[Series Index]
Worldviews
The term 'worldview' has been defined in various ways, but essentially it has to do with beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality and one's place in it. It's a bit like 'religion,' but doesn't necessarily include divine spirits, and worldviews may be significantly different among people in the same overall religion. The idea that the world is getting better would be part of a worldview, as would the idea that the world is getting worse...or the idea that these labels are inappropriate. Worldviews may include both descriptive elements (the way things are) and normative elements (the way things ought to be). It's a very broad and loosely defined term that's used to indicate major differences in people's views of the world.
What relationship does science have with worldviews?
Let's look at two popular answers in western culture...
[T]he Christian worldview, which believes that God created the world with natural "laws" and orderliness, is what undergirds the entire scientific enterprise. For example, inductive reasoning and the scientific method are based on the assumption of the regularity of the laws of nature. This means that scientists assume that water will boil tomorrow under the identical conditions that it does today. Without this kind of regularity, we could not learn from experience, including the experiences of scientific testing. This also helps to explain why in cultures where creation is said to be an illusion or disorderly chaos because it was not created by an orderly God, the sciences have not historically flourished; indeed, the scientific method depends on the kind of underlying worldview that a creating and providentially ruling God of the Bible provides.1And...
Science in general does not so much reject the supernatural as ignore it. Science cannot incorporate the supernatural into its methodology; it could not function if it had to contend with occasional violations of natural law, but must instead assume that nature is regular and repeatable. This assumption is known as methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is not a choice; science cannot function if it is not empirical, that is, ultimately based on experiment and observation. Science necessarily restricts itself to purely naturalistic explanations.2So in one answer, science must assume a certain kind of God created and rules over the physical world. In the other, science must assume everything that happens in the physical world has a non-supernatural explanation. I contend — along with Gauch — that both of these answers are wrong.
Necessary and Unnecessary Presuppositions
Instead of focusing on the differences in the two answers above, consider the common ground: an orderly physical world in which experience counts toward understanding how it functions. Sound familiar? This common ground matches the fundamental presupposition of science featured in Part 6 of this series:
The physical world is orderly and comprehensible.Both answers above make the mistake of adding a reason why the physical world is orderly and comprehensible. The physical world could be orderly because an orderly God made it that way, or because an orderly nature explains it all. Either worldview can supply the necessary precondition.
In fact, most actual worldviews can. The real enemy to scientific method is not any popular worldview; it's radical skepticism. This might come in the form of philosophical worries about sense data being systematically unreliable, a religious conviction that God planted intentionally misleading evidence 'to test our faith,' or any other variant which goes against the fundamental scientific presupposition above.
In an excellent journal article on the topic, Gauch summarizes the dangers of putting worldview-specific restrictions on science:
Unnecessary presuppositions of science can hinder discussions of important issues from progressing, erode the proper influence of evidence, blur the distinction between presuppositions and conclusions, undermine science's status as a public endeavor, and pick needless fights regarding religions and worldviews.3But methodological naturalism IS worldview neutral!
...or so the argument goes, usually from those who hold a naturalistic worldview. Since my own worldview is naturalistic, let me share a few considerations which changed my mind on this point.
- If Deism were true, i.e. if God created an orderly physical world and doesn't intervene further, there wouldn't necessarily be any way for us to find out. The world might be completely indistinguishable from a naturalistic world. Therefore, 'methodological Deism' could serve just as well as 'methodological naturalism.' Would naturalists accept this terminology as non-biased toward 'philosophical Deism,' the belief that Deism is true? I sure wouldn't.
- Conducting science under an 'as if' methodology produces 'as if' results. Anyone who doesn't accept naturalism — most of humanity! — would rightly question whether scientific results are true, or merely would be true if naturalism were true.
- It is more sensible to understand science's wariness about supernatural explanations as a matter of historical experience, not an in-principle exclusion. I highly recommend Boudry et al.'s paper on re-construing methodological naturalism in a defeasible role, rather than as a hard restriction on scientific method.4
1. Driscoll, M. and Breshears, G. (2010). Doctrine: what christians should believe. Wheaton, IL: Crossway. p. 80
2. Young, M. and Strode, P.K. (2009). Why evolution works (and creationism fails). Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press. p. 40
3. Gauch, H. G., Jr. (2006). Science, worldviews and education. Science & education, 18(6). Also see the book of the same name.
4. Boudry, M., Blancke, S., and Braeckman, J. (2010). How not to attack intelligent design creationism: philosophical misconceptions about methodological naturalism. Foundations of science, 15(3). [copy here]
Two points.
ReplyDeleteI don't really understand your "beef" with the term "Methodological Naturalism". Whether you want to justify it a priori or (like all of us apparently do) a posteriori, MN is a sound scientific practice. Young scientists shouldn't be taught to examine supernatural explanations for their empirical problems, just in case MN is false. And "Methodological Naturalism" is a good name for that. "Methodological Desim" doesn't fit, since we're looking methodologically for natural causes, not superantural ones, even if the ultimate cause is superantural.
Secondly, the religious won't change their opinion about science because of this nomenclature. Orthodox Jews (with which I quibble most) don't accept MN as a principle because they don't accept the regularity of nature. They maintain it breaks down precisely at the points where miracles occur, so science can't go there.
You said previously that everyone that agrees that a pedestrian was killed because he was run over by a car accepts the assumptions of the scientific method. This is not the case. The religious accept this way of reasoning only up to a point, and at exactly that point they break away from the scientific method.
It is simply not true that there is "near universal" acceptance of the Fundamental Proposition - at least not in the same meaning of "orderly" that science truly uses, since at least the time of Gallileo and the start of the Scientific Revolution: the sense of a universal law of nature. This, and not choice of terminology, is at the root of the disagreement.
With Galilleo came a shift of worldview, the creation of a Scientific Worldview that sees the world's "Order" as underlaid by mathematical universal laws of nature. This poured meaning into MN, and led to the immensly successfully Scientific Revolution. The religious, on the other hand, hold a different worldview, where the Order is more organic and laws of nature may be breached at singular cases. Science done under MN is impotent to convince them, as all they need do is add enough miracles and all evidence is explained away.
This very-real dispute is the heart of the dispute over MN. It won't be solved by word-games. And it stems directly from the difference in worldviews.
Yair
"If Deism were true, i.e. if God created an orderly physical world and doesn't intervene further, there wouldn't necessarily be any way for us to find out. The world might be completely indistinguishable from a naturalistic world. Therefore, 'methodological Deism' could serve just as well as 'methodological naturalism.'
ReplyDeleteThis is a very important point, and I don't understand why people don't "get" this.
Furthermore, why would methodological naturalism be different from the God of compatibilism? IOW, if free will is false (as both methodological naturalism and compatibilist theology imply), then why wouldn't God have pre-ordained "apparent interventions"? For example, let's assume for sake of discussion that the walls of Jericho really fell when the Hebrew's blew their trumpets. Let's also suppose that the walls of Jericho fell due to subterranean erosion that had been working for decades, and not due to the horns blowing. Nevertheless, why would we rule out a compatibilist God from pre-ordaining both events to happen simultaneously in order to make himself known to future people?
As Yair says, the big disconnect comes in whenever people insist that God can only reveal himself by violating the Laws of Nature. As far as I know, that idea is new with Hume, and wouldn't have been recognized by theologians prior to 1748.
Yair,
ReplyDeleteI figured this post would provoke some objections! I can explain my 'beef' by presenting a dilemma: _Could_ evidence and logic ever indicate a non-natural explanation?
Yes — Then why keep science from following the evidence and logic where they lead?
No — Then why would science need an extra rule against something impossible?
By my count, methodological naturalism is either unnecessary or overly restrictive.
.."Whether you want to justify it a priori or (like all of us apparently do) a posteriori, MN is a sound scientific practice."
The Boudry paper distinguishes between MN as a presupposition (Intrinsic MN) and as a "provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists" (Provisory MN). If you're open to the latter, then we might not need to argue about whether it's a presupposition of science.
As for the rest, I don't see how occasional miracles contradict the idea that the physical world operates in a lawful manner. Or how the scientific revolution required giving up the first idea in order to adopt the second.
" _Could_ evidence and logic ever indicate a non-natural explanation?"
ReplyDeleteSure. But what does this has to do with MN?
Perhaps one needs to distinguish two levels here, let's call them Ideal Science and Practical Science. Ideally, you'd check all possibilities including supernatural ones. In practice, you're limited so you're adopting heuristics to aid your search and MN is a major one.
MN determines the kind of hypotheses and problems you're setting out to explore. But it is not a blindfold. In the course of regular research, under MN, it is possible in theory that phenomena would be discovered that would invite non-MN scientific hypotheses. And of course, in rare cases supernatural hypotheses are tested directly, such as in prayer trials. So yes, ultimately evidence can lead regular, respectable science to a supernatural theory. This is perhaps less likely than if we sought out this (hypothetical) supernatural theory to begin-with, but that's the price for using heuristics (or, really, any past "knowledge" that turns out to be false).
So - Yes.
"Yes — Then why keep science from following the evidence and logic where they lead?"
Because we're operating under limited resources. It pays to limit and direct the search in ways that are productive.
"No — Then why would science need an extra rule against something impossible?"
For the same reason. It pays to have a rule that say "don't try to fly by jumping off the cliff and waving your hands", not because flying in this way is possible but because it will save lives that can be put to better use investigating other ways to fly.
"By my count, methodological naturalism is either unnecessary or overly restrictive."
It is extremely restrictive. But whether it is OVERLY restrictive depends on what the world is like. To the best of our knowledge this far, the world is Natural, so restricting ourselves to Natural causes is not OVERLY restrictive at all.
"If you're open to the latter, then we might not need to argue about whether it's a presupposition of science. "
*shrug* It is not a presupposition of Ideal Science, up there in the clouds. In the real-world, in the scientific method in practice, MN is a presupposition in practice. So - what's in a name?
Yes, in principle MN is an a posteriori inferrment, a scientific theory, however vague. In practice, however, it is part and parcel of the Scientific Method in most domains and questions, and there is no point to disguise that fact.
...
...
ReplyDelete"As for the rest, I don't see how occasional miracles contradict the idea that the physical world operates in a lawful manner."
Miracles, as violations of the universal uniform laws of nature, violate the idea that the world operates in accordance with universal uniform laws of nature. That's just logic.
"Or how the scientific revolution required giving up the first idea in order to adopt the second."
Well, that's not quite what happened. The scientific revolution replaced an organic, intentional, intelligent and anthropocentric Order with a mechanistic, blind, cold, heartlessly uniform Order. Whereas before it something was "natural" to the extent it was ordinary, now it was "natural" to the extent that it was borne out by this uniform layer underlying reality. It is only against this new background that "miracle" now begins to be seen not as mere serendipitous concurrence, but (at least also) as phenomena freed from the shackles of the rigid fundamental Laws.
The success and vigor of the Scientific Revolution is due in large part to the Methodological Naturalism that this new Scientific or Mechanistic Worldview suggests.
What was necessary, therefore, was to abandon the Organic worldview, in order to engage in the (far more fruitful) Scientific Method WITH Methodological Naturalism.
Strictly speaking, yes - one can continue to hold theistic worldviews such as Teleology, Occasionalism, or Anthropocentrism and conduct science under these lights. In practice, however, MN only really flows from the Naturalistic worldview, and is by far the most successful approach. As rationalists, we must be willing to accept that some day this may change - but until it does, there is simply no sense to adopting these unsupported worldviews, as they do not lead to successful science.
In the real-world, therefore, the Scientific Method in Practice, which includes Methodological Naturalism, is very much tied to Metaphysical Naturalism, and succesfull can only proceed under different worldviews by cognitive dissonance and flimsy theology.
Yair
Yair,
ReplyDelete.."It is not a presupposition of Ideal Science, up there in the clouds. In the real-world, in the scientific method in practice, MN is a presupposition in practice. So - what's in a name?"
It sure sounds like you're defending PMN (Pragmatic or Provisory MN) not IMN (Intrinsic MN), as the Boudry et al. paper defines the terms. I don't have a problem with that. The type of methodological naturalism I'm arguing against in the post is IMN.
I should also point out that 'presupposition' — as Gauch uses the term — is restricted to assumptions scientific inquiry can't possibly address. In other words, if scientific method turns up evidence in favor of naturalism, then naturalism necessarily can't have been a presupposition of scientific method. Same deal for the highly counter-intuitive discoveries in physics over the last century.
.."Miracles, as violations of the universal uniform laws of nature, violate the idea that the world operates in accordance with universal uniform laws of nature. That's just logic."
Only if miracles were supposed to be natural violations of natural order. I don't see a problem with the natural world operating according to universal, uniform laws...unless an outside agent intervenes.
Of course such interventions could conceivably keep us from figuring out how the natural world would operate on its own. Suppose a supernatural agent just makes a star disappear once a decade. We would — under PMN — keep looking for a natural explanation and never find one. On the other hand, an outside agent who wants to communicate with us could also personally inform a prophet about which star is going to vanish next. And this pattern just keeps happening as our understanding of physics otherwise fills out.
The real dividing line between IMN and PMN is whether there will ever come a point where hugely increasing weight of evidence for a supernatural agent gets to count as a scientific theory.
Yes, I am defending PMN. I want to stress, however, that MN IS part of the Scientific Method In Practice; the justification is P instead of I, but the point is that MN really is part of the method and we should not hide that fact.
ReplyDeleteI do believe IMN is essentially justified at the abstract level, on grounds of the incoherence of the entire "supernatural" label and God concept. However, this is irrelevant as this does not preclude Aliens (as in "Outside of Our Universe", perhaps) that are, for all practical purposes, Gods - and similar "analogs" that provide philosophically acceptable varieties of "supernatural" staples.
While science cannot truly establish its presuppositions scientifically (for reasons of circularity), it can check itself for consistency. If scientific research, for example, would have shown that human memory is so bad that it cannot serve as a foundation for the scientific method, then science would have cut its own underpinning and would have collapsed under its own weight. For this reason, I won't go so far as to say science can't "address" such presuppositions, although of course I agree with the main message.
Finally, as to miracles, well... It is the mechanistic worldview that leads to MN, and with it to the real success of the scientific method. Occasionalism can serve as a substitute since it's so damn close, but it ultimately is in conflict not just with MN but with the greater scientific method itself. If Theism is correct, only the Organic view really makes sense, and under this view the "truths" this method can achieve are superficial at best. This is why you hear the religious speak about "other ways of knowing" - they don't really admit to the scientific method at all, even as they pretend (even to themselves) that they do. And for good cause. It doesn't really make sense if theism (and the Organic worldview) are correct.
It is only the evident success and number of secular scientists, operating under the mechanistic worldview, that keeps not just the MN but also the scientific method itself alive. If it wasn't for that, science would have died of neglect and forgotten in favor of "spiritual" concerns, and in time even its practical applications would have been forgotten and lost; this is what happened for the Romans/Byzantines, and the Arabs too.
Yair
Yair,
ReplyDeleteYou were making perfect sense right up until this part:
"If Theism is correct, only the Organic view really makes sense, and under this view the "truths" this method can achieve are superficial at best. This is why you hear the religious speak about "other ways of knowing" - they don't really admit to the scientific method at all, even as they pretend (even to themselves) that they do. And for good cause. It doesn't really make sense if theism (and the Organic worldview) are correct."
What is that even supposed to mean? What is the "organic worldview", and why on earth would it be the only worldview that makes sense under theism?
Also, this doesn't make much sense to me:
"It is only the evident success and number of secular scientists, operating under the mechanistic worldview, that keeps not just the MN but also the scientific method itself alive. If it wasn't for that, science would have died of neglect and forgotten in favor of "spiritual" concerns, and in time even its practical applications would have been forgotten and lost; this is what happened for the Romans/Byzantines, and the Arabs too."
You seem to be implying that religion and a mechanistic worldview are incompatible.
JS -
ReplyDeleteReligion and a mechanistic worldview are incompatible. Which is not to say that people won't hold both at the same time - people are weird that way. But there is an inherent tension between the two, and this is why I believe that if a religious society is left to its own devices (without secular or even just technological-need pressures) science will atrophy and disappear within it.
The "Organic" view sees reality as more of an "organism" (in the pre-science, folk-concept, meaning) than a machine. It stems from the idea that God the creator is a Person, and his creation is hence a multi-leveled work of art, a symphony that need not adhere to any rigid structures or rules. Any and all Theistic religions, when left to their own devices, therefore focus on understanding the different levels, and especially the spiritually meaningful ones, through non-scientific means - such as natural theology and teleology, exegesis, mystic experiences, sermons and meditations, and so on. The pursuit of science is devalued, but just as importantly the mindset these "different ways of knowing" foster is one that is incongruent with the pursuit of science. Mystic exceptions and miracles gradually become the norm, teleology undermines causality, and the entire Fundamental Assumption is turned on its head. The Order and values fostered by the Organic worldview is incompatible with the Scientific Method.
This is a caricature that draws the extremes, and of course in real-life there would be variety and cognitive dissonance galore. But still, at the fundamental level a Personal deity is incompatible with the skeptical, objective, impersonal, causality-oriented approach of science. There may still be Order, and it may still be Comprehensible, but it is no longer comprehensible by skeptical scientific inquiry. At the least, such inquiry will miss out on the key aspects of reality, and will thus fail to Comprehend it. At the far end of the the logical and social entailment (an end that will surely never be reached in practice) the entire objectivity and regularity of nature are undermined in-principle (even if not in-practice) so that the entire method is rendered absurd.
"Religion and a mechanistic worldview are incompatible."
ReplyDeleteThis is obviously false. You should be able to list several existing religions that are completely compatible with a mechanistic world view.
I think you're getting confused between "religion" and "violations of the laws of nature".
Belief in violations of the laws of nature is not religion -- it is incoherent superstition. Superstition is a characteristic of some religions, but is by no means exclusive to religion. Superstitious "magical thinking" seems to be nearly as popular among atheists as among theists.
"The "Organic" view sees reality as more of an "organism" (in the pre-science, folk-concept, meaning) than a machine. It stems from the idea that God the creator is a Person, and his creation is hence a multi-leveled work of art, a symphony that need not adhere to any rigid structures or rules."
This sounds like something you read from a Joseph Campbell book, and not a religion that any people follow. And we've already established that "religion" and "mechanistic worldview" are orthogonal categories.
"At the far end of the the logical and social entailment (an end that will surely never be reached in practice) the entire objectivity and regularity of nature are undermined in-principle (even if not in-practice) so that the entire method is rendered absurd."
You're saying that the existence of an omnipotent and eternal lawgiver would undermine, in principle, the objectivity and regularity of nature. Good luck defending that claim, or finding anyone else who defends it.
Yair,
ReplyDelete.."Yes, I am defending PMN. I want to stress, however, that MN IS part of the Scientific Method In Practice; the justification is P instead of I, but the point is that MN really is part of the method and we should not hide that fact."
As I've been saying, that's fine. The last two posts have been on presuppositions, and MN only counts as a presupposition if it's the 'intrinsic' version. It (or its cousin) can still function as an empirically-motivated part of scientific practice.
.."I do believe IMN is essentially justified at the abstract level, on grounds of the incoherence of the entire "supernatural" label and God concept."
If so, then you'd have a general philosophical justification for rejecting the possibility of supernatural causes, as opposed to something science-specific.
.."If scientific research, for example, would have shown that human memory is so bad that it cannot serve as a foundation for the scientific method, then science would have cut its own underpinning [….]"
Wouldn't that be an impossible scenario?
.."It is only against this new background that "miracle" now begins to be seen not as mere serendipitous concurrence, but (at least also) as phenomena freed from the shackles of the rigid fundamental Laws."
I'm not buying that, since — from the start — the Christian religion was largely based on the idea of a miracle that is naturally impossible, not just the equivalent of a synchronicity sign.
I do grant that some religious views and many religious people are a drag on scientific inquiry, but I don't see it as the stark dichotomy you're making it out to be. At least, I would need to be convinced into seeing religion as essentially anti-scientific. Let's just say I'm feeling postmodernist enough today to be skeptical of the metanarrative you're painting. ;)
JS Allen -
ReplyDeleteI don't expect to convince you, but I believe that high-minded theological concepts like "eternal lawgiver" play second fiddle to folk practices and needs. When it comes to the social effects of religion, academic theology is almost meaningless. What is meaningful is that the worldview that the two major world religions (Christianity and Islam) promote is founded on the idea that the world is the creation of a Personal deity, a deity that is a person, that cares about YOU and US, and (nearly always) that one can have a personal relationship with. This is not some theological mambo-jumbo about the nature of god, this is a very tangible idea that has very tangible repercussions - which include, IMO, ultimately an Organic worldview and the devaluation and undermining of science. All the fancy theology in the world won't save a religious society from heading down these paths, just like all their fancy theology didn't help Catholics reject pagan practices (they incorporated them instead). Theology is impotent before the social pressures, and will chance to fit the needs of society rather than the other way around.
I do concede that "religion" is too broad a stroke - there are religions that don't promote this core element in their worldview, and for these my argument won't apply. But they are inconsequential, at least in the West, and not what I had in mind.
"Belief in violations of the laws of nature is not religion -- it is incoherent superstition. "
What is incoherent is a violation of a descriptive Law of Nature. A violation of a Universal Uniform "Law of Nature" (i.e. that failure of such a description), however, is very much coherent. And as this is the Order that underlies the (modern) mechanistic worldview, all (theistic) religions are incompatible with the mechanistic worldview.
This isn't important by itself. What is important is the nature of the difference, which is that the difference is between folk-psychology and folk-physics intuitions. That is a difference that makes a difference, a difference that pushes the modes of understanding and representing the universe to different paths.
As I said, I don't expect to convince you, but I hope I've shown why I think as I do.
Yair
Garren Hochstetler -
ReplyDelete"If so, then you'd have a general philosophical justification for rejecting the possibility of supernatural causes, as opposed to something science-specific."
Quite so. But again, this is inconsequential in practice.
"Wouldn't that be an impossible scenario? "
I don't think so. Not by presupposition. We certainly do run experiments to test people's memory, and it isn't that great. These experiments could show any level and quality of memory. If reality was such that these experiments showed disastrously poor memory, then we would be exposing an inconsistency in the scientific method. We wouldn't even be able to believe our memories of these experiments...
"I'm not buying that, since — from the start — the Christian religion was largely based on the idea of a miracle that is naturally impossible, not just the equivalent of a synchronicity sign."
It is clear that the ancients did have a concept of "violating the way nature usually works", and that this was one kind of miracle. But without an intuitive concept of a Universal Law of Nature, it was just not the case that such miracles was conceived as "naturally impossible" - there was [outside of early Greek philosophy] no concept of "natural" for contrast here. Every thing was really a miraculous phenomena, supported only by God, and manifested only at his Will. What we now consider "naturally impossible" was therefore perceived more as "unusual", "extraordinary" - that is all. The brokering of peace between two sworn enemies was just as (or, nearly) as unusual. True, this is not mere serendipity - but it isn't far from it.
It is only with the formulation of universal uniform laws of nature that a clearer concept of "natural" emerged, against which a "supernatural" miracle could be construed as a violation of the natural order. The earlier sentiment, that as I conceded did exist, coalesced into a clearer form.
The import of all of this is not so much in the understanding of miracles, that merely got clearer and more nuanced, but in its mirror image - the understanding of nature. Only against this new mechanistic understanding of nature (recapitulating the ancient Greek conception, of course) was it possible to pour meaning into terms like "natural causes", develop MN, and launch the scientific revolution.
"Let's just say I'm feeling postmodernist enough today to be skeptical of the metanarrative you're painting."
Heh. I won't expect to convince you with a few blog comments, but I hope I gave enough to show the outline of my thought on this. A large part of my thinking on these issues is due to Richard Carrier's youtube lectures on the history of science, and Lindberg's "The Beginnings of Western Science" (none of them makes my claims, they just initiated them). Another pillar is private talks with an historian called Stuard Parker; he probably holds diametrical views, but really hammered in a better understanding of the "organic" worldview for me. No doubt, I'm also influenced by all the talk of atheism/religion incompatibility that is floating around atheist blogs.
Yair
Yair,
ReplyDeleteActually, I think I see your point.
"Theology is impotent before the social pressures, and will chance to fit the needs of society rather than the other way around."
Of course, atheists do the same. The social pressures don't go away just because you switch to a different ideology. The answer, of course, is to continually fight superstition.
Having said that, science itself does have better checks and balances that make it far more difficult for superstition and social pressure to corrupt it.
"And as this is the Order that underlies the (modern) mechanistic worldview, all (theistic) religions are incompatible with the mechanistic worldview."
First, let me agree that theistic religion practiced by "man on the street" tends to be rather superstitious. But any theism that rejects libertarian free will would be entirely compatible with a mechanistic worldview. Rejection of libertarian free will is a creed professed by something like 100 million Christians and professed by close to half of Muslims. So the core professed belief of many theists is basically professing a mechanistic universe.
JS Allen,
ReplyDelete"Of course, atheists do the same. The social pressures don't go away just because you switch to a different ideology. "
But their expressions do. In a culture where the Supreme Deity is seen as impartial and uninterested in petty human affairs (e.g. Brahman), religious tendencies evolve into polytheism, relatively peaceful and accepting of other faiths. In a culture where the Supreme Deity is seen as interested in mortal affairs (e.g. Yahawa), people tend to adhere to the One True Way and enforce it by force. In a culture where no deity, supreme or otherwise, is thought to exist, people tend to turn to each other for aid - with good or bad results, depending on how wisely they do so (e.g. Norweigian socialism vs. Russian communism).
Culture matters.
"Having said that, science itself does have better checks and balances that make it far more difficult for superstition and social pressure to corrupt it."
Certainly. But looking at the "science" of communist Russia and Nazi Germany, I am not at all confident that these would suffice.
"But any theism that rejects libertarian free will would be entirely compatible with a mechanistic worldview. Rejection of libertarian free will is a creed professed by something like 100 million Christians and professed by close to half of Muslims. So the core professed belief of many theists is basically professing a mechanistic universe. "
Perhaps. But as you say, this is not the religion as practiced on the street. I don't really care about the religion of the theologians.
Yair
"In a culture where the Supreme Deity is seen as interested in mortal affairs (e.g. Yahawa), people tend to adhere to the One True Way and enforce it by force. In a culture where no deity, supreme or otherwise, is thought to exist, people tend to turn to each other for aid"
ReplyDeleteI think this is highly oversimplified. I'm more persuaded by Popper's ides, that the primary threat to the good of humanity is totalitarian thinking -- the belief in one idea (religious or otherwise) to the exclusion of others. Unbridled belief in pure laissez-faire Capitalism has caused a tremendous amount of human misery, as has a religious belief in communism.
"Perhaps. But as you say, this is not the religion as practiced on the street. I don't really care about the religion of the theologians."
I mentioned the 100 million figure specifically to challenge the idea that this is a "religion of the theologians". That still leaves up to 90% of the Christians whose belief is incompatible with a mechanistic worldview, but the remaining 100 million are a lot more than just "theologians". And the Christians who profess anti-libertarian creeds tend to be less involved in politics, culture, or proselytization (with some notable exceptions that prove the rule).
So I'm agreeing with you that a mechanistic worldview is critical for scientific process. But I think that religion itself is not the primary enemy of mechanistic thinking. It's not even accurate to say that anti-libertarian religious thinking was a reaction to scientific thinking -- John Calvin's anti-libertarian writings were prominent and influential in England shortly before Francis Bacon was born.
"I think this is highly oversimplified. I'm more persuaded by Popper's ides, that the primary threat to the good of humanity is totalitarian thinking"
ReplyDeleteIt's quite simplified, and of course you (and Popper) may be right. But I was not gunning for "The Source of All Evil"; merely pointing out "an" evil, one causal chain among many.
"the remaining 100 million are a lot more than just "theologians"."
I'm frankly doubtful that those 100 million truly, at the personal level, reject libertanian free will, or that all of those who do also accept the mechanistic view. But even if I accept it at face value, what this leaves us with is 10% (say) that find it possible to accept the mechanistic view, and this in an age where that view is strongly supported by pressures from the success of science and the need for scientifically-based technology. That's... not very impressive.
"I think that religion itself is not the primary enemy of mechanistic thinking"
If religion isn't the primary enemy of mechanistic thinking - what is? It certainly appears to me that the objections to it are overwhelmingly coming from religious grounds. I fully grant that some religious currents don't object to mechanism, but the objections that do arise (and, IMO, will inevitably develop and dominate) do stem from religion.
"John Calvin's anti-libertarian writings were prominent and influential in England shortly before Francis Bacon was born"
As an historical note - John Calvin (1509-1564) adopted Predestination that while a close-cousin to the Mechanical worldview was not quite it. Wikipedia apparently maintains that "Universal mechanism" was first advanced prominently Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) (that's news to me). At any rate the two views are distinct enough to matter - there is a difference between everything being determined in advance, and the world working like a machine. It is only the latter that works so well to drive science.
Yair
"I'm frankly doubtful that those 100 million truly, at the personal level, reject libertanian free will"
ReplyDeleteHere we get to the crux of the issue. You can say exactly the same about the scientists who claim that the universe is mechanistic. If pressed, many (maybe half) of them will concede that there is no such thing as libertarian free will. But it's hard to tell if they "truly, at a personal level" reject libertarian free will.
The stubborn belief in libertarian free will has, in many ways, hampered scientific advance. It is no surprise that many of our best scientists are people who have/had Asperger's and didn't believe in libertarian free will in the first place.
"If religion isn't the primary enemy of mechanistic thinking - what is?"
IMO, the answer is obvious. We have a deep bias toward belief in libertarian free will, and this bias is very difficult to shake. Belief in libertarian free will is fundamentally opposed to a mechanical universe, because you open the door for all sorts of teleological explanations. You even hinted at this in your comments above about "super alien".
"As an historical note - John Calvin (1509-1564) adopted Predestination that while a close-cousin to the Mechanical worldview was not quite it."
I'm not saying that Calvin created the model, but Calvin decisively removed the greatest roadblock -- belief in libertarian free will. It's hard to overstate the impact that this was having on England in the time of Bacon, Hobbes, etc. In 1534, Henry VIII completely split the Church of England from the Church of Rome and built the new Church on Reformed creeds.
The creeds professed by the new Church of England were an explicit denial of libertarian free will, which was completely revolutionary. The creeds insisted that every act of the human will was predestined. For Bacon and Hobbes, this revolution was as fresh as the memory of the Vietnam war is for us. The revolution in mechanistic thinking simply couldn't have arisen in Rome or any other place where libertarian free will was still taken for granted.