Can science discover moral facts?
Carrier is following Sam Harris' lead by putting this provocative claim in the title, and — like Harris — doing some philosophy first to analytically reduce moral facts to scientifically-accessible components. So the really controversial steps are philosophical rather than scientific.
I'm familiar with moral philosophy. Give me the short version!
Moral facts are whichever hypothetical imperatives correspond to an individual's deepest desires. Human-universal moral facts exist because all humans share a set of deepest desires. Since science can investigate both hypothetical imperatives and desires, science can discover human-universal moral facts.
What makes 'ought' claims true?
Let's start by looking at conditional 'ought' claims (aka hypothetical imperatives).
If you want to wake up in time for work, you ought to set an alarm clock.So if I really do want to become a doctor and there really is this connection between studying diligently and becoming a doctor, then I really ought to study diligently. Carrier points out that both of these prerequisites are open to scientific investigation. "And wherever both are an empirically demonstrated fact, the imperative they entail is an empirically demonstrated fact."1 This means that science can discover 'ought' facts, not just 'is' facts.
If you want your car to stay put, you ought not park in a tow-away zone.
If you want to become a doctor, you ought to study diligently.
What makes an 'ought' claim a moral 'ought' claim?
The majority view has been that moral 'oughts' are different from the above kind of 'oughts' because they're not conditional on what a person wants. Carrier disagrees on the grounds that any system of imperatives which doesn't line up with what a person most wants can't count as morality, because that person will "have a better reason to do something else instead."2
Instead of viewing morality as something that stands in opposition to our desires, morality has to do with what fulfills our deepest desires. It's just that, sometimes, we're mistaken about what promotes our own deepest desires. "What we really want most, and what will really obtain that, are matters of fact that cannot truly be answered from the armchair. Empirical methods must be deployed to ascertain and verify them. Only science has the best tools to do this."3
Doesn't this make morality an individual thing?
Even if morality is grounded on the individual level, there may still be universal moral facts if some moral facts apply to every individual. (Or at least human-universal moral facts if all humans share some moral facts.) Carrier argues that it's likely all humans have the same set of deepest desires.
"Only if what an individual wants most (when rational and sufficiently informed) is not the same as for everyone else will this not be the case. Then, a different set of moral facts will be true for them (yet even then true moral facts still exist, they are just again relative to different groups or individuals.) But that outcome is very improbable for members of the same species."4Carrier's justification for this statement is hard to follow, but it goes something like this:
Humans share many biological facts, and these facts generate a hierarchy of high-order desires that we're stuck with, i.e. we can't just change them without altering our natural humanity. "For example: we all need to eat, breathe, move, think, and cooperate and socialize with a community[....]"5 The way these fundamental desires play out for individuals may differ, but we share our most basic biological needs.
Biological differences among humans aren't sufficient to change these high-order desires, at least not without extreme genetic mutation.
Environmental differences only make a difference in how our fundamental human desires play out. Same algorithm; different results. If I had lived life in your shoes, I would want most the things you want most.
So, ultimately, only our shared human biology determines our high-order/foundational/deepest desires, which in turn determine what is morally right for all of us in general terms, and what is right for each of us when applied to our individual situations. To use one of Carrier's examples, we all have fundamental desires to eat and to avoid pointless harm, which might make it morally right for me to eat strawberries but morally right for you to avoid eating strawberries because you're allergic to them; we're both following the same basic imperatives of eating and avoiding pointless harm, which means there is no real difference in moral facts here.
...
To review, Carrier believes moral facts are open to scientific inquiry because his metaethics reduce moral facts to facts about the effectiveness of means to ends (hypothetical imperatives) and psychology (what a person most fundamentally desires). This would be enough to explain how moral facts "naturally exist" and how "science could find them," but he goes one step farther and argues that humanity shares one set of moral facts.
Carrier's chapter is followed by an appendix containing, as he puts it: "formal deductive proofs of every one of these conclusions, fully verifying that they are necessarily true."6 I appreciate his boldness! Still, I disagree with his moral philosophy at several points, as I will explain in the next post [which is here, but only covers one point of disagreement].
1. Carrier, R. (2011). Moral facts naturally exist (and science could find them). In Loftus, J.W. (Ed.), The end of christianity (pp. 333-358). Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. p. 335
2. ibid. p. 343
3. ibid. p. 342
4. ibid. p. 351
5. ibid. p. 352
6. ibid. p. 334
"I disagree with his moral philosophy at several points, as I will explain in the next post. "
ReplyDeleteAs I largely subscribe to his metaethics, I am looking forward to hearing your critique!
My major point of contention with him is that I believe human beings inhabit a spectrum of "basic desires", e.g. sociopathy. So instead of the One True Morality, we end up with an Adjustable System, where each user must set the dials balancing the different desires and psychological components to suit his own idiosyncratic psyche. I have a few other bones to pick, too - but overall, I agree with Carrier.
I do find him annoying. Which is frustrating in that he actually has very smart and interesting things to say IMHO. It's just that he writes (and speaks) like a teenager. "Fully verifying that they are necessarily true" my ass.
Yair
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ReplyDeleteMoral facts are whichever hypothetical imperatives correspond to an individual's deepest desires. Human-universal moral facts exist because all humans share a set of deepest desires.
Carrier is a joke. Why is he bizarrely associating desire with moral truth? We desire water, sex and power. So do penguins and cockroaches. It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether we ought to, with morality.It can be convenient that we all feel certain ways, or almost the same, but again, nothing to do with morality at all.
Why has he confused economics and science with morality???
And how exactly did "happiness" become the ultimate criterion and equated with morality? That's been an absurd assumption since Socrates.
He also is clueless to the idea that, even if you accepted his bizarre definition of morality, and ranking of happiness, there would be multitudes of conflicting methods to achieve those desires for everyone. There's no moral system there at all.
Moral facts are what it is true we Ought to do even if terrible for me and others, not merely conditionally because I desire those things. Under Carrier's ridiculous system, I ought to kill my biggest competitor, even though morally I Ought never to do such a thing - assuming you can invent such a moral system.
(Carrier then begins to assert mystical absolutes, which ultimately rely on Christian inventions of individual worth, to get around such obvious disasters for his moral preaching.)
>>any system of imperatives which doesn't line up with what a person most wants can't count as morality, because that person will "have a better reason to do something else instead."
That just shows he's on a wild goose chase. Again, no connection to
morality there at all.
>>fundamental desires to eat
>>morally right for me to eat strawberries
This is idiotic. Just because I had Indian for lunch doesn't mean it is "morally" true I ought to be near a toilet at 2pm. It's just a good idea for a few reasons.
Don't you find it utterly bizarre that an atheist is preaching morality like Christians? Doesn't that make you question his atheism?
We are just another bug on a rock in space for a brief moment in time. There is nothing we Ought to do.
"To use one of Carrier's examples, we all have fundamental desires to eat
ReplyDeleteand to avoid pointless harm, which might make it morally right for me
to eat strawberries but morally right for you to avoid eating
strawberries because you're allergic to them; we're both following the
same basic imperatives of eating and avoiding pointless harm, which
means there is no real difference in moral facts here."
Firstly, on atheism, eating would be considered right if one wanted to survive and fulfill our goals. Why is it even objectively moral to survive and fulfill our goals/desires? Atheism has no objective answer to this, since the answer is based on subjective foundations.
Secondly, Carrier hasn't objectively defined "pointless harm". Is it pointless harm when we kill animals in order to eat them? Is it pointless harm when we take the life of plants in order to eat them? Since atheists are subjective agents, therefore, the standard to define "pointless harm" becomes subjective. This leads to absolute chaos, because one can easily argue that cannibalism becomes moral, if it is the only way to survive (i.e. as in the: "R v Dudley and Stephens" case).
Thirdly, just because we have fundamental desires to do things doesn't make them objectively morally right. For example, the enlightened robber (who knows he can probably get away with it) can have a desire to steal cash from someone, to help fulfill fundamental desires. Does it become objectively morally right to steal? Most atheists including Carrier would presumably find it objectively immoral. But we'll disagree whether or not this is moral, because we are subjective agents, which shows that the criteria/foundation for morality is subjective, hence, on atheism, morality is subjective, not objective.
Lastly, on atheism, what objective reason is there to think human flourishing is objectively moral? On atheism, we are simply a by product of time, chance and matter. If a person blows a child to death in the middle of no-where, all that's happened is that nature has rearranged the collocation of atoms that used to be a child. An atheist has to have FAITH that human flourishing is the objective standard to make moral or immoral judgment.
Thank you for your comments, Ronald! Some responses:
ReplyDelete> "Firstly, on atheism, eating would be considered right if one wanted to survive and fulfill our goals."
Atheism doesn't come bundled with an ethical system to justify saying "On atheism..." and give a value judgment. If you're referring to Carrier's ethical views, that's fine, but you shouldn't conflate his views with what is given by atheism.
> "Why is it even objectively moral to survive and fulfill our goals/desires? Atheism has no objective answer to this, since the answer is based on subjective foundations."
I find the terms "objective" and "subjective" to only be useful as a set of vague verbal gestures, especially when it comes to moral philosophy. Their definitions are fuzzy enough that most ethical systems can be classified as "subjective" or "objective" depending entirely on how those words are being applied at the moment. They're more useful for rhetoric than for clear communication of ideas.
> "Thirdly, just because we have fundamental desires to do things doesn't make them objectively morally right. For example, the enlightened robber (who knows he can probably get away with it) can have a desire to steal cash from someone, to help fulfill fundamental desires. Does it become objectively morally right to steal? Most atheists including Carrier would presumably find it objectively immoral"
I wouldn't presume that about Carrier. You might find the notion repulsive, but there are usually uncomfortable implications to any ethical system laid out in significant detail. What you did would be like me telling a Christian that she presumably disagrees with a certain Christian ethical system because it implies moral approval of genocide in certain situations.
Overall, I don't think you're doing a very good job of engaging with Carrier's specific approach.