I consistently distinguish my own best interest from moral rightness. I do so with the crazy notion that the moral thing for me to do has to do with the best interests of everyone affected, without privileging myself. "
Of course you did not mean it as a crazy notion, did you? This is pretty much what most people mean (regardless of how they theoretically define it) when they mean a moral end. This, in ethics, is called the "moral point of view". That is the justification for Rawl's contractarianism, Railton's social rationality or, for that matter, Fyfe's desirism (which treats all such moral ends as side-effects of people's desires, as instrumental)
@faithlessgod,
ReplyDeleteRight, I didn't actually mean it's a crazy notion.